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ABSTRACT 
 
Conventional views on state-formation examined within nation political and resource 
constraints to assess changes that took place.  In my dissertation, I explored how 
external stressors such as international treaties affected domestic legal reforms.  By 
creating a dataset of 235 treaties involving European, Asian, North American, and 
South American states, I juxtaposed the restructuring process of three Asian countries 
– China, Japan, and Korea to global trends in trading and diplomacy.  I used Chi-
square tests of variance to deduce that geographic origins of the treaty partners 
affected the types of treaties signed and the level of symmetries for treaties. The year 
of when the treaties were signed also had an effect.  Further, treaties tended towards 
mutual benefits around the early 20th century as cross-regional tensions declined.  By 
the end of the 19th century, treaties specified to form categories such as arbitrage, 
consular, delimitation, and extradition treaties.  China, Japan, and Korea’s varied turns 
in the 20th century address how even if external partners approached a nation with 
asymmetric levels of power, the way in which a nation addressed these provocations 
mattered.  In times of external threats, a nation, restructuring its political and social 
infrastructures prevented the nation from losing its domestic sovereignty.   
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PREFACE 
 
Treaties as Literature 
 
  Techniques for textual analysis in literature apply to qualitative analysis of 
legal texts.  Quantitative and qualitative analysis of treaties inform scholars of the 
laws’ impact.  The qualitative assessment of the treaties examined the syntagmatic, 
which are the surface structures in the treaties.   The parts within the treaties are 
paratactic structures such as interchangeable sentences.  The paratactic axes as it 
pertains to the syntagmatic structure of the text evolved to where treaties from 
disparate parts of the world mirrored other treaties involving wholly different sets of 
nation-states.   
 Writing about nation-states at the macro level poses additional challenges.  
When I stepped outside the text to analyze the implications of the treaty (the exegesis), 
I used nations and occasionally individual diplomats as grammatical subjects.  As 
Nietzsche noted in the Genealogy of Morals, the problem of subject led writers to 
appropriate roles to a subject when it is more often complex interpolated entities that 
yielded such results.   The grammatical subject is a “little changeling” (Nietzsche 
[1887] 1956).  I often use nations as subjects when in fact a group of elite men 
frequently demanded the outcome treaty negotiations and other events.  The countries 
themselves became actors as did clauses, legal enactments, and individual persons.  
The readers shall excuse the shorthand I used for the grammatical subject throughout  
the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 1 
PROJECT OVERVIEW 	  
Introduction 
 In my dissertation, I examine how Euro-centric conceptions of statehood and 
international law became a dominant set of practices for conducting inter-state relations.  
To capture how international legal practices were established, I study an aggregate of 19th 
century bilateral treaties from Asia, Europe, and Latin America.  Treaties chronicled the 
encounters of two or more nationally based legal institutions during times of conflict and 
cooperation.  Unlike Asian interstate relations, which was based on hierarchies, the a 
priori notion of “Western” style treaties was that nations, prior to engaging in treaty 
relations, were independent and sovereign.  Legally, treaties performed both contractual 
and legislative roles.  Legal scholars and government officials conceived treaties as 
contracts between two or more sovereign nations.  Upon ratification, provisions in the 
treaties required countries to accommodate inter-state relations within the domestic 
legislative spheres.  Through the proliferation of treaties, the norms and conditions for 
diplomacy, commerce, and criminal justice became more standardized.   
 The dissertation examines the impact of 19th treaties in two ways.  First, I 
examine at the macro-level how western legal traditions evolved as the dominant form of 
legal organization globally in the 19th century.  By examining 235 treaties from various 
regions, I evaluate patterns for international relations that emerged throughout the 
century.  Second, I focus on Asia’s transition from the suzerain state system to the 
international system and how legal transactions allowed Japan to colonize Korea.  Korea 
was recognized as a sovereign state for a decade before Japan officially annexed it in 
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1910.  Japan’s colonization of Korea occurred through treaties that extracted economic 
resources from Korea.  Economic goals accelerated the inter-state relations and 
encouraged multiple nation-states to contact Asian states in the 19th century.  
 Six chapters comprise the dissertation.  The first chapter discusses why treaties 
provide insight for socio-political transformations, international relations, sovereignty, 
and legal history.  I provide historical background for the treaty systems of the 19th 
century.  I describe the dataset I constructed using 235 treaties signed from 1783 to 1912.   
The earliest treaty included in the dataset is the Paris Peace Treaty, which ended the 
American Revolutionary War, from 1783.  The last treaty in the dataset is the Whangpoo 
Conservancy Administration Agreement, a multilateral treaty between China and 11 
Western nations of 1912.  The treaties involving Asian, European, North American, and 
South American nations were of historical significance and also pedestrian transactions.  
The offices of the foreign secretary published treaties in these special volumes.  From 
there, I strove for a representative sample of treaties signed during the 19th century.   
Data Collection 
 By constructing a dataset of 235 treaties that were mostly concluded in the 19th 
century between sovereign nations, the dissertation discusses the trends in international 
agreements.  The treaties comprised seven major categories – peace, extradition, 
navigation, commerce, and friendship, commerce, extradition, and others.  Bilateral 
treaties, as openly accessible source of data, provide the main source of evidence for the 
dissertation because treaties highlighted activity of international relations.  Treaties 
captured much of the context and content of international relations.       
 I assembled a nearly exhaustive sample of treaties between Asian and European 
nations from the 19th century. The treaties between European and postcolonial Latin 
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American states countered the treaties between European and Asian nations.  The content 
of the treaties are tabulated for mainly symmetric versus asymmetric results.  Each treaty 
had information for about 10 to 30 provisions out of 64 that I categorized.  I focused on 
29 key provisions, which included key features of the 19th century treaties such as the 
most favored nation clause, extraterritorial jurisdiction, arbitrage, extradition, arms sales, 
opium regulations, religious freedoms, and consular representation. The range of 
provisions captured the variability in economic, diplomatic, and political emphases of the 
treaties.  
Chapter Summaries of the Dissertation 
 Also in chapter 1’s literature review section, I discuss my theoretical orientation 
at the macro-level.   International relations scholars often examined problems at the state-
level.  Likewise, I include state-level implications of international treaties with an 
emphasis on treaties’ effects on domestic politics.  I outline realist, liberalist, and 
constructivist perspectives of international relations and evaluate how the models fit in 
with 19th century sovereignty norms.  Sociological literature explored the theoretical 
praxis of economically weaker states interacting with stronger states via the world 
systems theory (Wallerstein 1984), how certain models for treaty writing are exported via 
the world society model (Meyer et al. 1997), and how an outsider orients him or herself 
in a foreign culture via colonial theory (Steinmetz 2008).  Legal scholarship also 
discussed why agreement does not guarantee compliance (Hathaway 2005).  Texts on law 
and imperialism, comparative state analysis, organizational learning, international 
relations, and historical accounts of East Asian societies defined the processes for coming 
to terms with Euro-centric definitions for sovereignty, independence, and autonomy.  
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 In the second chapter, I analyze key diplomatic, political, economic, and social 
trends of 19th century bilateral treaties.  Descriptive statistics of the treaties such as year, 
types of treaties, and number of articles in the treaties are also summarized.  I define legal 
and economic terms that the treaties featured.  The most favored nation clause, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, extradition, and delimitation become relevant terms for 
discussion in the quantitative and qualitative portions of the thesis.  
 Economic disparities were not the sole determinants for inequality in the world 
system.  Biases based on regional differences caused buffers in business transactions 
during the 19th century.  Unlike contemporary theories of regionalism (Clark and 
Beckfield 2009, Zhou 2011, 2013), tensions involving sovereignty and territoriality in 
Asia and Latin America made within region trade agreements skewed and asymmetric, 
where one party benefits more from the transaction than the other.  Despite Asian and 
Latin American nations’ similar standing among Europeans, Europeans treaties with 
Latin American states provided more reciprocal and symmetric outcomes for the most 
favored nation clause, extraterritorial jurisdiction, consular representation, and diplomatic 
privileges.  Though the European cultural seeds planted in South America occurred via 
harsh colonization, all of the elites in postcolonial Latin American states considered 
themselves European and maintained cultural allegiances to Europe through akin 
religious, artistic, and scholarly pursuits.  
 On the other hand, Asians were relatively unknown to Europeans, and most 
known accounts of Asia were replications and retellings of exotic travel logs that were 
often fictitious to begin with (Said 1978).  Unfamiliarity rendered more asymmetric 
treaties between Asian and European countries.  The Asian and European pairing had less 
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reciprocal outcomes in the most favored nation clauses (65%) and consular representation 
(78%) than treaties between Latin American and European countries, which were all 
reciprocal for both provisions.  The treaties between Asian and European nations 
benefited Europeans more. 
 Several key features of the treaty emerged from the treaties.  The most favored 
nation clause, an arrangement that mainly helped European states establish improve 
trading terms without arduous renegotiation subsided during the early 20th century.  As 
for consular representation, treaties after 1901 mentioned the clause less frequently.  
From 1861 through 1900, treaties established for both sides to send diplomats or special 
agents to handle specific tasks.  From 1881 to 1900, treaties mutually allowed local 
authorities to protect citizens from the other’s nation who may be residing within their 
jurisdiction.  Other issues such as opium was mentioned sparingly. Only 12 out of 235 
treaties banned the trade of certain goods such as opium or ginseng.  In one case from 
1869, opium trade was sanctioned between Austria-Hungary and China after Austro-
Hungary paid a tariff.  Important trends based on region and years accentuated the 
challenges that Asian nations faced while facing a new set of legal norms.    
 In chapter three, I discuss the historical significance of treaties that China signed 
during the 19th century.  China’s experience affected how other Asian nation-states 
interacted with European states.  Using primary and secondary histories of China, I 
describe tributary state relations, government, and commerce in Asia before treaty 
relations with Western nations.  After China signed the Treaty of Nanking with Great 
Britain in 1842 after the Opium War, the Chinese empire was furthered weakened as a 
result.  The decline of China from prominence to disarray occurred over several decades.  
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By the 1930’s, districts in China were under German, British, and Japanese rule and 
Chinese rulers’ central authority weakened.  
 In the fourth chapter, I discuss Japan’s signing of the Treaty of Kanagawa with 
the United States in 1854.  Japan went onto sign Ansei treaties of (1858) with the 
Netherlands, Great Britain, and Russia thereafter.  The early “unequal” treaties 
encouraged the Japanese government to revamp from feudalism under the Tokugawa 
Shogunate to a monarchy by reinstating the emperor in 1868.  Concurrently, the adoption 
of Western clothing, providing compulsory education, abolishing social classes, and 
relinquishing superstitious “Evil customs of the past” ensued (deBary et al. 2005, 137).  
By the 1870s, Japan emerged as an economic and military force in Asia. 
 In 1905, shortly before the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905) that ended the Russo-
Japanese war, the Japanese government held secret meetings with the United States to 
assure non-interference from the U.S. regarding Japan’s imperial interests.  Western 
nations noticed Japan’s increasing military might.  In 1910, Japan annexed Korea without 
Western dissent. Economically, Japan continued to grow.  By 1930, Japan’s involvement 
spanned from Manchuria to the eastern coast of China (Duus 1989, 5).  The Japanese 
strategically purchased factories and imposed export restrictions to influence China’s 
foreign affairs.   The Chinese and Japanese cases highlighted how colonialism was not 
necessarily a European impetus.  The conventional dichotomy of colonialism as a 
“White” versus “Other” distinction appeared unnecessary because similar levels of 
contention among geographically neighboring states also existed.   
Korea’s Treaty Relations 
 In the fifth chapter, I outline Korea’s historical intermingling where multiple 
imperial powers vied for control during the 19th century.  So to extend Skocpol’s (1979) 
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and Goldstone’s (1991) theories on state breakdowns that recognized in part the 
robustness of external forces, the Korean case supposed ways in which external forces 
were multidimensional.  Although treaties promoted sovereign equality among nations, 
some nations such as Korea suffered to lose its sovereignty.  Korea as a geographically 
advantageous location in Asia, multiple imperial interests from China, Japan, and the 
United States implemented laws differently to influence Korea.  
 Korea had close ties with the Chinese.  From the late 17th to 19th century, Qing-
ruled China was Asia’s economic, political, and intellectual center.  In 1637, Korea, 
named Choson at this time, entered tributary relations with China’s Qing rulers (Larsen 
2008).  In the 19th century, the Korean state was less stable than the Chinese state.  King 
Kojong of Korea who had begun his reign in 1863 as a young child turned the control 
over to Daewongun, the regent.  Daewongun, a strict isolationist, limited contact with all 
foreign states, including China.   
 Korean elites who opposed the break from China informed the Qing government 
of the military uprising against the government in Korea when Korea was recognized as 
an independent nation.  Chinese troops entered Korea to quell the Imo Mutiny of Korean 
soldiers in 1882.  From 1882 to 1885, the Chinese government was the imperial power in 
Korea.  The treaties signed at this time including the Overland and Maritime Trade 
Treaty in 1882 and another commercial treaty in 1883 between China and Korea reflected 
the tensions that Korea experienced after abandoning its traditional tributary relations to 
China.  A faction of the Korean aristocracy valued their formal ties with China.  In the 
Sino-Korean treaties, the texts alluded to the centuries of trade relations between the two 
nations where China set the rules.  
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 Japan viewed Korea as an independent nation as opposed to an extension of the 
Chinese empire.  Japan found Korea approachable.  In 1875, Japanese naval vessel 
named Unyo advanced to Korea and a skirmish ensued.  The Koreans signed its first 
Western style treaty a year later.  The Treaty of Kanghwa (1876) with Japan signaled to 
the “family of nations” that Korea was an autonomous and sovereign state.   Soon after, 
elites of the progressive Enlightenment party promoted Korea’s alliance with Japan. 
Korea’s Enlightenment Party led a violent coup in 1884 that resulted in several 
assassinations.  And mayhem ensued.  In over a few decades, Korean elites relinquished 
Confucian orthodoxy, accepted tenuous sovereignty, and developed radical perspectives 
to combat external influences. 
 In Asia and beyond, borders, military strongholds, and economic resources 
exchanged hands globally in the 19th century.  Treaties affected changes in Asia’s 
geopolitical networks (Collins 1995).  The shift in geopolitics features the downfall of 
China and the rise of Japan.  As Japan gained dominance in Asia, Japan began to export 
and import large volumes of goods in and out of China.  Through treaties, Japan 
eventually colonized Korea and 26 other territories in the Pacific.  Japan’s economic 
insurgence as well as military prowess aided its expansion.  The Euro-centric “family of 
nations” extended to include Japan by the early 20th century as a member (Gong 1984).  
 Another imperial interest in Korea appeared from the West.  In the midst of 
Chinese and Japanese factions forming within Korea, the United States entered Korea 
with cultural and economic motives.  In 1882 the United States concluded the Treaty of 
Amity and Commerce with Korea, which allowed among other opportunities, the 
settlement of Christian missionaries.  In his letters, American naval officer, George 
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Foulk, detailed the gruesome accounts of imprisonment and torture that transpired after 
the 1884 coup attempt in Korea.  Foulk befriended aristocratic Koreans and conversed 
with several Koreans who later studied in the United States.  Korean Christians allied 
themselves with Americans.  The U.S.-Korean treaty yielded more reciprocal rights than 
Korea’s treaties with the Japanese or Chinese around the 1880s.  Korea’s displacement 
from sovereignty to dependency portrays the significance of legal status in international 
relations.  
The sixth chapter of the dissertation summarizes the effects of bilateral treaties in 
Latin America and Africa.  Further, I discuss how the project ties in with contemporary 
studies on regional blocks in global trade (Clark and Beckfield 2009, Zhou 2011, Zhou 
and Park 2012).  Bilateral relations grew towards multilateral and region-based blocks of 
trade interests.  Treaties in the 21st century are criticized for their lack of overarching 
enforcement mechanisms beyond the sovereign states that wrote them. The current 
inefficacy in international law could be the result of 19th century law’s paternalistic and 
overbearing measures of enforcement.  In the past, bilateral and multilateral treaties 
implied that representatives from one party were present in the other’s country to enforce 
the conditions of the treaty.  To establish a mechanism in the modern legal climate where 
issues of human rights, environmental and sustainability issues, and financial markets 
need stronger checks, an examination of laws in the time of imperialism relay why law 
had been enforced differently then.  
Treaties across regions provided the evidence for the norm setting for 
international relations via the rule of law. By examining the contours of international 
relations between and among European, North American, South American, and Asian 
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states in the 19th century, patterns for the types of bilateral agreements emerged.  The 
themes that materialized out of the treaties were predominantly economic with key 
diplomatic and cultural stipulations.   
Limitations of the study 
 Though the dataset did not include observations on every 19th century treaty, 
about 235 treaties written in German, French, Spanish, English, and Korean were in the 
sample.  The focal region for the dissertation was East Asia. Therefore, 19th century 
treaties involving China, Japan, and Korea are extensively covered.  To compare 
European treaties with Asians, I included key treaties signed between Western nations 
and postcolonial Latin American states.   Additionally, treaties among Asian, North 
American, and South American nations are included in the analyses.  Treaties that 
involved African states were not in the dataset.  However, I discuss Christine Agwabu’s 
(1995) careful analysis of African treaties in chapter 6.  
Big Categories in International Relations 	   Paramount to the study of international relations (IR) is the concept of 
sovereignty.  In the Gentle Civilizer of Nations, sovereignty comes as a gift to non-
western reaches of the world.  The origins of sovereignty trace back to the Peace at 
Westphalia in 1648.  However the notion of the sovereign existed back in the 13th and 
14th centuries (Meron 1995).  In effect Westphalia synthesized several earlier treaties of 
Osnabrück and Münster using the principle of cuius region, eius religio that as a principle 
of the state system appeared in the Treaty of Ausburg in 1555 (Aalberts 2012, 11).  The 
earlier organization of political bodies was domains existed under the same Christian 
laws. The Treaty of Ausburg confirmed the secular component of ruling bodies without 
 	  
	  	   J.M.	  Park	  26	  
external interference.  Still, Westphalia exemplifies the triumph of skillful diplomacy.  
The category of sovereign statehood was more alleged than emphasized.  
 The Westphalian version of sovereignty had two dimensions. The first dimension 
is internal and reflects a government’s authority over a given territory.  The second 
dimension is external and implies that there is no overarching authority that guides 
interstate commerce.  The process is compared to a Janus faced traditional realist IR, 
where one side is a beautiful and orderly face while the other side shows anarchy 
(Aalberts 2012, 14).  Westphalia helped for nations to develop a legal personality that is 
considered the cornerstone of international law and also provide a basis for realist 
reasoning in IR.  State centered theories fail to be useful when states have domestically 
contested issues and weak internal sovereignty (Lake 2008).   	   Realists emphasize autonomy of nation-states and counter the notion with an 
anarchic system.  In terms of states interacting with and reacting to one another, theories 
in IR grossly simplified into realism and constructivism perceive the role of the state 
differently.  Constructivism is closely aligned with institutionalism and shares a norm-
based construction of reality.  As Strang (1991) noted, the realist and institutional 
perspectives offer different explanations for the expansion of colonies.  The “cultural 
constitution” of Western states that created “mutual recognition” was an institutional 
argument for how states chose to colonize certain polities versus others (Strang 1991, 
162).  The realist explanation would view that non-European polities bore little effect on 
the balance of power within Europe and that Europeans competed with one another to 
gain territories.  
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Realism 
 In a skeletal view, the realist approach is state-centered and associated with the 
maintenance of the balance of power.  As Wolforth (2008 Oxford handbook) noted, the 
four central propositions of realism are 1) groupism, 2) egoism, 3) anarchy, and 4) power 
politics (133).  States, the in realist model are rational self-interested actors endowed with 
“power capabilities” (Strang 1991, 145).  In theory, stability among nations is possible if 
each states holds equal power compared to the other states (Strang 1991, 146).  The 
hegemonic stability theory acknowledged that powerful states influence the international 
system (Wolforth 2008, 142).  The power transition theory, as a subset of the hegemonic 
stability theory, which is attributed Organski, examines the cyclical relationship to war 
and the changing power figures for the international system.  States take a different share 
of power in the international system and states rarely act on their own accord because it 
may destabilize the balance of power.  Realists emphasize autonomy of nation-states and 
counter the notion with an anarchic system.   
 Realism comes in many forms. Classical realism associated with E.H. Carr, Hans 
Morgenthau, and Raymond Aron, work with concepts built on power.  Kenneth Waltz 
and Robert Gilpin represented neorealism.  Mearsheimer considered offensive realism an 
offshoot of Waltz’s neorealism (Wolforth 2008, 139).  Defensive realists such as Van 
Evera (1999) and Taliaferro (2000) theorized that the rise of group identity through 
nationalism make it more difficult to conquer or subjugate other groups. 
 Sovereignty as the property of states exists prior to the international system and 
society according to Waltz, Wendt, Ashley, and other realists. However, governance in 
the 17th century as it is now required a multilevel approach.  It was misleading to assume 
horizontal sovereignty where all states are equal to another even in the plainly legal 
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sense.  The terms of the bilateral treaties examined in the dissertation highlight how 
sovereignty was a complex and contested issue.  The complexities arose from economic, 
territorial, and cultural distances.   
Materialism 
 The materialists include realists of international relations and the 
hegemonic/world systems theorists of sociology (Go 2008). Julian Go reviews the 
materialist perspective of colonialism as partial influences of the realist school of 
international relations that Morgenthau and Walt typifies and the sociological tradition of 
hegemonic power and world systems theories that Marx and Wallerstein typifies.  The 
realists would place more value on material facts such as economic and military 
resources.  In Morgenthau’s classical view (1978), countries with resources will 
continually expand (Go 2008, 204).  Realism diverges into two forms --  “offensive” and 
“defensive” realisms, where the offensive strategy shows that those with resources will 
expand.  The defensive school predicts that those constrained for resources will have to 
expand.  Either way, states are conceptualized as self-maximizing individualistic actors.  
 Self-interest may be primal, however, the acceptance and acknowledgement from 
other members of the international system are paramount.  Furthermore, the membership 
into the international society becomes a necessary investment for peripheral nation-states 
of 15th through 20th centuries.  Therefore different permutations of realism justify how 
certain forms of power predominate over time.    
Institutionalism 
 The two main subsets of the neoliberal institutionalism are social constructivism 
and English School (Stein 2008, 207).  Social constructivism relies on the formation of 
the international society based on interaction while the English School posits the 
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existence of an international society based on rules and norms.  Constructivists feature 
international law as a major institution.  Laws’ focus on private and public goods 
broadens the reach of institutions in international relations (Stein 2008, 214).  Historical 
institutionalism fits in with my goals to track the historical changes in legal and 
governing organizations internationally.   
 Sovereignty ipso facto is an institution based on agreed upon definitions for a 
state.  In Tanja Aalberts’s Constructing Sovereignty between Politics and Law (2012), the 
author parses the argument into the origins of sovereignty, the institution of sovereignty, 
its identity, linguistic turn, and subjective use of the term.  The types of sovereignty that 
Aalberts identifies remain more as perspectives for studying sovereignty.  Stephen 
Krasner’s approach examined the term sovereignty embodied contradictory assertions 
presenting itself under the veneer of organized hypocrisy.  Krasner identified two kinds 
of sovereignty, Westphalian and international legal.  Westphalian model represented the 
nation-state’s autonomous right to rule without outside interference.  International legal 
represents how exclusion is not complete since “mutual recognition of territorial entities” 
is first and foremost to sovereign status (Aalberts 2012, 37).  Furthermore, international 
legal sovereignty developed into interdependence sovereignty that refers to cross-border 
controls.  Westphalian sovereignty developed into domestic sovereignty.  Jackson’s 
positive and negative sovereignty referred to rights of authority and capabilities for 
control after nations are recognized as sovereign states.  
 Aalberts criticizes Krasner’s definition of sovereignty as being inflexible because 
it focused on material factors instead of norms and on behavior (2012, 38).  Krasner 
emphasized the material factors because sovereignty norms are often violated.  In March 
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and Olsen’s groupings, the logic of consequence remains more important than the logic 
of appropriateness (Aalberts 2012, 39).  Sovereignty, according to Aalberts, remains the 
domain of politics and law so it required a multidimensional approach that should 
examine how it has managed to evolve over centuries.   
 In essence, sovereignty is an abstract notion that as Berger and Luckman ([1966] 
1989) noted has gone through a process of reification.  As Douglas North noted, 
institution has formal rules such as laws and informal rules such as norms (Aalberts 2012, 
44).  As it lies, sovereignty is an institution because it is an abstract concept that conveys 
meaning for practitioners of international law.   
The English School 
 The English School within IR emphasized an approach of viewing nation-states as 
being a part of a cooperative international society.  Hedley Bull’s The Anarchical Society 
(1977) made the study of sovereignty as an interdisciplinary issue.  Bull tied politics with 
international law.  Necessarily, sociology, history, and ethnic studies also contribute to 
the discussion of sovereignty today.  Bull conceives sovereignty as a result of statehood. 
Sovereignty is a right, issued through 1) claims, 2) recognition, and 3) order (Aalberts 
2012, 50).  The English School is a juxtaposition of the neo-realist view where nation 
states compete for power and strive to survive in a disorderly anarchic system.  For 
scholars of the English School, rules, norms, and values are reified through discourse and 
the international system is kept healthy thusly.  The perspective of sovereignty as a form 
of membership prevents the system from becoming completely anarchic.  The norms 
refer to the standard of conduct or later the standard of civilization.   
 Interstate discourse is necessary for to create normative solidarism, which in turn 
may examine Westphalian sovereignty as almost a “straitjacket” (Buzan 2004, 8).  The 
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English School’s vision of the international society is not necessarily fully harmonious. It 
can be understood as an effort among nation-states to “agree to disagree” and maintain 
mostly practical ties with one another (Aalberts 2012, 50).  Society helps institutions 
maintain common goals that signal the existence of an international society (Bull 1977).      
 The English School’s answer to why there is cohesion in an international system 
that lacks an overarching governing system is “some enlightened form of interest that 
entails a normative element” (Aalberts 2012, 52).  The international society envisioned 
by the English School is akin to the establishment of customary law. The two elements of 
customary law are (1) a settled practice and (2) opinio iuris sive necessitatis or the sense 
of legal obligation (ibid).  Sovereignty is a regulative principle.  Sovereignty is not a 
given rule of states it is the mere “rules for coexistence” (Bull [1977] 1995, 35).   
 Why institutions matter is aligned with what actors may gain via the rules.  
Rational choice theory guides neoliberal institutional scholars such as Keohane and 
Ikenberry (Richardson 2008).  Ikenberry (2001) claimed that historical trends illustrated 
how “Power is exercised through rules and institutions,” where the hegemon’s power is 
approachable (Richardson 2008, 225).  Global organizations such as the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, the World Trade Organization, and the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation are elements of the spread of institutionalism that show how agreements 
concern multiple nations at once.  
 Institutional analysis examines more than the instance of whether physical 
organizations exist or not.   The intangible aspects of institutions rely on norms and 
meanings.  The cultural framework of the institutional approach reflected Oran Young’s 
sentiments for “easily identifiable rules.” The rules would be affiliated with certain 
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conventions (Strang 1991, 147).  Sovereignty embraced the notion of recognition that 
linked and connected nation-states with one another (Strang 1991, 148).  Therefore 
unrecognized polities suffer from high levels of instability before other nations properly 
warrantead the status of statehood.  Institutional approaches enlivened the world polity or 
the world society model of charted globalization through ideas.  
Constructivism in International Relations 
 The core attribute of constructivism was the “international reality is socially 
constructed” (Hurd 2008, 305).  As Ian Hurd (2008) described constructivism, the four 
distinguishing features of constructivism were 1) to oppose materialism of the neorealist 
and neoliberal traditions. Constructivists also 2) construed state interests systematically 
from both liberal (Moravcsik 1999) and realist (Krasner 1999) perspectives (Hurd 2008, 
303).  3) The mutual constitution of structures and agents represented the institutions and 
actors in the context.  4) The multiple logics of anarchy included a logic that the 
international system may not be anarchic.  
 The vast sociological literature on states, state formation, and international 
institutions mostly incorporates aspects of culture, which was less frequently 
incorporated in International Relations’ (IR) theories on statecraft.  Constructivism in IR 
highlighted norms and cultural categories to explain the impacts of economic and military 
power differentials.   Constructivists in international relations continued to discuss power 
even while discussing norm structuration.  Law carried power because it was able to 
structure a person’s perceptions in terms of framing how a person comprehended 
knowledge.  Additionally, laws extend to enforcement and punishment.  
 Constructivism in international relations infused cultural explanations the ties that 
form globally.  The philosophical foundations of constructivism according Adler came 
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from the belief that what we accepted as a material reality was based on perceptions 
(Berger and Luckmann 1966).  Constructivism as used in IR contains at least three layers 
– the metaphysical stance, social theory, and theoretical and empirical perspective.  The 
metaphysical stance asks what we can know about the social world.  The social context 
and the role of intersubjectivity affect international affairs (Adler 2002, 96).  In an 
empirical and theoretical perspective, the role of identities, norms, and institutions appear 
more relevant.    
Sovereignty within Constructivism 
 Alexander Wendt, a social constructivist, stated that the four legitimating aspects 
of sovereignty were role identity, collective identity, type identity, and corporate identity.  
Role identity speaks to the recognition process needed to become a sovereign state in the 
international system.  Collective identity comes as a part of a states’ recognition of 
themselves as a part of the international system.  The type identity refers to how social 
phenomenon, even if not new, attain new meaning once a term for it is generated.  
Corporate identity forms from similar yet distinct actors that combine as interlocking 
parts in a greater system.  Wendt goes on to list five features of a state as “an 
institutional-legal order; a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; sovereignty; society; 
and territory” (Wendt 1999, 202, Aalberts 2012, 76).  At least legally, sovereignty has the 
flavor of equality.  Dating back to the Montevideo Convention of 1933, the definition of 
statehood required the possession of a permanent population, defined sovereignty, 
defined territory, government, and “capacity to enter into relations with other states” 
(1933).   
 As Westlake had noted in The Principles of International Law (1894), a 
recognizable form of govern
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Koskenniemi notes, the facts of the social world are not automatically present (Aalberts 
2012, 81).  In the first half of the 19th century, legal scholars such as von Martens, 
Klueber, and Kaltenborn agreed that European states were divided into sovereign nation 
states, so the effort to establish laws governing over the sovereign nations seemed futile.  
Hautefeuille insisted that international law had “divine and primitive” origins that further 
suggested that it would be impossible to have a set of guidelines to regulate “all people of 
the universe” (Hautefeuille in Koskenniemi 2002, 30).  In agreement with these concepts, 
Hobson noted that nationalism leads to internationalism (1938, 11). 
Connections to Historical Sociology 
 The logical connections between international relations to historical sociology 
connect pieces from each discipline to the other.   Hobden and Hobson (2002) challenged 
sociologists’ use of international relations theories for being based on chronofetishism 
which posited that the present can be understood by only examining the present 
circumstances (Hobson 2002, 6).  They also criticized tempocentricism, which examined 
the past through the lens of the present (Hobson 2002, 9).  Sociologists and 
constructivists often share a norm-based approach.    
 As Michael Barnett noted, the constructivists needed to develops theories that 
connected the state to the society, examined political economies, and assessed the 
autonomy and importance of international organizations (Hobson 2002, 26).  A. Claire 
Culter emphasized law from the critical theory perspective.  She argued that the study of 
international law in international relations had been ahistorical since the primary 
assumption was that law was an instrument for the state.  In fact, law was part positive, 
built up of somewhat arbitrary but standardized rules, and customary, built up from local 
customs and practices.  Historically assessing the development of international law 
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removed the chronofetishism that Hobson faults with current interdisciplinary work 
between international relations and law.  
 Constructivism does not clearly define the studies’ unit of analysis as the state or 
any other entity.  With constructivism, international relations scholars lost the thread of 
positivism and scientific claims for significance that IR scholars attributed to the their 
theories.  The scientific positivism that generations have upheld had been socially 
constructed as well (Knorr-Cetina 1981).  Therefore, the world of ideas and beliefs 
weighed the evaluation process. As a more sociological approach in IR, constructivism 
connected to the world society model (Kratochwil 2008, 446).   As the founder of the 
Stanford School, John Meyer proposed the detailed impact of Western institutions such 
as law and commercial interests that extended Western concepts as legitimate modes of 
governance, education, and public policy.  
World Polity  
 A macro-level approach is applicable for the project.  The globalizing theoretical 
orientation of World Society also known as the world polity model as John Meyer 
proposed, added traction to the discussion of law in international politics.  Meyer et al. 
(1997) analyzed the nation-state as an institutional form that diffused.  Based on the 
Western liberal and democratic model, the features of the nation-state such as a national 
constitution, democratic elections, and compulsory elementary education, the authors 
argued spread since World War II (Meyer et al. 1997, 148).   
Sovereignty within World Polity Model 
 As a legal institution, sovereignty is set up through documents such as the 
national constitution that sets the foundation.  The constitution spread as a global process 
(Ramirez and Boli 1987) and represents a national sentiment (Norton 1993).    
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Sovereignty as a social construction still requires the audience and states that are able to 
recognize other nations.  Hence, “middle ground constructivism” mediates the positions 
of rationalists and reflectivists (Adler 1997).  Rationalists accept the existence of states 
and examine the role of the state separate from their values.  Reflectivists question the 
processes that constructed the knowledge base and entertain notions of subjectivity into 
the process.   But cultural phenomena are just as objective as material resources since 
they are all inclusive in the “real world” (Wendt 1999, Aalberts 2012, 72).  
 Meyer et al.’s institutional perspective added to three established approaches.  
The microrealist analysis, which is a part of international relations, macrorealist 
arguments from the world systems theory and state competition theory, and 
microphenomenological approach informed the authors’ approach to the nation-state and 
cultural transpositions.  The microrealist view premised the existence of the nation-state 
in an anarchic system. Nation-states were rational actors that had local or national 
cultures (Meyer et al. 1997, 146). From the macrorealist view, the state reacted to 
external economic, military, or political pressures instead of acting in accordance to 
national values.  Here culture held the position of hegemonic ideology.  The 
micropheomenological approach prefaced the importance of culture but casted culture as 
a local or national level effect.  Unlike previous approaches, the world society model 
developed avenues for understanding patterns as a form of diffusion that operated at the 
nation-state level.  World society responded to the state level analyses of the realist 
school in international relations.   
 Distinctively, the world society approach constructed the nation-state as actors 
that constantly reified themselves based on cultural markers such as citizenship rights, 
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socioeconomic development, and criminal procedures (Meyer et al. 1997, 148).  Though 
the authors did not define culture forthrightly, the implied definition examined ideas that 
promoted certain legal codifications such as human rights standards.  The actors as 
individuals or nation-states used scripts instead of self-directed initiatives to motivate 
change.  Often the role of the nation-state was to change and adapt constantly.  The 
authors noted that the properties of the culturally constituted nation-state were to exhibit 
a degree of isomorphism in structure and policy and vary to become rational.  
Inadvertently, nation-states decoupled in purpose and structure or intentions and results 
(Meyer et al. 1997, 152).  The expansive structuration in a standardized way attributed to 
the institutions transferring globally before the ideology of the nation-states matched the 
purpose or intents of the project.  Moreover, the central government may direct the 
expansive structuration of unrealistic five-year plans that fail to meet the needs of 
citizens.  But the five-year plans promoted growth in idealized world cultural norms such 
as improved gross domestic products, extended national education, and increased exports.  
Still much of the project relied on post-World War II developments of state building that 
privileged democracies.  
 The world society scholars discredited internal changes affecting global 
dynamics. Because the “’internally’ generated changes are infused with world-cultural” 
concepts for proper conduct (Meyer et al. 1997, 160).  The strong emphasis of Western 
“correctness” implied that the less widespread norms to be inferior.  The rejection of 
dominant world cultures which are notably Western and Christian norms, the authors 
viewed still followed some script for social order and purpose. Furthermore, the authors 
contended that the script of social movements followed the Western standards for 
 	  
	  	   J.M.	  Park	  38	  
organizing.  However, Meyer et al.’s division of nationalist and religious organizations 
discounted the contentions existing within a nation-state over national or religious 
teachings.  Therefore, the world polity model somewhat overlooks religion and other 
forms of rational or irrational knowledge.    
 Meyer et al. (1997, 169) did not distinctly substantiate the varying nuances in 
cultural and ideological inconsistencies around the world.  Nation-states following 
proscribed scripts are important to note, however, the level of contention that is felt 
domestically regarding what are often legal changes are not easily absorbed into the 
existing social and national cultures.  What Loveman (2005) labeled “symbolic power” is 
significant since the central bureaucracy at early stages of nation building cannot wield 
enough power to have citizens act in accordance to the written law.    
 Global norms mature into practice and acceptance.  Recent sociological studies on 
human rights treaties (Cole 2005, 2012, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005) highlighted a 
popularly legislated law that had not been regularly practiced.  The case of human rights 
violations within nation-states that passed international treaties and domestic laws to 
protect human rights standards captured the gap between ratification and compliance.  
Why nation-states agreed to sign onto human rights treaties followed three major lines of 
arguments (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005, Hafner-Burton et al. 2008).  The first 
argument examined how powerful liberal nation-states forced the resource-deprived and 
repressive regimes to agree to treaty conditions.  Hafner-Burton et al. discredited the 
power politics model because powerful liberal regimes are not signed onto human rights 
agreements themselves.  The second line of theorizing understood the tactical aspects of 
the “liberal approach” in signing onto human rights treaty (Moravscik 2000).  But 
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statistical evidence cannot support the claim for regimes agreeing to human rights 
protections before institutions for enforcements are built up domestically.  The third 
thread was an “ideational” approach that emphasized societies learning to value the 
content of the law.  The “ideational” approach anticipated repressive regimes to change 
their minds about human rights violations (Hafner-Burton et al. 2008, 121).  
Constructivism from international relations (Finnemore 1996, Katzenstein 1996) 
developed the “ideational” approach.  Studies on human rights treaties examined how 
economic power converged around ideas and norms. 
 The world society model, nonetheless, remains a fruitful theoretical orientation in 
that even though ideas do not always directly travel from the source to the peripheries, 
the logic of legitimacy remains true in the realms of international law and finance.  As I 
examined the treaties, I noted that during the span of the 19th century, Western legal and 
business procedures usurped prior norms in several Asian states.  Since the 16th century, 
Western ideas travailed practices in South America (Mahoney 2010) and Africa (Agawu 
1995).  Meyer’s theories conceptualized the logics for formal and informal empires. In 
informal empires, soft power (Nye 2004) from a dominant world power influences the 
actions of other nation-states.  In formal empires during the 19th century, scientism and 
positivism mandated certain Weltanschauung.  
 Studying empires requires an interdisciplinary approach.  Go (2008) bridges 
multiple approaches in sociology and IR.  His contribution was appending a field 
approach to macro-level historical analyses of world society and world systems theories.  
Go, as part of the Michigan School, added Bourdieuian field analysis to the study of 
empires and globalization.  Go grouped materialist orientations towards globalization as 
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the world systems theory in sociology (Wallerstein 1984) and realism in international 
relations (Go 2008, 204).   The institutional approach included world polity or world 
society model (Meyer et al. 1997) and constructivism in international relations.  In sum, 
institutional approaches in sociology and IR provide rationale for material consequences 
for nation-states. 
Organizations and Nation-States 
 Through treaties, high contracting parties engaged one another.   Literature in 
organizational learning provided useful terminology such as knowledge acquisition, 
information distribution, information interpretation, and organizational memory (Huber 
1991).  However, the theories lacked substantial empirical testing.  This article tests how 
nations as an organization acquired knowledge of the Western international system.  
Even if the process was not voluntary on both sides, contact with new ideas provided 
opportunities for re-interpretation and other institutional changes.  As Feldman and 
Kanter (1965) noted, an organization seeks "additional alternatives when the 
consequences of the present alternatives do not satisfy its goals" (622 [1991]).  For 
nations, a breakdown in the existing structures and the loss of support from the nations’ 
elites led to macro-level restructuring (Skocpol 1979, Hobden 1999).   
 The introduction of new legal terminologies drastically affected Asia’s 
compliance with modern international law and the types of relations that ensued.  The 
game of language in sovereignty remains strong not only in debates across the realist to 
liberalist spectrum.  The game is not only an aspect of the game theoretical and rationalist 
model found in international relations today.   
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Positivism  
 Despite the polysemy of institutions such as economics, politics, and status 
groups, which make up a state, legal institutions fundamentally define the state as an 
entity in the international system.  Gerritt Gong’s (1984) analysis of European legal 
treatises highlighted Westerners’ perceptions of Asians as progressing towards 
civilization. He studied how international law professors and practitioners in the 19th 
century created categories for semi-civilized nations (Gong 1984).  Positivism in law and 
social science motivated unwelcome discourses regarding eugenics and incorrect 
assumptions about race.  In the 19th century, social commentators such as Gobineau wrote 
racist tracts on miscegenation and racial hierarchies, which influenced public perceptions 
and legal scholarship (Young 1995).  Positivism and eugenics promoted ideas of the 
cientificos in Mexico, which resolved to expunge superstitious beliefs in Latin America 
(Meade 2010, 153).  Positivism, in part, was an effort to deemphasize the dogma of 
Catholicism as well as folk religions.  Strict scientism invalidated organic cultural  
 The French colonial mind developed amidst debates among racial theorist such as 
Le Bon and Gobineau in the late 19th century (Thomas 2011, xiv).  Lorcin (2011) added 
to the discussion of French colonialism that the discourse had been more masculine and 
women’s voices were silent (15).  In general, colonialism in the Middle East, Africa, or 
Asia had focused on “artificiality” of the colonial state (Jabri 2013, 93).  And the 
emphasis of social scientists had been on political mobilization or intellectual discourse.  
More and more the discussion detracted from material consequences and the validity of 
legal agreements.  
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Differing Orientations to Law 
 International relations acknowledge law’s significance differently.  Sociological 
approaches to the study of law, examine how cultures construct and attribute meaning to 
legal practices.  Sociology of law made strides to include cultural and social structures 
into legal rationales.  The focus on colonial law has been limited.  The lack may be 
attributed to the amount of contextual understanding needed to address 19th century legal 
norms.  In pre-modern and colonial states, law’s reach differed according to the nation’s 
bureaucratic organizations and the person’s social status within that nation (Cassel 2012, 
8).  Creating bonds through treaties allowed Europeans to forge relationships with Asian 
states (Anghie 2004, Halliday and Osinsky 2006, Koskenniemi 2002, Peters 2009). The 
gradual implementation of written law superseded oral agreements in Asia, which 
affectively led formal law to become an inescapable aspect of modern life globally.  
 Different schools of sociology recognized the global reach of international law.  
Halliday and Osinsky (2006) identified world polity, world system, law and economic 
development, and postcolonial studies as the four major perspectives on globalization, 
which included some analysis of law.  In postcolonial studies, hybridization of law, 
where laws of multiple countries inform each other’s legal systems towards change, is the 
product of globalization (Liu 1999, Nakamura 2004).   
Postcolonial studies and the Law 
 In postcolonial studies, even though the colonizing and colonized nations had 
incongruent legal orders i.e. legal pluralism, such that foreigners in China followed one 
set of legal practices while the Chinese followed local customs, the convergence of law 
i.e. hybridity where Western legalists accommodated local customs in Asia had not been 
widely theorized.  Postcolonial theory remains marginal in international law and the 
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third-world perspectives in international law (TWAIL) is small (Anghie 2004).  Law did 
not hold a central place in postcolonial theory either, although historians are increasingly 
studying law (Cassel 2012, Dudden 2005, Larsen 2008, Liu 1999). Instead of eschewing 
psychoanalysis of the subjugated persons (Bhahba 1994, Dudden 2005, Duara 2003, Said 
1978) and the material consequences of economic relations (Hobson 1938), legal 
agreements captured the spoken and unspoken standards for subjugation and economy 
practices.1  Historians of contested sites concentrated on precarious legal conditions such 
as legal pluralism (Griffiths 1986, Heuschert 1998), where more than one legal order co-
existed. The production of new legal codes contributed to colonial legacies. 
 In contested sites, law has had to intervene. Postcolonial studies emerged from 
India and other former European colonies where laws were directly imposed to quell 
uprisings.  The “Rule of Law” as it applied to colonies had its own inherent 
contradictions.  Especially for the British, “Rule of Law” kept power as a right that 
Britain extended to local rulers.  But these applications of law changed political dynamics 
within a state.  Women’s rights and family law in post-colonial North African states 
adapted to assuage some national preferences in the former French colonies (Charrad 
2001).  Laws occasionally led to violence.  In India and Egypt, legal entanglements with 
the British included treaties signed from years 1856 to 1882 that resulted in wars (Hussin 
2009).  Actions before and after the signing of treaties affected national economic and 
political outcomes.  
For the United States, America’s geographic distance from Korea prevented the 
United States from investing heavily in Korea.  The United States’ practice of foreign 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As Marco Sassòli noted, “There can be empty written rules, but never empty unwritten rules” (1990). “Es 
(kann) wohl nichtssagende geschriebene, nicht aber nichtssagende ungeschriebene Normen geben” from 
Bedeutung einer Kodifikation für das allgemeine Völkerrecht 187 as appeared in (Villiger 1997). 
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diplomacy used economic relationships as a key feature.  The U.S. primarily desired the 
most-favored nation status from China, Japan, and Korea (Dennett 1922).  The 19th 
century roots linked to the United States’ usage of multilaterialism in the 20th century as a 
foreign relations policy (Beeson and Higgott 2005).   
In other parts of Asia, Great Britain and Russia kept close watch over major ports 
in the region. By the 1860s, the British had a stronghold over the major ports of China.  
Even though Russia was collapsing from within, the Russian empire still had great 
interest in the northern border regions of China.  Further, Russia and Japan volleyed for 
control over the Sakhalin Islands and the fisheries industry. Within Japan, colonization 
began within with the Ryukyu Islands.  The government expunged the Ainu ethnicity to 
promote a new unified Japan (Hirano 2009).  
Intra-Asian Law up through the Nineteenth Century 
 Asia in the 19th century was a gravely contested site.  Though the treaties between 
Asian and Western nations dealt with trade, the linguistic-legal practices such as Martin 
translating Wheaton’s Elements of International Law (1836) into Chinese in 1865 created 
new layers of meaning into legal scholarship (Auslin 2004).  The act of translating or 
creating transliterations for Western legal terms into Chinese and Japanese opened up the 
way Asian scholars scrutinized their language.  For example, Mori, a Japanese professor, 
recasted Japanese as form of “deranged Chinese” and wanted a new language that suited 
the “modern nation” (Dudden 1999, 165).  These changes in language affixed new 
meaning to old practices. 
 Traditional Chinese law had been referred to as a model; Nakamura argued that 
during the Qing Dynasty in the 19th century, law was not a model (2004, 156).  Early 
translators misread “order” (令) as “current” (今)	 led Westerners to conceive Chinese 
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law to be affected based on time (Nakamura 2004, 42).  Korean law was a derivative of 
Chinese customs, which idealized a derivation of power and authority from the central 
government (Shaw 1981).  The refinement of legal terms relating to state autonomy came 
as a measure to align the Chinese legal system to the Western legal systems that relied on 
written law (Nakamura 2004).  The Chinese legal scholars left more rules customary and 
had local offices make judgments based on specific cases instead of formalizing 
standards.  The room for interpretation allowed plurality to exist so that privileges were 
granted to members of the royal family or court official under the “Eight Considerations” 
(Bayi) within China (Cassel 2012, 16).  Distinctions according to ethnicity in China, 
social groups in Japan, and ascriptive birthright in Korea instituted plurality in domestic 
laws. After the treaties, Asian officials expected complete autonomy in domestic affairs 
regardless of the provision on extradition rights and allowances for foreign residences.   
Asian officials constantly questioned the validity of agreements with Western nations and 
avoided accepting contractual obligations.        
 Even though China had signed treaties previously, the Treaty of Tianjin (1858) 
was still considered a mere formality to the Chinese government.2  The treaty to Chinese 
officials was performative.  Treaties understandably had material consequences such as 
withdrawing foreign troops from China (D. Wang 2005, 17). Diplomat Gui Liang’s 
comments reified the apprehension that the Chinese did not put practical importance into 
legal documents.  Gui Liang wrote, “The treaties of peace with Britain and France cannot 
be taken as real” (D. Wang 2005, 17).  He dismissed the treaties as just a “few sheets of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  An important issue worked out in the treaty dealt with the residence of British officers in Beijing, which 
had special significance as the “Forbidden City.” The foreign ways were not respected because foreigners 
were barred from entering Chinese communities.  
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paper” that can “henceforth be treated as rubbish” (D. Wang 2005, 17).  China did not 
share with the West, a pre-contractual understanding of international legal regime. 
Unsurprisingly, other treaties proceeded to emphasize written communications in 
jurisdictional and commercial intercourse so that the Chinese would learn to accept 
Western legal practices. The Europeans, who in the case of China were mostly British, 
found China’s unwritten but locally understood customs of commerce difficult to follow.  
The emphasis on documentation necessitated articles in treaties that provided detailed 
instructions for the Chinese on how to conduct business.  
 This legal change contributed to China’s commercial and fiscal demise.   Up 
through the 19th century, China’s wealth was comparable to the Europeans in terms of 
industrial and technological advances.  As Kenneth Pomeranz (2000) noted, the growth 
of Europe in the 19th century was surprising due to China and Japan’s high standards of 
living and longer life expectancies, which were better than European standards of that 
time.  For the Europeans, law made unequal trading conditions beneficial. Westlake 
(1894) discussed the legal right to conquer.  He noted that territories, which lacked an 
organized and recognizable form of government, were poachable.  The Europeans felt it 
was within their bounds to recognize what met the “standard of civilization” (Gong 
1984).  Even the Stanley treaties that explorers made the Africans sign or the Native 
American treaties that the U.S. signed (Champagne 1983, Steinman 2012) were legal 
agreements.   
Inter-Asian Law during the Nineteenth Century 
For the Chinese and Japanese, diplomacy towards the Koreans captured the 
fissure in future visions within Asia.  The Chinese attempted to use treaties to further 
ingrain the hierarchical tributary state relations that it had with Korea for centuries.  
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Furthermore, the Japanese advantageously benefited from the praxis of international law 
to gain Korea as a territory.  The documents were significant for the conquerors and later 
the subjugated persons understood the ramifications of the treaties.3  
 Legal contracts between two nations were consequential whether the document 
was a short memorandum or a lengthy peace treaty.  Modern colonialism used annexation 
treaties as a technique to gain control.  Treaties were tools used to seize a territory that 
had resources and to admonish insurgents after insurrections.  As a tool for conquest, the 
Japanese used varied types of treaties.  Japan’s colonization of Korea resulted from a 
sequence of treaties used to encroach upon Korea’s diplomatic and economic affairs. 
With relatively short treaties on fishery regulations (1889), internal administration 
(1907), prison reforms (1909), and bank regulations (1909), the Japanese usurped 
Korea’s rights to domestic sovereignty.  Benign treaties such as the Korean and Japanese 
fisheries regulations of 1889 and the short documents on internal administration and the 
administration of justice and prisons in Korea undermined Korea’s economic and 
political future (Korea 1891 [ct 1897], 375). The issues were not limited to economic 
gain.  The Japanese used the documents to distinguish their practices from Koreans’ past 
customs.  
In early modern Korea, racial homogeneity did not prevent the Japanese from 
colonizing the Koreans, although the divisions among ethnicities intensified. With law, 
officials in power made finer distinctions based on ethnic heritage (Go 2004, Kim 2009, 
Wimmer 2008). But hierarchies in ethnicities or nationalities were not new in Asia. The 
tributary state system, the previous organizing structure for international relations in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The case of Native Americans are worse in that some protections that the treaties granted them were later 
annulled or unsupported by the white settlers. 
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Asia, specifically ordered other nationalities into statuses below the Chinese.  The 
tributary state system differed from the European model of the international system, 
which promoted legal equivalence among nations.  Despite the legal language of equality, 
the Europeans did not treat Asian nations as equals.   
The different orientations towards law referred to how European and Chinese 
legal traditions differed.  However, how fields studied law can be marked for their 
differences.  Sociology of law had focused on contemporary trends where law provided 
room for misinterpretation, which led to undue discrimination practices.  Colonial 
scholars added law to an ongoing list of injustices and subjective practices that colonizers 
laid onto colonized persons.  Those that were already disadvantaged in resources had to 
combat the loss of legal resources.  However both historians and sociologists drew on law 
as a form of ideology without complementing the material consequences of these ideas 
thoroughly.  Adding to the various perspectives, I approached law as a pathway to 
economic reforms that intensified or made possible the inequalities of the colonial 
experience.  
Western Legal Tradition 
As Berman stated, the “western legal tradition” is an intellectual construct 
(Berman 1983).  The trajectory of the Western legal tradition as it originated from Europe 
had spread to the Americas, Asia, and Africa.  As one may wonder, the terms, “western,” 
“legal” or “tradition” needed definitions before they are accepted as wholly consistent 
terms.  Berman noted that the Western legal tradition constantly evolved since the 11th 
century and legal developments are ongoing (Berman 1983, Berman 2003, Goldman 
2007).  Contemporary scholars should not uphold legal traditions with blind historicitiy, 
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which lauded the development of such institutions as logical and performing a 
functionalist perspective (Berman 1983, 17).   
Fundamental changes in the Western legal tradition included the shift of “law as 
order” to “law as justice” (Berman 1983, 22). Berman’s seminal work from 1983 
distributed widely, Goldman, reassessed Berman’s typology of only four out of ten 
characteristics of the Western legal tradition remaining.  The four traditions stipulated 
that 1) law differed from politics or religion, 2) the legal profession was a socially closed 
network, 3) law was systemic and conceptual, and 4) legal learning operated outside the 
law (Goldman 2007, 16).   
According to Berman, six other characteristics are no longer relevant.   Berman 
presumed more often now that law lost its sense of hierarchy, people believed less in 
changes in law being continuous, and changes in law were believed to be based on 
external pressures (Goldman 2007, 16).  Berman also believed that people viewed law to 
be “an instrument of the state” (Goldman 2007, 16).  He noted that how society 
exterminated multiple jurisdictions to form a centralized set of regulations and how 
political instability promulgated new laws or reformed old laws with new content 
(Goldman 2007, 16).  Goldman contended Berman’s theory because current international 
relations policy of the European Union and the World Trade Organization exercised 
supranational powers over domestic sovereignty.  
Jurisprudence, as a branch of philosophy, pondered what people could know 
through law.  Enlightenment scholars such as Kant influenced Western international law 
(Koh 1997).  Especially in the liberal vein, Kant appropriated three rights – 1) right from 
arbitrary rule, i.e. negative rights, 2) rights to protect and promote capacity and 
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opportunity, i.e. positive freedoms, and 3) the right to democratic participation or 
representation (Koh 1997, 2628).  Koh, a scholar of transnational legal transaction, 	  	   
The spread of Western international law occurred through treaties and legal 
training. In Europe, elites accessed entry into the legal profession.  In 19th Asia, the 
foremost of the elites acquired Western legal training (Dezalay and Garth 2010, 32).  
W.A.P. Martin’s translation of Wheaton into Chinese in 1863 spread western legal 
education to Asia.  Wheaton first distinguished treaty-making capacity in his “Elements 
of International Law” (1894), and today the term implied (Peters 2009).  Sovereign states 
held treaty-making powers.    
Fitzmaurice (2010) noted how 1969’s Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT) codified the works of treaties.  Treaties can be normative or law-making which 
implied that laws furthered the structure making of international law.  Normative treaties 
set up international standards.  On the other hand, contractual or reciprocal treaties were 
treaties written to further state interests (Fitzmaurice 2010).  Especially after 1969, the 
standard in international law had been to favor stability instead of changes (Fitzmaurice 
2010).  Breaking the terms of the treaty was difficult. But the grounds for termination are 
material breach of the treaty, fundamental change of circumstances, supervening 
impossibility of performance, emergence of new peremptory norms, armed conflict, 
extinction of a party, or desuetude where from the conduct of the parties the signees 
acknowledge that the treaty was no longer binding (Fitzmaurice 2010).  The stipulation 
on termination are noted in article 42(2) and article 56(1) of the VCLT in that treaties can 
be denounced if the treaty provisions allowed for the withdrawal or the right to terminate 
was implied in the treaty.   
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 Undeniably, treaties mark international cooperation.  Modern international law 
did not develop shortly after the Peace at Westphalia.  However, the legal standards 
following the positive law tradition emerged in the 19th century after the Napoleonic 
Wars and the Congress of Vienna in 1815.  The philosophical discussions on law remain 
well rooted in theology and 15th century legal scholarship as well.  Like any academic 
field, the field of pre-modern international law has divisions and controversies.  
Historiography of the field would capture how there was never a solid definition for what 
is international law.  Studying treaties that were signed before the finalization of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) passed in 1969 presented deep 
challenges because the terms were not set; they were being formulated. The VCLT did 
not address the issues of unequal treaties but in 1969 treaties were considered invalid if 
the council saw violations to the laws of engagement.   
Unequal Treaties 
 According to Peters (2007), a treaty can be deemed unequal due to its substance 
and/or lack of consent. The substance of the treaty can be unequal based on four different 
qualifications, which may refer to the lack of reciprocity, infringement of sovereignty, 
violation of peremptory international laws, or the impingement of article 103 of the 
United Nations Charter, which deals with the encroachment of self-determination, 
violation of sovereignty, or the use of force.  In cases for 19th century bilateral treaties, 
most inequalities fall on the lack of reciprocity in the treaty conditions.  The Chinese 
often stated that their treaty partners did not provide in exchange similar trading benefits 
that the Chinese had granted the other party.   
 Many of the treaties of interest in the case study chapters of the dissertation focus 
on what are often called “unequal” treaties.  According to the Max Planck Encyclopedia 
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of Public International Law, “unequal” treaties are pejorative terms used to categorize 
19th century treaties that Asians signed with European nations.  The rudimentary division 
of the non-West versus the West led to another set of assumptions about the “uncivilized” 
versus the “civilized” (Peters 2009).  “Unequal” treaties also evoke 20th century 
colonialism and capitulations, which were more specific to sultans of the Ottoman 
Empire.  Peters (2007) noted that the historical accounts of unequal treaties 
disproportionately deal with China. The popular view of why unequal treaties existed 
indicated European rivalries to take over Asia.  The Asians in the 19th century were not 
considered indigenous people (Craven 2005, 343).    
 19th century treaties dealt with the sovereignty differently from nations after the 
UN, in that the notion of sovereignty formalized along with the concept of international 
law.  Signing a treaty meant a nation had sovereignty.  Infringement of sovereignty 
became more difficult to prove since the signing of a treaty symbolized a nation’s status 
as sovereign nations.   And the treaty could be viewed and accepted by other members of 
the international society as documents ratified by two or more sovereign nations.  Also 
the sovereignty principle was sanctified after the ratification of the UN charter.  
 The violation of ius cogens or peremptory norms also invalidates a treaty as 
unequal.  But the most fundamental peremptory norm handles sovereign equality.  In 
writing treaties, the partners are considered legal equals even if nations’ sizes, military 
and economic resources, population, or date of establishment differ substantially.  
Signing treaties under duress also invalidates the treaty.  The use of force was more 
common in the 19th century and the conditions provided in the UN charter curbed the use 
of force in 20th century contracts between nations.  Conflicts with Article 103 of the UN 
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charter render treaties inapplicable but did not invalidate them.  The text of article 103, 
 “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
 Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
 international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall 
 prevail,” (www.un.org) 
reaffirmed article 2 which upheld sovereign equality and reprimanded the use of force in 
negotiations.  
 Especially with nations before the formation of the UN, defining which nations 
are sovereign and capable of signing treaties becomes highly contentious.  Soviets 
publicists have argued that treaties could never be equal since the two parties preparing 
the treaties are rarely equal (Peters 2009).  The Communist Chinese asserted the few that 
most treaties were unequal not only due to the substance of the treaties but also because 
the signing parties were not equal (Chiu 1972).  But the historical perspective of the 
Soviet scholars would make pacta sunt servanda in that “agreements must be kept” 
difficult to assert for previous treaties. But as article 51 and 52 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties noted, the term “force” could be military force, political pressures, 
or the threat of economic sanctions.   
 Unequal treaties in particular changed the international orientation in East Asia.  
The consequences of unequal treaties may take decades to correct.  The pacta sunt 
servanda may be suspended to clausula rebus sic stantibus (“things thus standing”) to 
remove certain treaty agreements.  Peters argues a popular legal position that unequal 
treaties were an “innovation” to use in East Asia (Peters 2009).  The treaties managed to 
spread international law globally.  But she also notes that the Japanese built their military, 
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enacted social reforms, changed political structures, and increased economic production 
as a response to the treaties (Peters 2009).   
 In a contemporary context, treaties can be invalidated in cases where states are 
dissolved.  The new law (“de Lege Ferenda”) states that the treaties should have consent 
from all contracting parties, be mindful of the judgment of other countries in the 
international community, and provide laws of mutual benefits if possible.  Unequal 
treaties as an issue within international law did not resolve with the end of colonialism.  
Wealthier countries extracting land, natural resources, and labor from poorer nations 
continues to affect international bilateral and multilateral agreements.  The legal tenets 
developed during the 19th century still control the dynamics of globalization.  
Treaty Interpretation 
 Legal scholars commonly use three modes of treaty application and 
interpretations. The three methods of treaty interpretation are the textual approach, 
intentionalist approach, and the teleological approach.  Textualism stays closely to the 
wording of the documents. And vague meanings of certain words are situated in the 
language that the piece is written. The intentionalist approach is not practiced as 
commonly (Bederman 2001). It fixates on the intent of the drafters. The task is difficult 
because much information on the historical context and even the biography of the drafters 
become necessary for interpreting the treaty. The teleological approach focuses on the 
object or the purpose of the treaty.  The treaties in this paper are analyzed using the three 
approaches because these treaties were written at least 100 years ago, intentionalist and 
teleological approaches are more possible in these cases than for more recent treaties. The 
effects of the unequal treaties include political and economic transformations in East 
Asia.  
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 Similarly, Fitzmaurice (2010) distinguished treaty interpretation with four 
principles.  Principle 1 was the textualist view of interpreting he actual text. Principle 2 
was to close to the intentionalist approach of updating what the authors might have 
implied for the contemporary context of previously written treaties.  Fitzmaurice’s 
principle 3 examined the treaty in their entirety where excerpted passages were not 
interpreted on their own.  Principle 4 of the scheme mirrored the teleological approach in 
that the effectiveness (ut magis valeat quam pereat) of the treaty referred to the end goal 
achievable with the treaty.  Fitzmaurice noted that the four principles are associated with 
the subjective, which was based on authors’ intentions, objective, which was based on the 
text, and teleological, which referred to the object and purpose, approaches.  Examining 
the object and purpose were more synonymous with English and German legal practices.  
French scholars considered the title, preamble, an article in the treaty, or the preparatory 
work (travaux préparatoires) to provide the objective (Fitzmaurice 2010).  The analysis 
of travaux préparatoires, which was mentioned in article 31 of the VCLT remained a 
controversial source for treaty interpretations.  
 The analysis of legal texts employed terms developed in comparative literature.  
Laws help to define the dynamics of social change. Law can act as a label for existing 
social practices that achieve post hoc codifications, but law can also be a prescription for 
social conduct at the individual level. It also plays a large impact for the future since 
historical events after passage of certain laws have a ripple effect on society.   
 The way to conceptualize treaties remains varied.  In Weber’s terms, treaties are a 
part of “public” laws, which “regulate state-oriented action” (Weber [1922] 1968, 641). 
The objectives of the state (Staatsanstalt) are presented in treaties. Making contact with 
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other states is an aspect of state power.  State power can be a legal representation of the 
monarch’s patrimonial rights or constitutional rights which refer to the rights of citizens, 
which later become known as vested or inalienable rights (Weber [1922] 1968, 642). The 
state remains an important component for the practices of international law.  
 International law is built upon ideas from various national laws and in return 
informs legal changes within states.  Regardless of the way in which the domestic state is 
organized, the treaty can represent how the state wants to project their stances to other 
states. Tying international law to the concept of natural law was largely the Western 
influence found in current frameworks of international law (Bederman 2001).  The 
naturalist and positivist perspectives of international law set the foundation for legal 
scholarship.4  
 The theory and doctrine behind international law were not uniformly established. 
International law has a strong basis in theoretical and abstract thinking.  Koskenniemi 
(2007) noted that Grotius’s view of universal law related to Hobbes and Pufendorf’s 
theories that humans wanted to avoid pain and seek pleasure.  In the 18th century, 
diplomacy in Europe enforced curbing warfare.  The development of civilizational stages 
examining history developed during the 19th century (Koskenniemi 2007).    
Treaties’ Significant Terms 
 The practice of international law progressed in the 19th century to affect 
colonization and motives for trade.  Treaties secured trading rights in many cases. Trade 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 An early proponent of the naturalist view of international law was Franciscus de Vitoria. Writing in the 
16th century, Vitoria was one of the earliest formulators in international law. He addressed the issue of 
Spanish colonization of the Americas where he developed an argument based on natural law. The natural 
law thesis explores the realm of innate rights given to humans. Though in cases of imperialism debate 
arises as it did between Sepulveda and de las Casas whether aborigines can be considered human.  Vitoria’s 
De Indis Et De Ure Belli Relectiones serves several purposes. It addresses just causes for war and compels 
moralistic and economic rationale behind the imperial policies of Spain. 
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along with civil liberties grew to be prominent themes.  Treaties of the 19th century often 
refer to two particular rights, the most favored nation clause (MFN) and extraterritoriality 
laws.  The most favored nation clause promoted benefits such as low tariffs to insure 
frequent economic exchange between two states. The privileges enjoyed via the MFN 
clause are valid for both parties. Historically, the MFN clause can be traced back to the 
11th Europe (Newcombe and Paradell 2009).  A treaty between England and Burgundy 
dating back to August 17, 1417 used the MFN clause to grant each other rights to use 
ports in the others’ domain. MFN clause refers mostly to trade treaties and was developed 
in the 17th century for diplomatic negotiations. The clause can be simplified to indicate 
that the contracting parties agree in respects regarding “commerce and navigation, any 
privilege, favor, or immunity which either grants to a third state shall be granted to the 
other” (Hornbeck 1909, 398).  The “most-favored-nation” was mentioned in a trade treaty 
between Denmark and the Hanse cities (article 6) signed on August 16, 1692.  Early 
international treaties between the United States and France on February 6, 1778 also 
included the MFN clause. The U.S. granted France a most favored nation status for the 
equivalent in return (Hornbeck 1909, Wilson [1910] 1939). During the 18th century, MFN 
clauses frequently appeared in commercial treaties of Europe, and the application of the 
clause extended beyond the commercial to political terms.  
 For instance, Great Britain had most favored nation status in China, which meant 
that Great Britain enjoyed privileges such as low tariffs and permissions to enter ports. 
Via commercial treaties, Great Britain introduced ways to protect Christian missions and 
reformulate the role of merchants in a neo-Confucian society.  In the context of 19th 
treaties between Western powers and East Asian nations, MFN clause encapsulated a 
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realist perspective “to gain and to preserve the greatest possible advantages” (Hornbeck 
1909, 397).  Great Britain’s MFN status with China encouraged other Western powers to 
write treaties with China and to include the MFN clause. The MFN clause was a fluid 
marker. If for instance the United States negotiated a better import rate with China, 
without having to sign a new treaty, Great Britain would enjoy the better rate that the 
U.S. negotiated. Great Britain (and those following Britain) later used the privileges to 
deplete China’s resources.  
 Another feature of the unequal treaties in East Asia was extraterritoriality, which 
granted foreign residents immunity from being tried under Chinese, Japanese or Korean 
laws.  International law entangled Western and East Asian norms in the criminal justice 
systems.  In terms of regulating conduct, neo-Confucian states valued adherence to 
certain rituals such as ancestral worships and laws against suicide that Western states 
could not consider seriously. More commonly, crimes committed by British citizen 
against Chinese citizens were leanly persecuted. Whereas Chinese citizens committing an 
offense against a British citizen led to a trial in China where a British official was present 
and able to oversee the process. The procedure in which criminal trials were processed 
was part of larger corpus of Western legal traditions, which were rooted in ideas of 
certain civil liberties.  
 The introduction of civil liberties that were established in the West via treaties can 
be seen as part of setting the “standard of ‘civilization’” (Gong 1984). The “civilization,” 
which initially included Christian European nations, later included the United States and 
Japan.  Gong examined a 1905 treatise on international law by Georg Schwarzenberger 
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where he identified at least five requirements of the standard of ‘civilization.’  To 
paraphrase, Schwarzenberger wrote,  
 “1. a ‘civilized’ state guarantees basic rights, i.e. life, dignity, and property; 
freedom of travel, commerce, and religion, especially that of foreign nationals, 
 “2. a ‘civilized’ state exists as an organized political bureaucracy with some 
efficiency in running the state machinery, 
 “3. a ‘civilized’ state adheres to generally accepted international law, including 
the law of war, 
 “4. a ‘civilized state’ fulfills the obligations of the international system by 
maintaining adequate and permanent avenues for diplomatic interchange and 
communication, 
 “5. a ‘civilized’ state by and large conforms to the accepted norms and practices 
of the ‘civilized’ international society, e.g. suttee, polygamy, and slavery were considered 
‘uncivilized’, and therefore unacceptable” (Gong 1984, 14-5).  
 Schwarzenberger wrote about the ‘civilized’ state as a European from a Christian 
perspective and directly targeted non-western cultural practices to be barbaric.  East 
Asian states in turn labeled Westerners as barbarians.  Divergent normative spheres 
created tensions during the earliest diplomatic missions between Great Britain and China. 
Notable “hospitality errors” made early during diplomatic exchanges highlight the 
normative tensions that Western and East Asian nations wrestled with.  
Treaties’ Contents 
 The tensions were partly addressed in the treaties of the 19th centuries. I argue 
throughout that the treaties’ contents mainly served economic interests.  The treaties 
raised major themes including 1) securing trade, 2) teaching how to transact business and 
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ways to aid smoother exchange, and 3) protecting the lives and property of foreigners 
living in Asia.  Explicitly, the ease and facilitation of trade saddled along codes of 
conduct that the Europeans had developed. 
 The unequal treaties touch upon colonialism and the end of isolationism of the 
early 20th century.  Especially in the 20th century, legal documentation affected state 
relations. The problem of inequality is a local and global phenomena that cannot be 
overlooked as a social artifact. Given historical laws affected modern legal standards  
(Craven 2005). The differences of cultural norms and values, which arise today in 
debates regarding universal human rights versus the Asian values argument present 
similar paradoxes that were presented in treaties. The troubling aspect of treaties and 
inequality remains that the language and germinating ideas of international law regarded 
the equality of nations as an underlying principle, despite evoking recognition of national 
sovereignties. The treaties of the 19th century could not protect domestic sovereignty for 
every nation.  
 Asian states had organized forms of government and an intra regional civilization 
that did not conform to the western “standard of civilization” (Gong 1984).  I examined 
how the introduction of international law affected Asian states, namely China, Japan, and 
Korea. Certainly economic changes affected Asian states, however, social conditions and 
traditional methods for business conducts changed as well.  The expansion of 
international law as it originated in Europe spread to Asia via the imperial urges of 
European states during the long nineteenth century. The rationale behind the Berlin West 
Africa conference (1884-1885), which emphasized commerce towards a free trade 
agreement and humanitarian intervention as the motive for entering Africa was also 
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pertinent to Asian states, who were perceived as potential commercial partners. Also the 
discussion of Asian governments as being too decadent and non-Christian (Westlake 
1894, 51) ushered in new protections for foreigners residing or traveling within Asia. 
Thereby creating avenues where foreigners to could proselytize or build institutions such 
as schools or hospitals.  
 The historical period in which the treaties were written remains key since the 
treaties in and of themselves became signifiers of what Martti Koskenniemi (2002) would 
call the “gift of sovereignty.”  During the 19th century, the distinction between natural 
law and positive law developed. Natural law, as Wheaton defined it, is based on innate 
condition of a state. Natural law is largely based on morals, divine, and preconceived 
notions of what is the natural state. Positive international law, which predominated during 
the long 19th century, envisions states to conform to a set of laws that have been 
constructed.  Since the universal law of nations is difficult to assess, Wheaton noted that 
public law was a construction that “with slight exceptions, has always been, and still is, 
limited to the civilized and Christian people of Europe or those of European origin” 
(1916, 17).  Wheaton’s perspective of public international law preceded the “Scramble 
for Africa” and the end of isolationism in Asia. The discussion of the various sets of 
treaties will show that the function of the treaties signed between Asian and European 
states was to include economic and social provisions to promote western standards of 
civilization.  
The connection between theory and practice continued in the debates about 
international law, enforcement, and efficacy.  Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) 
presented empirical evidence as to why international human rights treaties could not 
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improve human rights conditions within sovereign nations that signed onto the 
agreements.  Hathaway (2005, 2008) directed the discussion into theoretical justifications 
of international law. She argued that the Legal Enforcement and Collateral Consequences 
international treaties suffered as inefficient because treaties lacked overarching 
institutions that check on compliance.   
International law is “usually obeyed” but “rarely enforced” (Koh 1997, 2603). 
There are four common ways – coincidence, conformity, compliance, and obedience - to 
interpret written law and legal conduct (Koh 1997). First, the coincidence factor assumes 
that no causal relationship exists between written law and it ineffectiveness. Second, 
conformity theory suggests that people conform to the rules only when it is convenient 
for them.  Third, people are compliant based on specific rewards or fear of punishment.  
Fourth, once the behavior has been internalized as a norm, then there would be obedience.  
The weak commitment in contemporary international treaties was a puzzling outcome in 
comparison to 19th century treaties where bilateral treaties implied that representatives 
from one party could be present in the other’s country to enforce the conditions of the 
treaty.   
Sociology of Law 
 Notably sociology of laws did not exist while sociology law embodied a mono-
tonal view of law.  Law, in however way you wish to look at it, was not monotonal, 
universal, and one-dimensional.  The logic pure law was a myth since legal practices 
were culturally and historically mediated.  Law had a less forthright treatment in 
sociology but even when law was examined intellectually, the examination treated law as 
a neutralizing or benign backdrop.  When law was discussed in the sense of 
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discrimination (Black 1993, Nelson and Bridges 1999), inequality was discussed 
uniformly as well.  Simply, law was not the same for each person that encountered it.    
 Halliday and Osinsky’s annual review article on the “Globalization of Law” 
(2006) did not emphasize law’s flexibility and dynamism.  Even though Halliday and 
Osinsky (2006) presented the four dominant forms of legal analysis from world polity, 
world systems, law and economic development, and postcolonial studies as having 
different mechanisms and power orientations, the overall scope of the article examined 
law in a mono-tonal way (459).  Notably, each perspective assumed that law traveled 
through a few sets of channels.  Law existed globally as written and standardized texts 
and also as unwritten and customary norms. 
 Different schools of sociology recognized the global reach of international law.  
Halliday and Osinsky (2006) identified world polity, world system, law and economic 
development, and postcolonial studies as the four major perspectives on globalization and 
law.  The world polity school viewed the outcomes of law to come via legal convergence, 
isomorphism, local adaptations of global standards; the agency through which law 
transferred globally was from world culture international governmental organizations, 
international non-governmental organizations, nation-states, mass media and local actors; 
the mechanisms included modeling nonreciprocal adjustments, capacity building and 
suasion; the ideological power motivated the change, and the structures through which 
the operation occurred was in international normmaking arenas such as the United 
Nations, the international advocacy networks, and professional communities (Halliday 
and Osinsky 2006, 459).  For the world systems school, the outcome were the weak 
institutionalization of global law; the nation-states, corporations, and anti-systemic 
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movements were the agents; the mechanisms included economic, political, and military 
coercion; economic, political, and military power extended the reach of the law; and the 
global actors’ economic and political relations created the structure or arena for the 
perspective (2006).   
 The law and economic development perspective studies outcomes based on 
agreement upon commercial rules and “law-enabled facilitation of economic growth”; the 
agency developing this strand of thought included the international financial institutions, 
aid agencies, nation-states, international organizations, professions, and civil society 
groups; the areas’ mechanism was through modeling, nonreciprocal adjustment, rewards, 
“capacity building, suasion, and economic coercion”; economy and ideology drove the 
law and economic development schools; development occurred in the realm of legal 
regulation of economic relations globally and international networks of legal and 
economic professionals (Halliday and Osinsky 2006).   
 The agents in postcolonial theory were nation-states, local elites, local social 
movements, and disadvantaged groups; the mechanism for exerting power included 
economic coercion, modeling, nonreciprocal adjustment, rewards, and suasion. The 
actors used ideological, economic, and political power in the realm of international 
normmaking arenas, legal and advocacy networks, and aid and dependency structures 
(Halliday and Osinsky 2006, 459).  The postcolonial studies examined law during times 
of transitions. 
Neo-Institutionalism and the Law  
 The landscape of legal scholarship was non-exhaustive (Donoghue 2009). Still 
sociology of law extended from Roscoe Pound’s notion voiced in the 1950s that law was 
a social institution situated in a civilized society (Goldman 2007, 5).  As Suchman and 
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Edelman (1996) indicated in “Legal Rational Myths: The New Institutionalism and the 
Law and Society Tradition,” sociology of law and sociology of organizations had been 
paired as institutions.  Suchman and Edelman used examples of the “legal fiction of the 
formal organization as ‘corporate person’” to illustrate how law allows for a certain 
conceptualization of the organization  (Suchman and Edelman 1996, 906).  The two main 
schools of sociology in law was to either view law as set of formal rules and obligations 
in the vein of “legal formalism” or as Suchman and Edelman would propose viewing law 
as a social institution that was culturally and structurally embedded (Suchman and 
Edelman 1996, 907).  Individual behavior may be culturally driven while organizational 
behavior was rationally and materially driven (Suchman and Edelman 1996, 914).   
 Institutional theorists envisioned linkages to institutional norms as a form of 
“loose couplings” and “ceremonial conformity” and actors manufactured the myth that 
their actions were rational when in fact it was done merely as a ritual act (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977).  The three landmark findings of New Institutionalism resolved (1) 
organizations as “complex social actors” who acts in a rational and technical manner 
according to the cultural environment, (2) because culture was significant, the 
organization comply to the rules through symbols and substance, and (3) in an 
environment where much symbolic displays existed, institutional isomorphism led to a 
social construction of legality (Suchman and Edelman 1996, 918).  DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) suggested that when the law was less certain, the organizations made greater 
efforts to make sense of or legitimize the law.    
 For comparative historical sociologists such as James Mahoney, institutional 
theory had grown abstract and vague (Mahoney 2010, 3).  Mahoney also noted the 
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importance of Latin American nations’ initial differences.  Without placing too much 
stake at the colonial relationship that the Latin Americans had with Europeans, the 
historical paths are linked as exceptional key indicators.  The differences between Asian 
and Latin Americans’ experiences with European colonizers traced how laws mediated 
the varying paths to economic stability in Asia and the Americas.  
Sociological Studies of Colonialism 
 As Julian Go’s (2012) article, “For a Postcolonial Sociology” remarked, 
sociologists have not fully addressed the issue of colonial identity that scholars of cultural 
studies debated energetically in the 20th century.  Go (2012) cited that between 1980 and 
2011, the American Journal of Sociology (109 times) and the American Sociological 
Review (twice) published far fewer articles or book reviews that drew on postcolonial 
theory than in leading history of literature journals (Go 2012, 2).  In comparison, 
hundreds of articles (362 articles not including those that referred to Said’s Orientalism 
directly) cited postcolonial theories in select journals in literature and history.  The large 
dismissal of postcolonial theory in sociology fails to underscore key socio-cultural 
changes that occurred during times of colonial transitions. In his essay, Go (2012) 
provided an elegant connection between actor-network theory and the mechanical growth 
of industries in colonial states.  He proscribes that works on relational theories in 
sociology (Go 2012) can broaden cultural sociology’s impact on the discipline overall.  
The study of colonial governments grants sociologists access to theories on the diffusion 
of legal and cultural practices that connect to other large-scale macro-level shifts not 
limited to postcolonial states.     
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 Sociologists studied the institutions that historians and literary theorists examined 
without directly engaging the postcolonial literature.  Works on revolutions (Skocpol 
1979, Goldstone 1991, Tilly 1993) and authoritarian regimes (Brubaker 1992, Berezin 
1997, Leuenberger 2006, Mann 2004) approached similar challenges involved with state 
restructuring, new cultural scripts, and ethnic boundary formations (Brubaker 1992, 
Wimmer 2008).  Historical sociologists of postcolonial sites (Barkey 2008, Lange 2009, 
Mahoney 2010) and path dependency models of postcolonial Latin American states 
(Mahoney 2001) also drew on modern state-formation literature (Adams, Clemens, and 
Orloff 2005).  The cultural analysis of historical changes included voicing marginalized 
perspectives.  
 Cultural sociology has not avoided the topic of postcolonial states and subjects by 
any means but there is room for legal analysis nonetheless.  Sociologists have delved 
more specifically into questions of decolonization (Strang 1990, 1991), gender (Bhambra 
2007, Charrad 2001), economic development (Chibber 2003), imperialism (Go 2008), 
ethnicity (Kim 2009, Shin 2010), international relations (Go 2008, 2012), and race 
(Loveman 2005, 2009). Broadly defined, the international relations (Go 2008) and 
postcolonial studies (Steinmetz 2003) are dichotomous along material and economic 
versus cultural and socially constructed realms.  These studies built from either the 
materialist or psychological and culturalist lenses that post-colonial scholars prescribed.    
 Postcolonial studies, international relations, and critical legal theory are 
disciplines that sociologists of culture could draw from.  As Go (2008) previously noted, 
the sociological approach has a natural segue to international relations theory.  In 
international relations, the norm-based constructivist view remains marginal (Finnemore 
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2003) but is growing.  Especially the constructivists’ engagement with international law 
accepted the challenges of cultural variability in terms of legal accountability, efficacy, 
and enforcement (Carlsnaes et al. 2002, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005, Hathaway 
2008).  
 Sociological investigations of law had made remarkable strides in addressing 
social actions under given sets of formal law.  Laws were not unchallenged decrees that 
were universally revered.  Sociologists studied the failure of compliance to human rights 
law (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005, Cole 2012).  This engagement deepened the 
understanding of legal accountability in international relations (Suchman and Edelman 
1996, Hobden and Hobson 2002).  The law and society approach used more cultural and 
norm-based choices to comprehend organizational decisions, but the studies chiefly 
examined contemporary law.  Therefore, legal transformations in colonial states required 
an integrated discussion of postcolonial studies, sociology of law, and comparative 
historical sociology. Building from rich traditions, a multidisciplinary approach to law 
and social change opens new avenues for a richer analysis of colonial regimes.   
 The division in studies of colonialism is at least two-fold. The first main line of 
argument focuses on the discourse of racism.  The second line of argument examples 
more social aspects of economic domination and other material gains.  Another trend in 
studying colonialism has been a psychic component moves beyond the colonized 
persons’ feelings of marginalization (Bhabha 1994, Fanon 1968, Steinmetz 2003).  The 
tussle of colonizers instructing all the while learning from those that they colonize 
complicates the ideology of imperialism versus the practice of colonialism.  As noted, 
modern colonialism used annexation treaties as a technique to seize control when if the 
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colony had resources or if the one group was antagonistic towards the other and could be 
overtaken. An aspect of colonialism that remains important is the cultural distance or 
difference (Steinmetz 2003, 42). Modern states, including colonial sites, require being 
recognized of their existence. Changing local customs of the colonized is not necessarily 
considered racial but an aspect of alterity (Chatterjee 1993, Steinmetz 2003). The 
Europeans had suspicions towards Asians, Africans, and others that portrayed the 
Chinese as double-dealers who had a forked tongue (Doppelzüngigkeit).  
 Racial motivations of colonialism are not the dominant rationale for states that use 
legal agreements to annex a territory. Since Europeans did not view Asia as in a state of 
anarchy but rather stagnation (Westlake 1894, Howe 2008, 217), the nature of mimicry 
and hybridity, where the Europeans went to Asia and adopted Asian customs, was more 
alive there than in South America or Africa.  The logic of Orientalist discourse is plagued 
with internal contradictions.  The cruelty witnessed on the grounds of colonial sites may 
relate to racism but from my legal analysis, the legal language abates these tensions.  
Naturally, individual persons write laws.  And if laws were written in an era when 
rhetoric for racial hierarchies and against miscegenation (Le Bon, Gobineau) gained 
influence then biases will exist (Young 1995).  Private conversations among diplomats 
capture what law and formal diplomatic acts do not.   
 The mental attitude, i.e. the acceptance of servitude, plays a more central role in 
cultural studies’ assessment of colonialism (Said 1978, Bhabha 2003, Howe 2008).  In 
the 19th century, meanings of civility were being destabilized.  Bhabha draws attention to 
the dimensions of mimicry and hybridity where colonial powers disavows and 
acknowledges differences constantly (1993). Often, discussion on colonialism examines 
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the phenomena as “homogenous and all-powerful” (Howe 2008, 222), but colonial rule 
has its variants.  Colonial rule can be direct and indirect (Mamdani 1996).  It may also be 
assimilative or associative (Wright 1991).   The most extreme form of assimilation would 
be an end to colonialism, according to Sartre (Steinmetz 2003, 47).  But influences seep 
out both ways. Examples in Latin America, Asia, and Africa attribute to the differences. 
Taiwan and Korea accepted Japanese colonial rule quite differently (Rubinstein 2007, 
Shin and Robinson 1999).  
 Germany as a colonizer also exercised its power differently.  Germany had three 
distinct forms of native policies. In Southwest Africa, the Germans exercised compulsory 
power over the Africans, massacring those that did not fully support plans for 
assimilation.  In the Samoas, the Germans practiced more indirect rule and had native 
policies align with existing customs.  The Germans viewed China as an empire in decline.  
Their governance of Qingdoa can be described as an indirect rule but the Germans 
promoted apartheid-like living situations and even micro managed Chinese theatrical 
productions to specify the size and cleanliness of Chinese homes (Steinmetz 2003, 49).  
Steinmetz examined colonialism beyond the culturalist vs. materialist lines and further 
teased out how elements of both steeped into several layers of thinking especially for the 
colonizers on the ground.  
Economic Colonialism 
 Even though Fieldhouse’s (1981) concerns included the economic calculations of 
colonialism, his writings did not avoid a discussion of race.  Fieldhouse, a conservative 
historian of colonialism, noted that empire building was not from jingoism or economic 
calculations (Howe 1998, 213).  Colonialism, Fieldhouse claimed, was the “last resort” to 
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the Europeans acquired colonial territories in the first place (Cain 1982) and the omission 
avoids the analysis the economic cost accrued to seize the territories.  The terrain of 
current post-colonial theories is marred with dense and often murky writing.  The 
complexity of the situations the authors discuss lends themselves to the style.  However, 
Fieldhouse used precise language to dismiss the “theory of capitalist imperialism” (Howe 
1998, 215).  He defended colonialism as a natural stage of progression (Howe 1998).   
 The strong economic perspective for colonialism by Marx assumed that 
colonialism was an inevitable stage in global capitalism (Agawu 1995, 12).  Marxist 
scholars would assess that economic motivations were behind colonialism.  Marx 
published in 1850 how the Opium War between China and Great Britain was for British 
economic gain and the extension of the practice of mercantilism.  The cultural debates in 
colonialism still use elements of Marx, specifically alienation and oppression, to further a 
link that culture has to economics.  J.A. Hobson (1938) argued against the primacy of 
economic motivations for colonialism.   
 From 1492 to 1700, Spanish colonialism established a phase of mercantilist 
colonialism in Latin America (Mahoney 2010, 50).  Characteristically, pre-existing 
settlements were uprooted and new political, economic, and social institutions were 
enforced.  Mercantilist policies generally represented instances where nations were 
interested in short term gain to meet immediate consumption needs (Mahoney 2010, 21).  
In sum, mercantilist regimes sought national self-sufficiency, had restrictive state 
regulations for trade, ownership, and economic participation, and maintained status-group 
hierarchies based on patrimony and economic elites (Mahoney 2010, 21).  Mahoney 
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linked the dangers of short-term goals during the colonial period compounding towards 
poor economies centuries later.  
 In comparison to mercantilism, liberal colonialism focused on long-term 
investments.  Under a liberal regime, state actors were allowed to control their own 
economic resources.  The regime promoted international comparative advantage, created 
fewer restrictions on trade, ownership, and economic participation, and acknowledged a 
market-based, capitalist elite class, especially in Latin America from 1700 to 1808 
(Mahoney 2010, 21).  Liberal aims of the Spanish empire created economic colonial 
centers and economic elites who controlled the commercial interests.  Later permutations 
of liberalism, such as neoliberal institutionalism furthered cross-cultural understandings 
in the interest of trade.  
Decolonization 
 Strang’s (1990, 1991) study of decolonization as a global process utilized the pre-
existing nation-state building model.  If the nation-state model transferred from Western 
powers to their dependencies, the change in ideology came from liberal Western 
education.  Claiming dependent territories in the first place came via Europeans 
occupying non-Western lands as unsettled territories.  Bilateral treaties of conquest were 
also used to claim territories (Strang 1991, 433).  New territories were ceded, changed 
governance, or gained independence via treaties.  The temporal analysis of the number of 
dependencies reported that from 1500 to 1987 there were 165 dependencies that became 
sovereign.  Rivalries between European states did not help nations reap the rewards of 
political expansion (Strang 1991, 161).  Instead, the competition lent disputed polities 
towards recognition rather than annexation.  Studying colonialism from the perspective of 
the colonizer and the colonized provide a multivalent view of law.   
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Conclusion 
 Treaties initiated foreigners to enter new countries.  The promulgation of trade 
and legislation challenged existing cultural norms for individuals.  The combination of 
law, history, economics, and race shaped how different nations reacted to treaties.  In the 
next chapter, I discuss the overall trends of economic, diplomatic, social, and political 
provisions formed around the 1860s.  At least on paper, treaties generally agreed to serve 
mutually beneficial goals.  
 The case studies of China, Japan, and Korea discuss how the intrusion of an 
external set of legal norms jar the flow of business and social conduct in other countries.  
The establishment of economic codependency maximized how a nation could be favored 
by another in future diplomatic settings.  Japan’s reaction to the “unequal” treaties of the 
1850s yielded the dismantling of regional power structures.  The steps towards 
annexation in the 19th and early 20th centuries highlighted the presence of international 
law and its efficacy in changing official goals and ideologies for the state.  	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CHAPTER 2 
EMPIRICS OF EMPIRES: STUDY OF REGIONAL DIFFERENCES OVER TIME 
  
 Treaties chronicle the dialogue that encompasses military, economic, political, 
and diplomatic issues between two nations.  When examining treaties for historical 
research, setting the scope for the study becomes a challenge.  Several types of 
documents named acts, agreements, armistices, cartels, concordats, covenants, 
conventions, declarations, protocols, or truces may be accepted in the same class as 
treaties (Foulke 1918, Bederman 2001).  Principally, the underlying component of a 
treaty remains that two or more sovereign nations are involved in its signing.   
 The contractual and legislative aspects of treaties made them a powerful tool for 
studying inter-state relations.  Conceptually, treaties are similar to contracts (C. Mahoney 
2007), however treaties lack the overarching enforcement structure that contracts 
between two persons within one country would have under state law.  National 
legislations changed as a result of treaties (Bederman 2001).   
Treaty Selection Process 
 Over two hundred historically relevant treaties from Asia, Europe, North 
America, and South America were examined for the dataset.  Before 1919, treaties were 
not systematically compiled; so several treaty volumes and compilations were acquired 
for the tabulations. After 1919, global record keeping improved with the League of 
Nations Treaty Series (LNTS) and the United Nations Treaty Series.  Conducting 
research on historical treaties written before 1919 required locating volumes usually 
organized by a nation’s foreign secretary’s office.  The treaties I use were drawn from 
several volumes including Treaties, conventions, international acts, protocols and 
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agreements between the United States of America and other powers, 1776-1909 (1910), 
Treaties and Conventions between Corea and Other Powers (1919), Hertslet's 
commercial treaties. A collection of treaties and conventions, between Great Britain and 
foreign powers (1907), Treaties and conventions between the empire of Japan and other 
powers (1899), Treaties, conventions, etc., between China and foreign states (1917), 
Nouveau recueil général de traités et autres actes relatifs aux rapports de droit 
international de G. Fr. de Martens,5 and treaties found online through sources such as 
Google books, archive.org, and the Yale University Law School’s Avalon Project.   
 I used the volumes mentioned above to select exhaustively treaties involving 
China, Japan, and Korea.  I started with China’s treaties with other nations in the 19th 
century.  Then I extended my cases to examine Japan and Korea’s treaties with Western 
countries.  After collecting data for China, Korea, and Japan, I used treaties that European 
countries signed with post-colonial Latin American states as a comparison category to the 
treaties that Europeans signed with Asians.  Several treaties between Latin American 
nations and the United States were found on the Avalon Project website.  Through 
additional document searches, other full-text treaties signed among Western nations were 
examined.  Treaties published from the late 18th century and the 19th century was not 
widely available through supra-national organizations.  Because the treaties in my dataset 
predate the League of Nations and the United Nations, private publishers were 
responsible for organizing the volumes’ contents.  By comparing several volumes 
organized around the treaties specific to China, Japan, and Korea, I coded unabridged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 De Martens organized treaties dating back to 1761.  For the years that I focus on, de Martens assembled 
over 35 volumes of treaties from 1876 to 1910 and 40 volumes from 1909 to 1944.  An exhaustive 
codification of all treaties in de Martens’ volumes is planned for future research.  
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versions of the treaties.  Nearly all treaties involving China, Japan or Korea from the 19th 
and early 20th centuries was included in the dataset.   
 I selected additional documents from the first four volumes of de Martens’s 
collection of treaties to include more treaties between European and Latin American 
states.  Representative samples of treaties from European, American, and Latin American 
countries were included to reflect the diplomatic patterns of the 19th century.  Documents 
from this period uploaded onto Yale University law school’s Avalon project website and 
de Martens’s volumes that stood out as treaties were coded into the dataset.  A volume 
dating back to the 18th century, de Martens categorized treaties thematically into basic 
types such as arbitrage, extradition, and delimitation.  I retained some of his 
specifications but also noted the distinction between friendship treaties and commerce 
and navigation treaties.  Many of the non-Asian treaties included documents pertaining to 
the United States.  But more than the half of treaties in the dataset involved non-Asian 
nation-states.    
Organization of Selected Treaties 
 The treaties’ years ranged from 1783 to 1912.  I surveyed a few treaties from the 
15th and 17th centuries but they were excluded so that the discussion could focus on 19th 
century bilateral treaties.  The treaties were written in over fourteen different languages.  
I examined 235 treaties written across seven region-based dyads which were Great 
Powers and Asian nations, among Great Powers, among Asian nations, Great Powers and 
post-colonial Latin American states, among Latin American states, Latin American states 
and Asian nations, and other polities including Hawaii, were also analyzed.  
 I assessed several key political, economic, diplomatic, and social provisions and 
described diplomatic representation, commercial exchanges, social conduits, criminal 
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actions, and cultural exchanges.  Initially, I searched for 64 key provisions or 
characteristics found in the treaties.  From the 64 items, I chose 29 significant provisions 
that highlighted regional and periodic symmetries. 
 Symmetry as used throughout refers to provisions’ outcomes where both sides 
benefited equally from the agreement.  Outcomes were symmetric when both countries 
received and offered like conditions. The provision for consular representation was 
symmetric if both countries sent a diplomat to the other’s country and asymmetric if only 
one side sent and the other hosted the diplomat.  Reciprocity like symmetry also referred 
to times when both sides complied with the conditions of the stated provision.  For 
instance, provisions for extraterritorial jurisdiction stated whether citizens of either 
country residing in the other’s country would be tried under criminal laws according to 
the national laws of their citizenship.  In a non-reciprocal case, a criminal would be tried 
under the country’s law where the crime occurred.   
Description of Region-based Dyads 
 Treaties engaged two or more sovereign nations.  The two sovereign nations were 
either from different regions or the same region.6  I specified 7 possible treaty partner 
pairings.  They were (1) Asian with Great Power, (2) intra Great Power, (3) intra Asia, 
(4) Great Power with Post-colonial Latin American states, (5) intra Post-colonial Latin 
American states, (6) Asian states with Post-colonial Latin American states, and (7) other 
treaty pairings of interest.  I focused on Asian and European treaty relations.  The treaties 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Also, I included 4 multilateral treaties.  In 3 out of 4 multilateral cases, Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
Belgium, Spain, the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, and Russia were on one 
side writing treaties with China in 1901, 1905, and 1912.  The other multilateral treaty was between the 
United States and a coalition of post-colonial Latin American states, namely Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela, in 1905. Even in the case of multilateral 
treaties, one side of the contracting party was all from one region, which was either Europe or Latin 
America.   
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between Asian and European nations, which included the United States, comprised 
largest pair grouping.  100 out of 235 treaties were treaties between Asian and European 
nations.  Of these treaties, 41 out of 100 treaties signed were friendship, also known as 
the amity and commerce, treaties. In additional comparison cases, I observed treaties 
within Great Powers that involved activity among European states, the United States, and 
Russia.7  19 out of 235 (8%) treaties were written among Asian nations. European and 
post-colonial Latin American states wrote mostly extradition and arbitrage (18 out of 30) 
treaties.  12 treaties were signed among post-colonial Latin American states.  There were 
8 treaties between Latin American and Asian states; there are 3 other treaties with a 
different pairing arrangement in the dataset.8  
Table 1. Distribution of Treaties by Region-based Dyad 
Region-based dyad Count 
1) Great Powers and Asian states 100 
2) Intra Great Powers 63 
3) Intra Asia 19 
4) Great Powers and Post Colonial 
Latin American States 
30 
5) Intra Post-colonial Latin 
American States 
12 
6) Post-colonial Latin American and 
Asian States 
8 
7) Other Treaties of interest 3 
Years, Decades, and Periods 
 The treaties ranged in years from 1783 to 1912.  The years were further 
transformed into 7 periods called binned decades to isolate time spans of 12 to 20 years.  
The years were divided into 1783 to 1799, 1800 to 1820, 1821 to 1840, 1841 to 1860, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 12 out of 62 within European treaties were commerce and navigation treaties and 20 out of 62 within 
European treaties were about arbitration, furthering trade goals.  
8 The 3 treaties were the 1805 Treaty of Tripoli between the United States and Tripoli, the 1871 Treaty of 
Amity and Commerce between the United States and Hawaii, and the 1875 Commercial Convention also 
between the United States and Hawaii.   
 	  
	  	   J.M.	  Park	  79	  
1861 to 1880, 1881 to 1900, and 1901 to 1912 time spans.  Less than 6 treaties were 
written within each of the first 3 binned decades, which were from 1783 to 1840.  
Figure 2. Chart of Treaties Signed 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Treaties for 
Binned Decades 
Binned Decades Count 
1) 1783 to 1799 2 
2) 1800 to 1820 6 
3) 1821 to 1840 2 
4) 1841 to 1860 27 
5) 1861 to 1880 46 
6) 1881 to 1900 65 
7) 1901 to 1912 87 
Treaty signing ballooned after 1841.  Nearly 96% of the treaties presented here were 
signed after 1841.  The number of treaties per decade increased over time.  Beginning 
with 1841, the number of treaties sampled increased from 27 to 46, then from 65 to 87.  
Over time, the median year of 1895 reflected the emerging importance of treaties.  
Time affected treaty types in that the specific types of treaties; particularly 
extradition, arbitrage, delimitation, and annexation treaties became more standardized 
after 1861.  1885 stood out as the keystone year for international relations.  The 
conclusion of the Berlin West Africa conference in February 1885 signaled a new era for 
expressing colonial interests among Europeans.  1885 was also the mean year for the 
treaties in the dataset.  The years of 1783 to 1884 were marked as pre-1885 and from 
1885 to 1912 are labeled post-1885.  93 treaties were signed before 1885, and 140 treaties 
were signed after 1885. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 Key treaty provisions included the most favored nation clause, consular 
representation, foreign residence, local authority, historical legacy, previous contracts, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, and disaster relief.  Several descriptive variables of interest 
included the mean months requested for ratification, which was usually about 6 months, 
and mean months when a meeting to renegotiate or terminate the treaty can be 
established, which was usually 7.5 years.  I used the number of articles, which were about 
14 articles per treaty, to gauge the length of the treaties.  These variables were some of 
the few variables that nearly every treaty provided information for.  Additional 
descriptions of the data informed the ways in which regions and time mattered.  
 To study variation across regions in treaty outcomes, I sorted the treaties by 
possible combinations of treaty signers according to regions. Differences based on 
regions were dually observed over time. The chi-square (X2) test is a nonparametric and 
distribution-free test used for data with nominal independent and dependent variables.  
The chi-square coefficient is based on the strength of the relationship between two 
variables and sample size.  The chi-squared tests of variance with additional Monte Carlo 
simulations used to correct for cells with less than 5 observations indicated how 
outcomes for variables such as extradition and the most favored nation clause had 
differences according to regions. The cross-tabulations of nominal variables yielded the 
approximate significance levels for symmetric measures. The tests of significance 
included here are the chi-square based contingency coefficient and the approximate 
significance.  The contingency coefficient was used because the matrix was larger than 2 
x 2.   
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 The chi-square based measure of the contingency coefficient, C, is understood as 
C = SQRT[X2/(X2 + n)].9  C is preferable for tables of 5 by 5 or larger and is the 
appropriate test for nominal variables. Significance levels for C are like those for chi-
square measures.  A perfect relationship is defined as weak monotonic, and a null 
relationship means that the variables have statistical independence in accordance with C.  
In terms of symmetricalness, C is symmetrical which means that it does not matter which 
column is independent or not.  C approaches 1 if the two variables have equal marginals. 
And C gets closer to 1 when the number of rows and columns increases.  So to interpret 
C, we can examine how the approximate significance can remain low to show the 
significance of the relationship between variables.  In SPSS, the Contingency Coefficient, 
C is adjusted as C* in that C* is a percentage from C over all maximum value of C.  So if 
C* is closer to 1, the relationship between two variables is stronger than if C* is closer to 
0.  
Hypotheses 
 Regional differences.  In this chapter, I explore 2 main hypotheses.  First, I 
discuss the significance of geography and how cultural differences are rooted in 
geography.  As Mahoney (2010) noted in Colonialism and Postcolonial Development: 
Spanish America in Comparative Perspective, geography on its own cannot explain 
disparate inequalities.  Although Mahoney evaluated differences based on levels of 
development, my inquiry on legal asymmetries found in treaties also examine geography 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 C can also be expressed in terms of phi. C = SQRT(ϕ2 /1+ ϕ2). Phi, ϕ, a chi-square based measurement of 
association that eliminates the sample size by taking the chi-square and dividing it by n (ϕ = SQRT(X2/n)).  
Phi is a symmetrical measure in that it does not matter which column is the independent variable.  Phi does 
not range from 0 to 1.  For tables larger than 2 by 2, the value of phi could go over 1.  Phi is sensitive to 
marginal distributions.  
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but acknowledge how cultural differences can be bridged for improved diplomatic 
relations.  Economic development beckons the question of advantages in the international 
system.  If industrial advantage allowed the Europeans to conquer much of the world, 
then how would geography proffer economic success?  Propinquity rarely bred friendly 
relations since rivalries, conflict over resources, and border disputes resulted from 
closeness.     
 Geography represented moreover the differences in levels of acceptance for 
international laws felt in Europe versus Asia.  The distinctions based on economic 
development or political regimes may not wholly capture how treaty relations differed.  
Since nations of comparable levels of development may have had unfriendly relations, 
perhaps regional differences attributable to cultural or civilizational vagaries may be 
expected.  
 Symmetry versus asymmetry derives from the study of unequal treaties.  Why 
Asian states regarded the treaties of 19th century as unequal is at least twofold.  First, the 
Asians did not want to engage in free trade and the involvement with the treaties was 
coerced.  Second, the terms outlined in the texts of the treaties were remarkably one-
sided.  And focusing on the internal asymmetries, where a tit for tat relationship did not 
occur, conveyed unequal treaty relations.  
Hypothesis 1:  Asymmetries in treaty outcomes will differ by region.  Treaties between  
 Asian and European states would be more asymmetric than treaties among 
 European states.  
 Time-dependent Symmetry. Institutions may tend toward symmetries over time 
since more resources will be disproportionately distributed to dominant actors (Mahoney 
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2010, 16).  Many legal scholars espoused scientism in the 19th century and the writing 
reflected the positivistic turn.  So as years had passed, less powerful European nations 
also vied for trading rights with Asian states.  Without military prowess to induce heavily 
one-sided treaties, other European nations formulated slightly more equivocal treaties.  In 
certain cases, European and Asian states benefited mutually.  The linguistic register of 
the treaties become more standardized and favor similarly worded passages.  
Furthermore, the legal status of the nation-states improved from unrecognized to 
sovereign polities.  The idealized notion of sovereign equality may have encouraged 
more symmetric outcomes in treaties.  
Hypothesis 2:  Treaty outcomes became more symmetric over time.  Treaties written after 
 1885 will be more symmetric than treaties written before 1885. 
Types of Treaties 
 I explore 7 region-based dyads of treaty signers, 7 binned decades, and 7 types of 
treaties.  Treaty types featured key topics.  The 7 treaty types were (1) peace, (2) 
commerce and navigation, (3) friendship, (4) extradition, (5) arbitrage, (6) delimitation 
and protectorate, and (7) consular plus other treaties. 
Table 3. Distribution of Treaties by Type 
Types of Treaties Count 
1) Peace 17 
2) Commerce and 
navigation 
37 
3) Friendship 64 
4) Extradition 23 
5) Arbitrage 33 
6) Delimitation and 
protectorate 
24 
7) Consular 
conventions and other  
37 
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 17 out of 235 treaties were peace treaties that were signed after wars.  37 out of 
235 treaties were commerce and navigation treaties; 64 out of 235 (27%) treaties were 
friendship treaties, which were treaties signed at the initial meeting of two contracting 
parties; 23 out of 235 treaties were extradition treaties, which dealt with the release and 
capture of criminals; 33 out of 235 treaties were arbitrage treaties, which protected parties 
from economic losses in foreign markets; 24 out of 235 treaties were delimitation treaties, 
which dealt with borders and territorial possessions; and 37 out of 235 treaties were 
consular conventions, pilotage, public health or other treaties of interest.   
 
Table 4. Contingency Analysis of Region by Type of Treaty 
 
Figure 3 
Region-based dyads by Type of Treaty 
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The mosaic plot graphically represents the proportions of 
treaty types by region and the numbers inside the cell show 
counts. The x-axis includes information regarding 7 types 
of treaties. 1 is peace; 2 is commerce and navigation; 3 is 
friendship; 4 is extradition; 5 is arbitrage; 6 is delimitation; 
and 7 includes all other treaty types such as consular 
convention, diplomatic representations, public health, 
pilotage, etc. The y-axis is color-coded to indicate regional 
pairings. White is Great Powers and Asia; next shade is 
Intra Great Powers; the third block which is a medium gray 
is Intra Asia; darker gray is Great Powers and postcolonial 
Latin American State; next is intra postcolonial Latin 
American States; dark gray is postcolonial Latin American 
and Asian States; black represents other treaties of interest.  
The numbers within the box are	  cell	  counts.	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Total 
Row % 
17 
7.23 
37 
15.74 
64 
27.23 
23 
9.79 
33 
14.04 
24 
10.21 
37 
15.74 
The percentages under the columns for the 7 types of treaties represented column percentages. For instance 
the 7 friendship treaties signed between Post-Colonial Latin American and Asian States constituted 11% of 
all friendship treaties. The last row included row percentages. 
 
The mosaic plot above classified certain treaties by specific regional groupings.  
The proportions of red blocks are notable in the graph because many of the treaties 
involved Europeans writing treaties with Asian nations.  For example, 41 friendship 
treaties were signed between European and Asian nations.  The first column of the plot 
represents peace treaties. The second row represents treaties among European nations, 
etc.  Table 4 (above) shows how various types of treaties represented the activities for 
given regions.  In the inner cells, the top number represents the number of treaties and the 
bottom number represents the column percentages.  For instance, 11 extradition treaties 
were signed between European and Latin American states, which made up 47% of all 
extradition treaties presented here.  In comparison, 9 extradition treaties were signed 
among European states, which made up 39% of the extradition treaties. To test the 
statistical significance of the tabulations, I ran a Monte Carlo simulation of 10,000 
iterations to find the symmetric measure’s approximate significance, which was 0 at the 
99% level, with a nominal-by-nominal contingency coefficient of .629. Therefore, it is 
highly unlikely that types of treaties were distributed purely by chance.  
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Peace treaties 
Peace and commerce treaties existed for centuries and later additions such as 
arbitrage, extradition, and delimitation developed in the latter half of the 19th century.10  
Peace treaties served a major purpose of ending conflict.  According to international law 
guides, peace treaties are similar to armistices, modus vivendi, and truces (Foulke 1918).  
Formally, peace treaties organized the resolution of the conflict for both sides.  The 
treaties covered topics such as indemnities, troop withdrawals, the status of refugees, 
border reconfigurations, dividing resources, or political reorganizations.   
Thirteen peace treaties were signed before 1885.  After 1885, 4 treaties were 
signed.  The major peace treaties examined were the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing between 
Great Britain and China, which was concluded after the first Opium War, and the 1895 
Treaty of Shimonoseki between Japan and China.  The 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki gave 
Japan control over Taiwan and other territories that were Chinese possessions.  As for 
indemnities, China paid Great Britain $21 million dollars in indemnities after the first 
Opium War in 1842, but the practice of paying indemnities was removed after Japan’s 
victory in the Russo-Japanese war in 1905.  1898 Treaty of Peace between the United 
States and Spain, 1904 Treaty of Peace and Amity between Bolivia and Chile, and 1905 
Treaty of Portsmouth between Japan and Russia are also included in the analysis.     
Commerce and navigation treaties 
The commerce and navigation treaties of the 19th century covered issues such as 
tonnage dues, import and export rates, the most favored clause, right to employ native 
workers, and other issues lying beyond economics.  Issues such as rights for foreigners to 
reside in the other’s country, extraterritorial jurisdiction, and relief in case of disasters 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The peace treaty between the Hittites and the Egyptians dated back to 1274 B.C. 
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filled the pages of the commerce and navigation treaties. They could be found for each 
treaty signing pair except in treaties among post-colonial Latin American states.  These 
treaties were common after the 1840s as well.  16 commerce treaties were before 1884 
and 20 were after 1885. 
Treaties such as the 1842 Webster-Ashburton Treaty between Great Britain and 
the United States, 1873 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and 
France, 1882 Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade between China and Korea, 
and the 1902 Commercial Treaty between Great Britain and China were few examples of 
commercial and navigation treaties included in the analysis.  Commerce was at the 
forefront of many treaties in treaties that were later specifically noted as treaties of amity 
and commerce, arbitrage, pilotage, immigration, and delimitation.  
Friendship treaties 
Friendship treaties were often the first treaties signed by two nations during the 
19th century.  Friendship treaties, also known as amity and commerce treaties, reflected 
the historical relations between Great Powers and Asian nations.  The amity and 
commerce treaties dominated the proportion of treaties signed from 1841 to 1900.  This 
feature attested to the large number of interactions between Great Powers and Asian 
nations included in the dataset.  62 out of 64 friendship treaties were signed from 1841 to 
1912.  The friendship treaties steadily increased in count from 12 to 17 to 22 from 1841 
to 1900 but from 1901 to 1912, the number dropped to 11 treaties.  35 friendship treaties 
were signed before 1884 and 29 were signed after 1885.  The friendship treaties included 
some economic provisions such as opening up treaty ports and often made arrangements 
for diplomatic officers to establish posts in recently contacted nations.  
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Extradition treaties 
Extradition is a process where one nation surrenders an alleged criminal or 
criminals to another nation for criminal prosecution or sentencing (Stein 2011).  
Extradition, an issue discussed in treaties as early as the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk 
between Russia and China, became more systemically discussed in separate treaties by 
the 1870s. Extradition treaties were common between European and or Latin American 
states.  9 of out 23 treaties were signed among European states; 11 of out 23 were signed 
between European and Latin American states; 3 out of 23 treaties were signed among 
Latin American states.  All extradition treaties in the dataset were signed after 1861.  The 
23 extradition treaties in the dataset were signed from 1870 to 1908.  12 extradition 
treaties were signed before 1884 and 11 were signed after 1885.  The trend inferred to 
ways in which the treaty system became complex with the increased specialization and 
typologies.   
Compared to peace, friendship, and commerce treaties, the extradition treaties 
added later into the repertoire of international treaties.  The extradition treaty exemplified 
the increasing complexities of the treaty system in the late 19th century.  Though earlier 
treaties mentioned procedures for extradition in treaties prior to 1861, devoting a treaty 
exclusively for extradition occurred in the latter third of the 19th century.   
The 1873 Extradition Treaty between Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, the 
1896 Extradition Convention between the United States and Argentina, which was 
ratified in 1900, and the 1908 Extradition Convention between the United States and 
Portugal had similar formats in terms of listing criminal offenses that referenced 12 to 20 
specific offenses including homicide, arson, counterfeiting, burglary, rape, abduction, 
embezzlement, revolt, piracy, obstruction of railroads, and slave trading.  In article 6 of 
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both the 1873 and 1900 treaties, extradition was not granted in cases where “for a crime 
or offense of a political character nor for those connected therewith” (Avalon 2012).  
Extradition treaties developed protections for political dissidents.  The similarities found 
in these treaties that involved different nations decades highlights the standardization in 
language, form, and style that patterned the treaties.  Similarities of the treaties’ texts 
became more prevalent over time.  As the treaty writing system proliferated, the types of 
treaties increased while the content and internal organization of certain treaty types 
became more standardized (Strang and Bradburn 1999).11    
Arbitrage treaties 
From 1901 to 1912, there were 85 treaties where 40% of them were arbitrage 
treaties.12  34 arbitrage treaties from 1901 to 1912 included key provisions for economic 
trade that occurred transnationally.  The treaties ensured smooth transactions for business 
in different financial markets. The 1899 Pacific Settlement of International Disputes in 
Hague established in Title 4 a protocol for such types of binding commercial agreements. 
And 20 out of 33 arbitrage treaties involved Western nations.  The arbitrage treaties 
comprised more than a third (33 out of 87, about 38%) of the treaties signed after 1901.  
For instance, the 1902 Treaty of Arbitrage between Chile and Argentina and the 1909 
Arbitration Convention between the United States and Austria-Hungary mentioned the 
1899 convention.  However, all parties on both sides agreed to appoint delegates to 
discuss issues that Hague agreement did not address (American Society of Law 1907, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Strang and Bradburn’s 1999 research on HMO legislation discussed how the language of the legislation 
looked similar across states within the United States.  Strang and Bradburn related their work more towards 
wordings of documents but the concept of forming symmetries around policy is instrumental in studying 
institutions.  
12 Arbitration lowered the risk of economic losses while transacting within foreign markets and not 
surprisingly, the 1899 convention in Hague which standardized procedures for arbitrage led way for the 
ratifications of several arbitrage treaties.   
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290).  The 1899 Hague convention patterned the format of future arbitration treaties, 
further standardizing treaties over time. 
Treaties of delimitation or annexation 
Treaties of delimitation or annexation managed borders, formalized land 
purchases, and made arrangements for territorial control.  Delimitation was another 
specialized treaty that emerged in the latter part of the 19th century.  Only 10% (24 out of 
235) of the treaties in the dataset were delimitation treaties. 5 out of the 24 treaties were 
signed from 1861 to 1880, and 14 out of 24 treaties were signed from 1901 to 1912.  
Notable treaties from this typology included the 1905 Protectorate and 1910 Annexation 
treaties between Japan and Korea, which bore significantly regarding sovereignty.   
Table 5. Logistic Fit of Type of Treaty By Year 
Whole Model Test 
Model  Log Likelihood DF Chi-Square Prob>ChiSq 
Difference 64.27 6 128.54 <.0001* 
Full 373.42 
Reduced 437.69 
 
Year did have statistical significance for the types of treaties signed among 
nation-states.  The chi-square probability is significant at the 99% level meaning that the 
year had an effect on type of treaty signed.  Arbitrage treaties were common after 1900 
while friendship or amity and commerce treaties were more prominent in the late 19th 
century.  
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Table 6.  Contingency Analysis of Type of Treaty by Binned Decades 
 
Figure 413 
 
Binned Decades By Type of Treaty 
Count 
Col % 
1)  
Peace 
 
Col % 
2) 
Commerce 
and 
Navigation 
3) 
Friendship 
4) 
Extradition 
5)  
Arbitrage 
6)  
Delimita-
tion and 
Annexation 
7)  
Consular 
and Other 
Treaties  
 
1)  1783-
1800 
1 
5.88 
 
0 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
1 
4.17 
 
0 
0.00 
2)  1801-
1820 
5 
29.41 
0 
0.00 
1 
1.56 
 
0 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
3)  1821-
1840 
1 
5.88 
 
0 
0.00 
1 
1.56 
 
0 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
4)  1841-
1860 
6 
35.29 
 
7 
18.92 
 
12 
18.75 
 
0 
0.00 
 
0 
0.00 
 
2 
8.33 
 
0 
0.00 
 
5)  1861-
1880 
0 
0.00 
7 
18.92 
 
17 
26.56 
 
11 
47.83 
 
0 
0.00 
5 
20.83 
 
6 
16.22 
 
6)  1881-
1900 
2 
11.76 
 
16 
48.65 
 
22 
34.38 
6 
26.09 
 
0 
0.00 
2 
8.33 
 
15 
40.54 
 
7)  1901-
1912 
2 
11.76 
 
5 
13.51 
 
11 
17.19 
 
6 
26.09 
 
33 
100.00 
 
14 
58.33 
 
16 
43.24 
 
Total 
Row % 
17 
7.23 
37 
15.74 
64 
27.23 
23 
9.79 
33 
14.04 
24 
10.21 
37 
15.74 
The mosaic plot depicts proportions.  27% of all treaties in the dataset were friendship treaties and 96% of 
them were written between 1841 and 1912. Also all of the arbitrage treaties in the dataset were signed from 
1901 to 1912, which signals the increasing complexities of the international system for treaties.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Although treaties are labeled as the x-axis, the graphical representation of the mosaic plot is the reverse 
based on the fit y by x input in the JMP package. 
The	  numbers	  inside	  the	  cell	  show	  counts.	  	  The	  mosaic	  plot’s	  x-­‐axis	  represents	  the	  types	  of	  treaties.	  1	  is	  peace;	  2	  is	  commerce	  and	  navigation;	  3	  is	  friendship;	  4	  is	  extradition;	  5	  is	  arbitrage;	  6	  is	  delimitation;	  and	  7	  includes	  all	  other	  treaty	  types	  such	  as	  consular	  convention,	  diplomatic	  representations,	  public	  health,	  pilotage,	  etc.	  	  The	  y-­‐axis	  is	  color	  coded	  to	  indicate	  the	  binned	  decades	  where	  white	  is	  from	  1783	  to	  1800;	  next	  bar	  is	  from	  1801	  to	  1820;	  third	  bar	  is	  from	  1821	  to	  1840;	  light	  gray	  is	  from	  1841	  to	  1860;	  medium	  gray	  is	  from	  1861	  to	  1880;	  dark	  gray	  is	  from	  1881	  to	  1900;	  black	  is	  from	  1901	  to	  1912.	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Other treaties of interest 
The last treaty type included public health, immigration, consular conventions, 
pilotage, and other sorts of treaties.  The category contained several types of treaties that 
discussed multiple and uniquely specified issues.  Treaties signed later in the 19th century 
grew increasingly complex and did not fit into the other 6 treaty types previously 
mentioned.  Also multilateral treaties proliferated so that one treaty could serve the role 
of multiple bilateral treaties.  The 1905 Convention of Public Health between the United 
States and Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and 
Venezuela was an example for a complicated and difficult to categorize treaty in the 
dataset.  7 treaties were signed before 1884, and 30 were signed after 1885.  6 out of 37 
treaties in the other treaties of interest category were signed from 1861 to 1880; 15 out of 
37 were from 1881 to 1900; 16 out of 37 treaties were signed from 1901 to 1912.  
Results from the Analysis of Key Provisions 
 The first hypothesis states that the regions affect whether the provisions in the 
treaties were symmetric or not.  The results supported the hypothesis because 
asymmetries were stark in treaties between Europeans and Asians as were treaties among 
Asians. Treaties between Latin Americans and Asians appeared less asymmetric and the 
small sample of the treaties being from the pairing may have affected the results. The 
treaties between Latin American and Europeans were more symmetric because elites of 
European descent adjudicated the treaties.  The prolonged period of colonialism 
impressed key European cultural legacies in terms of religion and political organizations 
in Latin America.  The similarities yielded more symmetric results.  Treaties among 
Europeans appeared more symmetric for key provisions because the “family of nations” 
principle applied mainly to other European nations.   
 	  
	  	   J.M.	  Park	  93	  
 Economic variables such as most favored nation clauses and disaster relief stress 
how regions affected the ways in which nations were treated differently.  Across regions 
the outcomes for most favored nation, disaster relief, and consular representation 
variables were statistically significant.  By years, the disaster relief variable is statistical 
significantly with the chi-square probability of .025, which is a low likelihood of the 
distribution occurring by chance.  MFN and consular representation were less affected by 
time. 
Table 7.  Symmetry of Significant Treaty Variables 
Region-based dyad MFN 
 
% reciprocal 
Disaster relief 
 
% reciprocal 
Consular 
Representation+ 
% reciprocal 
1) Great Powers and 
Asia 
63 (24 out of 
38) 
33 (13 out of 
40) 
77 (51 out of 66) 
2) Intra Great Powers 100 (7 out of 7) 83 (5 out of 6) 95 (18 out of 19) 
3) Intra Asia 50 (1 out of 2) 80 (4 out of 5) 57 (4 out of 7) 
4) Great Powers and 
Post-colonial Latin 
American State 
100 (5 out of 5) 57 (4 out of 7) 100 (8 out of 8) 
5) Intra Post-colonial 
Latin American State 
100 (2 out of 2) 0 (0 out of 1) 100 (2 out of 2) 
6) Post-colonial Latin 
American and Asian 
States 
100 (7 out of 7) 100 (3 out of 3) 100 (8 out of 8) 
7) Other Pairings of 
Interest 
100 (2 out of 2) 100 (1 out of 1) 100 (1 out of 1) 
Approximate 
significance 
(contingency 
coefficient) 
.000 (.43)* .002 (.38)* .000 (.47)* 
TOTAL (N=235) 63 out of 235 63 out of 235 111 out of 235 
The Economic Variables  
Most-Favored Nation Clauses 
The MFN clause was a common feature of 19th century bilateral treaties.  The 
MFN clause can be illustrated as such.  In this example country A signs a treaty with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
+ Codes 3 and 4 were combined to represent the reciprocal claim. 
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country B, where country B is granted MFN status.  A year or two later country A signs a 
different treaty with country C where country C negotiates better terms in an aspect such 
as tariff, duties, or other rates, and is granted MFN status.  Then country B without 
having to renegotiate the treaty with country A receives the better rate.  Country A 
without having been given mutual MFN status suffers from the conditions of the MFN 
clause.  Historically, if Great Britain signed a treaty with China that granted Great Britain 
MFN status and years later the United States happened to negotiate a better import rate or 
tariff with China. Then without having to sign a new treaty, Great Britain enjoyed the 
better rate that the U.S. negotiated.  Great Britain would have no need to renegotiate 
directly with China. The privileges enjoyed via the MFN clause could be valid for both 
parties if, for instance, Great Britain and China signed onto a treaty where both parties 
were granted MFN status.  Bilateral treaties of the 19th century focused on the 
disparities in economic status that the most favored nation treatment created for East 
Asian nations.  The most favored nation clause (MFN) dated back to the early 11th 
century.  It was a fluid and relative standard, most commonly found in commercial 
treaties.  It promoted benefits such as low tariffs to ensure frequent economic exchange 
between two states.14   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Historically, the MFN clause can be traced back to the 11th century Europe (Newcombe and Paradell 
2009).  A treaty between England and Burgundy dating back to August 17, 1417 also used the MFN clause 
to grant each other rights to use ports in the others’ domain. MFN clause refers mostly to trade treaties and 
was developed in the 17th century for diplomatic negotiations. The clause can be simplified to indicate that 
the contracting parties agree in respects regarding “commerce and navigation, any privilege, favor, or 
immunity which either grants to a third state shall be granted to the other” (Hornbeck 1909, 398).  The 
“most-favored-nation” was mentioned in a trade treaty between Denmark and the Hanse cities (article 6) 
signed on August 16, 1692.  Early international treaties between the United States and France on February 
6, 1778 also included the MFN clause. The U.S. granted France a most favored nation status for the 
equivalent in return (Hornbeck 1909, Wilson [1910] 1939). During the 18th century, MFN clauses 
frequently appeared in commercial treaties of Europe, and the application of the clause extended beyond 
the commercial to political terms.  
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However, most favored nation clauses often profited Great Powers when they 
initiated trade with Asian nations.  In the context of 19th treaties between Great Powers 
and Asian nations, the MFN clause encapsulated a realist perspective “to gain and to 
preserve the greatest possible advantages” for a nation (Hornbeck 1909, 397).  Whether it 
was economically fruitful or not, Great Britain’s MFN status with China encouraged 
other Great Powers to write treaties with China, where they too demanded the MFN 
status.  In theory, the practice should have profited Great Britain tremendously.  The 
Chinese reluctantly complied with British demands that extended beyond economic 
extraction and the lack of cooperation from the Chinese government created barriers for 
trade.  
Commerce motivated the signing of many treaties.  The stipulations for the most 
favored nation clause discussed the trading rights of Western and European states abroad. 
79% (50 out of 63) of all treaties that mentioned the MFN clause produced reciprocal 
benefits.  38 out of the 63 treaties that mentioned the most favored nation clause involved 
contracts between European and Asian nations. For treaties between European and Asian 
nations, 24 out of 38 (63%) were symmetric, which was below the general average for 
reciprocals benefits involving the MFN clause.  In fact, all other dyads that excluded Asia 
but mentioned the MFN clause always resulted in symmetric outcomes.   Regions were 
significant in that of the 15 total asymmetric outcomes for MFN in all of the treaties, 14 
of them were from treaties between European and Asian nations.  The one other 
asymmetric MFN outcome was from the 1896 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation 
between Japan and China.  Of the 14 asymmetric treaties from treaties between European 
and Asian nations, 8 treaties involved China, 4 involved Korea, and 2 involved Japan.  
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They were signed from 1854 through 1902.  MFN by region is statistically significant 
according to a chi-square based measure of contingency coefficient, which is .43 at the 
99.9% level of significance.  There is only a .1% chance that the null hypothesis of there 
being no relationship for regions and MFN that had been rejected in error.  So hypothesis 
1 is supported since regions played a significant role in MFN outcomes.  Treaties 
between European and Asian nations were least symmetric.  
Around the 1850’s, fewer treaties favored European nation-states at the expense 
of Asian states.  Observing the trends of MFN over time, the symmetric MFN clauses 
increased from 50% (4 out of 8) from 1841 to 1860, to 71% (10 out of 14) during 1861 to 
1880, to 89% (25 out of 28) from 1881 to 1900.  Article 2 of the 1778 treaty between 
France and the United States granted each other MFN.  In 1860, the signing of the 
Chevalier-Cobden Treaty of commerce between France and Great Britain where both 
sides granted each other MFN status marked the end of MFN usage in Europe 
(Koskenniemi 2007).  The provisions for the MFN clause verged toward symmetry and 
this supported hypothesis 2, which stated that symmetric outcomes are more common 
after 1861.  The break at 1885 was a critical juncture because 68% (19 out of 28) of 
treaties before 1884 were symmetric and 83% (29 out of 35) of the treaties after 1885 
were symmetric.  However, from 1901 to 1912, 4 out of 8 treaties mentioned the 
symmetric outcome for the most favored nation clause.   
Clandestine trade 
Treaties did not frequently mention clandestine trade, which included trading 
opium.  46 treaties prohibited clandestine trade.  Both sides disproved clandestine trade in 
22 out of 46 treaties.  And for the other half of the cases, one side explicitly stated that 
they would confiscate prohibited goods or items from the other if the vessels had 
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improper paperwork.  Of the 22 more one-sided treaties, 19 of the treaties were between 
European and Asian nations.  3 out of 22 one-sided treaties were among Asian nations.  
The clandestine trade and binned decades association yielded a significant result at the 
99.9% level with a contingency coefficient of .39.  By region, the clandestine trade 
variable was significant at the 99.8% level with a contingency coefficient of .34.   9 out 
of the 46 treaties that mentioned clandestine trade also mentioned opium.  By year, the 
chi-square probability for the clandestine trade variable was .0011 with a chi-square 
value of 10.71, which means that year affected the symmetry regarding clandestine trade. 
Figure 5. Opium Trade 
 
 
 
Table 8. Opium Trade 
Levels  Count 
1) Neither will sell to 
each other 
7 
2) Neither will sell to 
a third party 
4 
3) Opium trade 
permitted for a fee 
1 
 There were 12 out of 235 total treaties that mentioned the opium trade.  All 12 of 
the treaties were from 1847 to 1899.  Notably, these treaties were signed after the Opium 
War (1839-1842) between China and Great Britain. Of the 46 treaties that mentioned 
clandestine trade, 9 of them also mentioned opium.  9 out of 12 treaties that mentioned 
opium were between European and Asian nations.  3 out of the 12 treaties were among 
Asian nations.  And the treaty that permitted opium trade for a fee was signed in 1869 by 
China and Austria-Hungary.  Opium trade was widely banned.  Debates over the opium 
trade decreased after a few decades.  Time affected the symmetric and asymmetric 
outcomes of provisions found in treaties. 
1
2
3
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 The second hypothesis for this chapter stated that symmetries in treaties increased 
over time.  However, when provisions were examined in terms of treaties before and after 
1885, the asymmetries were still visible.  So symmetries did not emerge until the early 
20th century from treaties signed from 1901 to 1912.   
The Diplomatic Variables  
Diplomatic privileges 
The open market place required diplomats to assuage arguments that arose from 
commercial and political matters.  Consular officers were sent to establish customhouses, 
discuss tariffs, and negotiate work conditions.  The diplomatic variables in the analysis 
included consular representation and diplomatic privileges. Van Alebeek (2009) 
described diplomatic immunity as one of the oldest rules in international law.  
Renaissance diplomacy dealt with the practice of Christianity in that officers would 
oversee whether principalities were harmoniously maintaining European Christendom 
(Mattingly 1955, Mishra 2010).  With the expanding interest in trade, diplomats worked 
to maintain commercial relations.   
Provisions on diplomatic privileges examined whether both countries were 
allowed to send diplomats to the other’s country or if only one nation had the right to 
send an official.  Only 41 treaties mentioned diplomatic privileges directly and 54% (22 
out of 41) were between European and Asian nations. 90% of the treaties that mentioned 
diplomatic privileges agreed for both sides to have reciprocal privileges.   
By the end of the 19th century attempts to standardize diplomatic immunity took 
place with the Institut de Droit international issued its Règlement sur les immunités 
diplomatiques in 1895 and further in the ‘Les immunités diplomatiques’ in 1929 (van 
Aleebek 2009).  The year for when the treaty was signed did not affect the outcome of 
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diplomatic privileges.  The relationship between diplomatic privileges and decades 
yielded an approximate significance of .66 which was not low enough to reject the null 
hypothesis so the signing year appears to have no effect on the outcomes for diplomatic 
privileges.  Diplomatic privileges were symmetric throughout the 19th century.  Similarly, 
regions did not prove to affect the outcome of diplomatic privileges.  The approximate 
significance of .29 was not low enough to prove that patterns for diplomatic privileges 
changed widely according to regions.  However, the similarity of the privileges owed to 
the general normative behaviors attributed to diplomatic rights and immunities after 
centuries of developing the role.  
Consular representation 
The variables for consular representation regarded establishing diplomatic offices 
in foreign countries in the 19th century.  The provision for consular representation had 
four possible outcomes to assess.  Two of the four outcomes predicted symmetric 
possibilities, where officials from both countries were present within the other’s territory, 
or asymmetric possibilities, where one party sent but did not receive a representative.  
The positions included outposts for commercial agents.  63 out of the 108 (58%) treaties 
between European and Asian states mentioned consular representation.  57 treaties before 
1884 mentioned consular representation and 51 treaties after 1885 did.  45 out of 57 pre-
1884 treaties were symmetric versus 47 out of 51 post-1885 treaties.  And 58 out of 108 
treaties that mentioned consular representation had representation from consuls of both 
countries in the other’s territories.   
58% of the time when consular representation was mentioned, it involved 
European and Asian nations.  And 81% of the variables in treaties between European and 
Asian nations were symmetric.  85% of the results were towards a symmetric outcome.  
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In treaties among European nations, 18 out of 19 (95%) treaties were symmetric.  The 
European and Latin American states had 8 treaties, which were all symmetric, that 
mentioned consular representation, 8 out of 8 (100%) treaties involving Latin American 
and Asian states were also symmetric.  6 of these 8 treaties involved Japan and 2 out of 8 
treaties involved China.  Treaties between Latin American and Asian nations were signed 
from 1874 through 1908.  And 7 out of 8 treaties between Latin American and Asian 
nations also had symmetric outcomes for the most favored nation clause.  The provisions 
for consular representation also supported hypothesis 1 because treaties that included 
Asia as a treaty partner had less symmetric outcomes for provisions on consular 
representation.  
Again, the years affected symmetry in that both countries sent and received 
counselors.  From 1841 to 1860, 11 out of 19 treaties were symmetric.  From 1861 to 
1880, 24 out of 27 treaties were symmetric.  36 out of 39 treaties were symmetric from 
1881 to 1900.  From 1901 to 1912, 16 out of 18 treaties were symmetric on points of 
consular representation.  Furthermore, the pattern of increasing symmetries for the 
consular representation supported hypothesis 2.  For consular representation, the break at 
1885 was a critical marker for greater symmetries.  
85% of treaties that mentioned consular representation had reciprocal benefits.  In 
the 92 out of 108 treaties where consular representation occurred symmetrically, 82% (41 
out of 50) of the treaties also had symmetric most favored nation rights.  31 out of 53 
(58%) treaties had symmetric residential, 22 out of 40 (55%) treaties had symmetric local 
authoritarian and 32 out of 34 (94%) treaties had symmetric diplomatic privileges when 
consular representation was symmetric.  Symmetric consular representation was stable 
 	  
	   J.M.	  Park	  101	  
over time.  By region and by binned decades, consular representation proved statistically 
significant with the approximate significance of 0 with the contingency coefficient for the 
region as .47 and for decades as .51 at the 99% significance level.   Region and time 
affected consular representation.  Over time, consular representation became more 
reciprocal for the contracting parties.  
Disaster relief 
 Careening another countries’ distressed vessels was a major economic and 
diplomatic concern. When ships were distressed or wrecked due to natural or mechanical 
disasters, procedures were set in place to accommodate the crew and vessel.  Treaties 
before 1841 rarely included the variable for disaster relief.  Disaster relief was added later 
in the 19th century when the treaty system became more complicated.  From 1841 to 
1860, 38% of the treaties allowed the Western nations to dock on the coast of Asian 
nations during emergencies.   From 1861 to 1880, the percentage where Europeans 
benefited at the expense of Asians decreased to 29%, where only 2 of the 7 treaties from 
that time span had European-Asian treaties that benefited the Europeans.  From 1881 to 
1900, the 19 out of 24 treaties that mentioned disaster relief gave benefits to one side.  By 
1881, the mode changed towards symmetric ends where both nations were nominally 
allowed to use the others’ coasts in cases of emergencies.  From 1901 to 1912, 5 out of 6 
treaties established grounds for one country to get aid symmetrically from the other.  38 
treaties were signed before 1884, and 25 treaties were signed after 1885.  Unlike other 
variables related to trade, disaster relief appeared more pertinent before the 1885 before 
global standardization took place.  Disaster relief was significant according to regions 
with an approximate significance of .002 and the contingency coefficient of .38.  By 
decades, outcomes for disaster relief were statistically significant with an approximate 
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significance of .00 and the contingency coefficient of .46.  More relief policies were 
reciprocal over time.   
 European publicists established standards for disaster relief around the early 20th 
century.  Helping vessels in distress evolved into an international norm with the 
“Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Respecting Assistance and 
Salvage at Sea 103 BSP 434 (Date signed: 23rd September 1910), Art. 11” (Fasoli 2010).  
The responsibility of the cost accrued are filed under state responsibilities.  The 
stipulations were further mentioned in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, article 
98, in 1989.  Other forms of distress in the seas discussed mutiny on slave ships in 1855.  
Anglo-American Mixed Claims Commission dealt with possible mutinies on African 
vessels.  Much of the law on helping vessels in distress maintained the veneer of 
humanitarian efforts. However, the economic costs accrued for the repairs remained 
contestable.  
The Criminal Justice Variables  
Extraterritoriality 
Extraterritoriality remains a contentious topic for discussion in international law.  
Scholars of Asia have focused on extraterritoriality as a major conflict in cross-cultural 
treaties (Cassel 2012, Scully 2000).  Extraterritoriality had been practiced in Asia, 
Europe, and Latin America.  Broadly defined, extraterritoriality is where  
“persons existing beyond the limits of the enacting state or nation but who are still 
amenable to its laws. Jurisdiction exercised by a nation in other countries by 
treaty, or by its own ministers or consuls in foreign lands” (Gale Encyclopedia of 
American Law 321, 2010).   
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Table 9. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Region-based dyad ETJ 
% Reciprocal tried in 
court based on 
citizenship  
(raw counts) 
1) Great Powers and Asia 16 (6 out of 38) 
2) Intra Great Powers 57 (8 out of 14) 
3) Intra Asia 20 (1 out of 5) 
4) Great Powers and Post 
Colonial Latin American 
State 
64 (7 out of 11) 
5) Intra Post-colonial 
Latin American State 
75 (3 out of 4) 
6) Post-colonial Latin 
American and Asian 
States 
50 (2 out of 4) 
7) Other treaties of 
interest 
0 (0 out of 1) 
Approximate significance 
(contingency coefficient) 
.000 (.43)* 
 
Extraterritoriality dates back to the 17th century, when French legal theorist Pierre Ayraut 
(1583-1645) first proposed the notion.  In 1708, Great Britain passed the Act Preserving 
the Privileges of Ambassadors after a Russian ambassador’s arrest for debts in Britain 
caused an international scandal.  Georg Friederich de Martens’s Summary of the Law of 
Nations (1795) included extraterritoriality into the lexicon of international law.   
Prior to the 20th century the outcomes of extraterritoriality were asymmetric and 
heavily favored European nationals living in Asia more so than in other geographic 
locations.  77 out of 235 treaties mentioned the extraterritoriality.  Of the 77 treaties, 27 
of them (35%) reflected a reciprocal outcome for extraterritorial jurisdiction.  In treaties 
between Great Powers and Asian nations, 16% of the treaties were not reciprocal, which 
meant that Europeans were exempt from local laws while residing in Asia although local 
authorities were required to protect the property and possessions of Europeans.  The 
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unequal treaties in East Asia granted foreign residents immunity from being tried under 
Chinese, Japanese or Korean laws.   International law entangled Western and East Asian 
norms in the criminal justice systems.  In terms of regulating conduct, neo-Confucian 
states adhered to certain rituals such as ancestral worships and laws against suicide that 
differed in treatment from European states.  Commonly, crimes committed by British 
citizens against Chinese citizens were leanly prosecuted.  Whereas Chinese citizens 
committing an offense against a British citizen led to a trial in China where a British 
official was present to oversee the process. The procedure in which criminal trials were 
processed was part of a larger corpus of Western legal traditions, which were rooted in 
ideas of individual rights and civil liberties. 
Asian and European courts faced challenges while processing extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.  The difficulties arose due to China’s legal system lacking structured 
formalities for legal procedures that were found in European courts.  The mixed courts of 
Shanghai represented a plural legalism where the inchoate laws of the Qing court 
coexisted with the British legal system.  As noted in the 1843 Supplementary Treaty of 
Bogue, the English version of the treaty outlined that  
“’British subjects’ (Yingshang) and ‘Chinese’ (Huamin) should be resolved 
through negotiation between the ‘British Consul’ (guanshiguan) and the ‘Chinese 
Authorities’ (Huaguan), who should strive to resolve the matter ‘amicably’” 
(Cassel 2004).   
The language for the provision in English was clear whereas the Chinese text was 
ambiguous (Cassel 2004).  Due to the incompatible arrangement, legal procedures 
resembled the British system more.   The outcomes, which favored British citizens in 
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China, resulted from Great Britain’s ability to maneuver through an unknown system 
using legal language that Europeans knew.15  
Even decades later, Great Powers faced similar challenges in other East Asian 
nations.  An example from the 1882 Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United 
States and Korea indicated that  
“Whenever the King of Chosen [Korea] shall have so far modified and reformed 
the statutes and judicial procedure of his kingdom that… they conform to the laws 
and course of justice in the United States, the right of exterritorial jurisdiction 
over United States citizens in Chosen shall be abandoned” (Chung 1919, 200)  
accentuated the cultural crevices between two legal systems.   Plainly, Western powers 
wanted Asian nations to mirror Euro-centric legal procedures but not so soon where the 
Europeans could not take advantage of their legal position in Asia.   
A push for extraterritorial jurisdiction was for Westerners to protect their citizens 
against harsh sentences.  Provisions for criminal law involved other issues such as 
vicarious liabilities, excessive cruelty, and unusual punishments.  Vicarious liability is a 
form of retributive justice where if the crime was heinous the offender and his relatives 
could be financially and physically punished.  The practice had been common in 17th 
century Great Britain (Baty 1916).  Korea, Japan, and China kept vicarious liability in the 
criminal justice system up through the 19th century.  Though the practice sounds 
antiquated, vicarious liability is not an arcane concept since corporations, treated as 
persons in legal fiction, remained responsible for the actions of their employees.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In China, extraterritoriality created more trouble with domestically when gangster kingpin Du Yuesheng 
eluded local Chinese authorities by claiming French nationality (Cassel 2012, 39).   
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 6 out of 38 (16%) treaties between Great Powers signed with Asian nations were 
symmetric, where both sides were granted extraterritorial jurisdiction.  In 7 out of 11 
treaties that Great Powers signed with postcolonial Latin American states, the outcomes 
were symmetric.   In treaties among European nations, 8 out of 14 (57%) treaties had 
reciprocal extraterritorial rights.  Treaties signed among Asian nations appeared quite 
asymmetric with only 1 out of 5 cases being symmetric.  The extraterritorial jurisdiction 
(ETJ) variable appears mostly after 1841 because the bulk of the data are observations 
after that point.  46 treaties before 1884 and 31 treaties after 1885 included provisions for 
ETJ.  From 1841 to 1912, 74 out of 77 treaties with the ETJ variable were noted.  During 
1901 to 1912, 8 out of 14 cases demonstrated that individuals were to be tried according 
to local laws.  38 out of 77 (49%) of the ETJ observations are in treaties between 
European and Asian states.  In 32 out of those 38 cases, treaties recognized 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, so that persons were tried for laws of their citizenry, for 
persons living abroad. Over time, the percentages declined for incidents where criminals 
were tried under the laws of which they were citizens.  As a key legal instrument of 
imperial control, extraterritoriality was statistically significant for region and binned 
decades at the 99% significance level.  The contingency coefficient for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction with decades was .42 and the coefficient for extraterritoriality by regions was 
.43.  As a paragon of unequal treaties, extraterritoriality was contested across regions.  
The Social Variables 
Foreign Residence and Local Authorities 
The ability to settle abroad and to receive protection from local governments was 
the issue that the foreign residence and local authorities variables discussed. 
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Table 10. For Foreign Residence and Local Authority 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In table 10, I make a distinction between 0 and N.A., non-applicable.  
Non-applicable cases had neither symmetric nor asymmetric outcomes.   
 
The provision on foreign residences specified whether a person or persons from one 
country could build and rent houses or warehouses in another country.  The provision for 
local authorities promised that foreigners residing within the territories of another nation 
would receive protection against theft or attack.  The results of the foreign residence and 
local authority variables are less reciprocal for treaties between Europeans and Asians, 
than among Europeans.  Among Asians, the asymmetry was also pronounced.   
 As for the permissions for foreigners to reside in the other’s country, the issue 
was more important in treaties between European and Asian states during 1881 to 1900.  
34 treaties mentioned foreign residence before 1884 and 37 treaties mentioned it after 
1885.  47 out of 71 (66%) treaties with the variable for foreign residences involved 
contracts between European and Asian nations.  From 1881 to 1900, 24 out of 34 (71%) 
of the observations had reciprocal residential rights, where citizens from one side could 
Region-based dyad Foreign residence 
% Reciprocal 
(raw counts) 
Local authority 
% Reciprocal 
(raw counts) 
1) Great Powers and Asia 43 (20 out of 47) 46 (16 out of 35) 
2) Intra Great Powers 67 (2 out of 3) 45 (5 out of 11) 
3) Intra Asia 13 (1 out of 8) 0 (0 out of 2) 
4) Great Powers and 
Post-colonial Latin 
American State 
100 (4 out of 4) 27 (4 out of 15) 
5) Intra Post-colonial 
Latin American State 
100 (1 out of 1) 0 (0 out of 3) 
6) Post-colonial Latin 
American and Asian 
States 
86 (6 out of 7) 83 (5 out of 6) 
Approximate significance 
(contingency coefficient) 
.000 (.49)* .000 (.46)* 
TOTAL (N= 235) 70 out of 235 72 out of 235 
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rent or build houses and warehouses in the others’ country, for the contracting parties.  
The reciprocity divided quite evenly for residential rights. 36 out of 71 cases allowed 
only one side to send foreigners to reside in the other’s country; 35 out of 71 cases 
allowed both sides to send residents.   
 Treaties between Europeans and Asians comprised 47 out of 71 cases.  27 out of 
47 (57%) cases in treaties between Europeans and Asians give citizens from the Great 
Powers, the right to rent and build property in Asian countries.  And 20 out of 47 
observations presented how the rights are reciprocal. The foreign residence variable was 
significant at the 99% level with the contingency coefficient of .49 when cross-tabulated 
by region.  The contingency coefficient for foreign residence by decades was .45.  The 
cross-tabulation of foreign residence by decades also yielded statistically significant 
results in that the approximate significance was 0 because there is 99% confidence that 
the variance across decades is not by chance.  
Local authorities in a given jurisdiction were asked to protect residents including 
foreigners from theft, attack or any other disturbances.  From 1861 to 1912, the issue 
where local authorities had to maintain order increased.  From 1861 to 1880, only 26% (5 
out of 19) of the responses had a symmetric outcome where both sides would be 
protected by local authorities of whichever country they were residing in.  36 treaties 
were pre 1884 and 36 were signed after 1885.  From 1881 to 1900, the symmetric 
responses increased to 17 out of 27 (63%) where both sides had their citizens subjected to 
the rules and protection for whichever country they were in.  Moreover, much of the 
asymmetries that existed in treaties between Europeans and Asians stemmed from the 
frequency with which North American and European citizens lived in Asia from 1840 to 
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1880.  It was rare for Asians to live abroad. Eventually, Asians were traveling either for 
low wage work in South America by the 1860s or for academic studies in Europe by the 
1870s.  For measures on local authorities, the association with region was significant at 
the 99% confidence level with the contingency coefficient of .46.  The cross-tabulation 
with the local authorities with binned decades was also significant at the 99% confidence 
level.  The contingency coefficient was .41.   
Table 11. Historical Legacy and Previous Contracts 
Region-based dyad Historical legacy 
% mentioning past 
contact (raw counts) 
Previous contracts  
% amending previous 
laws (raw counts) 
1) Great Powers and Asia 16 (5 out of 31) 70 (28 out of 40) 
2) Intra Great Powers 47 (8 out of 17) 49 (19 out of 39) 
3) Intra Asia 20 (1 out of 5) 75 (3 out of 4) 
4) Great Powers and Post-
colonial Latin American 
State 
40 (2 out of 5) 27 (3 out of 11) 
5) Intra Post-colonial Latin 
American State 
100 (4 out of 4) 0 (0 out of 5) 
6) Post-colonial Latin 
American and Asian States 
N.A. 100 (1 out of 1) 
Approximate Significance  
(Contingency coefficient) 
.021 (.30) .000 (.35)* 
TOTAL (N= 235) 62 out of 235 100 out of 235 
Historical Legacies and Previous Contracts 
The historical legacies and previous contracts provisions measured how previous 
contact between two countries affected treaty outcomes commercially and diplomatically.  
With diplomatic exchanges, the previous contracts and historical legacies mostly affected 
the relations between European and Asian states and for among Asian states.  As for 
historical legacies, 50% (31 out of 62) of the total reflected how treaties between 
European and Asian states mentioned past relations.  62 out of 235 treaties had a marker 
for historical legacies.  Of those Asian and European comments on past relations, 5 out of 
31 treaties attempted to resolve past disagreements.  
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Sixty-two treaties in the dataset included a value for the historical legacy variable.  
In 20 out of 62 treaties flagged for the historical legacy variable, no history between the 
two nations prior to meeting for the treaty on-hand existed.  The historical legacy variable 
cross-tabulated with the binned decades yielded a contingency coefficient of .47 at the 
99% level.  Historical legacy as being neutral, positive or negative was mentioned in 42 
out of 62 cases.  Of those 42 cases, 19 treaties also discussed the most favored nation 
(MFN) clause and the majority of the promoted reciprocal MFN statuses.  16 out of 19 
MFN clauses nested within treaties that referenced historical legacy were for reciprocal 
statuses.  55% (34 out of 62) of the treaties that mentioned prior cultural exchanges were 
treaties signed after 1885.  28 treaties before or in 1884 mentioned historical legacy. 
Similarly, the mention of previous contracts and prior legal agreements became more 
prevalent in treaties signed later in the 19th century.  
One hundred treaties mentioned previous contracts.  The treaties could either 
either uphold previous treaties as valid (46%) or amend the previous treaties (54%).  Of 
the 100 treaties that mentioned previous contracts, 28 out of 40 (70%) treaties updated or 
amended prior agreements between European and Asian states.  For the treaties between 
European and Latin American states, only 5 out of 30 treaties in the sample mentioned 
the historical legacy although the newly independent Latin American states were once 
under European colonialism.  With previous contracts, the association with the regions 
was significant at the 99% level with a contingency coefficient of .35.  By binned 
decades, the contingency coefficient was .40 with a 99% level of confidence.  Several 
treaties omitted the formality of acknowledging the validity of previous contracts.  
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Seventy-four out of 100 treaties that mentioned previous contracts were signed 
after 1885.  And 32 out of 74 (43%) of them wished to uphold the contracts.  42 treaties 
signed after 1885 recommended amendments or updates to previous arrangements.  In 
cases where the previous contracts were not amended, the rights for foreigners to reside 
in the others’ country was also stated as symmetric in 6 out of 10 cases.  Of the treaties 
where previous contracts were valid, only 10 treaties in that grouping also mentioned 
foreign residential rights.  Additionally, 12 out of 15 treaties, where previous contracts 
were amended, the residential stipulations were symmetric.  Also if previous contracts 
were kept valid, in 8 out of 10 of those cases both parties were offered most favored 
nation status.  In cases where the previous contract was amended or updated in 10 out of 
14 cases the MFN status had symmetric outcomes.  So for previous contracts, changed or 
unchanged bore little impact on symmetries for economic variables.  However, the 
continued lines of communication proved to be a powerful indicator for mutually 
beneficial future outlooks.   
Conclusion 
Recalling the 2 main hypotheses that motivated my analysis, I find support for the 
first hypothesis.  The differences in outcomes according to region-based dyads appeared 
most significant if one or more of the high contracting parties were from Asia.  Post-
colonial Latin American states and Great Powers strove towards greater symmetries in 
economic, diplomatic, and criminal matters.  Great Powers with Asian nations or intra 
Asian nations bore asymmetric outcomes for items such as the most favored nation 
clauses, extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the rights of foreign residence.  
Many instances in the chapter supported hypothesis 2 because symmetry for 
nearly all variables increased over time.  By the 20th century asymmetries in the most 
 	  
	   J.M.	  Park	  112	  
favored nation clauses and foreign residences were nearly nonexistent.  The year 
following the Berlin West Africa Conference, 1885, did not yield more reciprocity 
legally.  Few cases involving the most favored nation clause, consular representation, 
disaster relief, foreign residences, and protection of properties, asymmetries declined 
after 1885 but economic inequality persisted.  For the other key provisions such as 
clandestine trade and local authorities, there was no great difference in activities pre- or 
post-1885.  Provisions for historical legacy and previous contracts suggested how having 
had a past persuaded symmetric outcomes on key terms in subsequent contracts.    
 The treaty system expanded near the end of the 19th century and grew increasingly 
complex.  Over time, each treaty dealt with topics more specifically.  The scope of the 
treaty became narrower. The newer treaty types included documents that dealt with 
specific items such as the arbitrage, extradition, delimitation, consular, and pilotage 
among others.  Commercial treaties as a broad category became more specialized and 
dealt with specific topics such as arbitrage, arbitration, and pilotage.   
All the while, the text of the treaties appeared more formulaic.  The 
standardization in legal contracts pervaded globally.  In extradition and arbitrage treaties, 
the format and content of the treaties were similar and often identical to one another.  The 
1893 Treaty of Friendship, Navigation and Commerce between Germany and Korea was 
nearly a facsimile of the 1883 Treaty of Friendship between Austria-Hungary and Korea.  
Sentiments were echoed in multiple friendship treaties as well.  These patterns formed the 
structures of international law. 
 In the 19th century, nations new to the Western legal system engaged with the 
rules.  In sum, contracting parties for the treaties represented unique national goals yet 
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European nations approached Asian and Latin American states with like economic and 
cultural goals.  The European states partly wanted economic resources acting in reaction 
to the world’s political economy (Strang 1990) but also desired to civilize different 
cultures namely towards Christianity (Kane and Park 2009).  The treaties in the dataset 
reflected how different regions started out asymmetrically for key economic, political, 
and social provisions but the relations grew towards symmetric outcomes by the 1900s.   
 In comparing the Great Powers’ treaties with Asian nations to western nations’ 
treaties with post-colonial Latin American states, literature on the domestic policies of 
the Latin American states shed light on post-colonial Latin American states’ endeavors to 
establish good relations with European nations because elites of South American 
considered themselves to be a part of Europe.  Cultural significance of race in Latin 
America appeared in different form from the racial identities that developed in Asia.  In 
the 19th century, post-colonial Latin American states presented a “whiter” and more 
European nation-state.  The state census intentionally discounted the existence of native 
tribes, avoided including categories for mixed race individuals, and lumped mixed race 
individuals with some European descent into the “White” category (Loveman 2009).  
Loveman’s studies on census reports demonstrated how governments dogmatically 
attempted to portray their states to be homogeneous.  Latin American states used treaties 
and other governmental acts to depoliticize racial tensions that existed within national 
borders.   Although South American nations were subjected to European colonial rule for 
centuries, South American states established friendly diplomatic relations with European 
states.  The effort resulted in post-colonial Latin American states garnering more 
symmetric treaties than Asian nations.   
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Asian nations, prior to the 20th century, hoped to combat the Great Powers and to 
preserve traditional hierarchies established within Asia instead of gaining Western allies.  
The Asian states unsuccessfully tried to maintain their isolationism first.  After signing 
“unequal” treaties, the Japanese government, in particular, with the Iwakura missions of 
1871 hoped to renegotiate the terms.  The mission did not succeed diplomatically, but the 
diplomats examined Western establishments and the Japanese found models to study and 
scrutinize.  As a result, the reaction to the “unequal” treaties created a new form of 
imperial power in the late 19th century, which germinated from Asia.  The process and 
ideologies, which led to Japan’s exercise of imperialism in the 20th century, are explored 
later in the dissertation. 
Appendix to Chapter 2 
Postcolonial Latin American Treaties  
 Colonial campaigns in the 15th century followed loose guidelines on how polities 
may be conquered.  Generally, areas without recognizable forms of governance were 
poachable polities for colonial regimes.  Without a form of governance, territories were 
not recognized as sovereign nations.  Westlake, a 19th century legal scholar, systematized 
how territories may be recognized as independent polities.  As Westlake had noted, at 
least 5 ways for territories to gain sovereign recognition – 1) occupation which was either 
discovery or more often annexation in modern times, 2) accretion which means water 
boundaries, 3) cession formally finalized by treaties, 4) conquest which were cessions 
without treaties, and 5) prescription which were property held by someone for a long time 
(1894, 146-160).  His efforts to provide some protections for longstanding residents of 
securely bordered areas were unwelcome since capricious standards denigrated certain 
polities from gaining sovereign recognition. 
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 During the 15th century, the legality of territorial conquest was unwarranted.  The 
effrontery of European aristocrats presented non-European polities as conquerable.  
Those decisions to colonize affected modern state development.  James Mahoney’s 
(2010) account of contemporary state development in 15 Latin American nation-states 
that were once under Spanish rule highlighted how pre-colonial settings affected colonial 
arrangements and the future outcomes for various nation-states.  He argues that political 
and economic arrangements established two centuries earlier have impact on levels of 
social and economic development today.  Mahoney used path-dependent models to credit 
pre-colonial conditions affecting postcolonial development.16  Three parts comprise a 
path-dependent argument.  The first element is the initial conditions that represent 
historical junctures.  The second part are the “increasing returns” that maintain a path 
(Mahoney 2003, 53).  At the third stage, the events reach equilibrium and the conditions 
are locked in place.  Economic growth in the colonial peripheries such as Argentina, 
Uruguay, and Costa Rica developed rapidly even though they were poor as colonies.  The 
three centuries of colonial activity in Latin America affected the times of independence 
and border issues (Mahoney 2003).   
 Mahoney tested the how Spain’s transition from the Hapsburg to the Bourbon 
monarchy changed the emphases in colonial campaigns.  Mahoney discussed mercantilist 
era (1492-1700) under the Hapsburgs and the liberal colonial era (1700-1808) under the 
Bourbons. Liberalism here is based on Mill and other European scholars’ call for the 
progressive principles of self-development (Mill 1859).   
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Mahoney employed a mixed-methods approach and assessed fuzzy set theory to discuss qualitative 
historical analyses and quantitative economic figures (Mahoney 2003). 
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Table 12. Model of Differentiated Colonial Phases in Spanish Latin America 
 Mercantilist (1492-1700) Liberalist (1700-1808) 
Accumulation Orientation Promotion of economic 
self-sufficiency; short run 
consumption 
Promotion of international 
comparative advantage; 
long run investment 
State Regulation More restrictions on trade, 
ownership, and economic 
participation 
Fewer restrictions on trade, 
ownership, and economic 
participation 
Stratification System Status-group hierarchy; 
patrimonial, state-economic 
elites 
Market-based class 
stratification; capitalist class 
Source: Mahoney (2010, 21) 
In the mid 17th century, Latin America was divided into viceroyalties (See Figure 6).  By 
the end of the 18th century, the Spanish crown allowed free trade in most of the colonies.  
Colonial imports to colonies increased ten-fold from 1782 to 1796 (Mahoney 2003, 72).   
How the colonial government distributed resources varied across Latin America over 
time.  Settling highly organized indigenous populations such as the Aztecs, Incas, and 
Aymaras during the mercantilist phase yielded to establishing a highly stratified colonial 
society based on economic extraction including forms of encomienda and mita.  The 
rigidity of the mercantilist colonial regimes hindered long-term economic growth when 
nations were postcolonial.  
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Figure 6 - Map of Spanish America, circa 1650
 
Sources: Burkholder and Johnson (1998, 82); Lombardi, Lombardi, and Stoner (1983, 28–29), and 
Sanchez-Albornoz (1974, 81) from (Mahoney 2003, 65) 
 
 During the liberal colonial phase, the Bourbon aristocracy focused on colonizing 
sparsely populated areas that did not have highly developed political organizations.  In 
regions with liberal colonial regimes, the indigenous population abided by less strict 
hierarchies.  Further, Mahoney discussed how best-positioned territories such as 
Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela became the colonial centers of the liberal colonial 
regimes while the mercantilist centers were Bolivia, Ecuador, and Guatemala which were 
not advantageous locales (Moran 2011).  Instead of limiting the scope to activities since 
World War II, examining how the last 200 years affected a nation certainly present 
scholars with more data and more insights into macro-level political decisions.  
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 Colonialism intensified hierarchies in Latin America.  The issue of citizenship 
developed concurrently with the issue of state sovereignty.  Younger (2012) captured the 
problems with Citizenship in the Río de la Plata Borderlands from 1845–1864.  Because 
Latin America maintained slavery for centuries even after colonial independence, the 
right to citizenship in Uruguay staved individuals from slavery.  Brazil did not abolish 
slavery until 1888.  The Extradition Treaty of 1851 between Uruguay and Brazil required 
slaves to return to Brazil.  During the mid to late 19th century, new governments disputed 
the borders within Latin America.  Treaties and other forms of legal interventions 
appeased micro-level conflicts between individuals that also attributed to macro-level and 
national decisions.  Property disputes usually required joint commissions to affirm 
decisions.  National sovereignty is a requirement for citizenship (Soysal 1994); and 
nation-states maintain the rights of citizenship. 
 During the 19th century, the right to national sovereignty became challenged due 
to new legal standards.  Legal categories such as protectorates granted Europeans control 
over non-European territories with a singular document (Anghie 2001).  The European 
diplomatic primacy of the balance of power theory, which Metternich proposed at the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815 after the Napoleonic Wars, shaped the debates during the 
West Africa Committee in 1865 and at Berlin in 1884.   As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884 to 1885 highlighted the colonial scramble of the 
19th century although competition alone did elicit political expansions.  Kasson at the 
Berlin Conference urged the diplomats to ensure voluntary consent for the conquered 
tribes of Africa, but linguistic barriers and conceptions of European superiority prevented 
steps towards attaining consent from the colonized. By exercising the legal concept of 
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terra nullius, the European officials nullified Latin American and African nations’ 
internal organizations.   
African Treaties in the 19th Century 
 Legal positivists such as Westlake dismissed some African tribes’ ability to 
manage their own polities.  The partition of Africa occurred with auspicious “treaties” 
that African natives signed with explorer Henry Morton Stanley (1841-1904) (Anghie 
2004, Hochschild 1998).  Stanley acted on behalf of King Leopold II of Belgium through 
an association called the International Association of Congo.  In addition to Belgium, 
Great Britain and France established extensive colonial campaigns in Africa.   
 Christiana Agawu’s dissertation (1995) distilled the intercultural (between 
African and European states) and intracultural (among European states) political 
contention over Africa from the 17th to 19th century.  Her main thesis emphasized the 
economic rationale for colonialism.  Cultural attributes also entered the multi-national 
planes of Africa.  Cross-cultural fluidity occurred more before rather than Africa formal 
treaties.  Before the annexation of African colonies, Europeans had contact with the 
Africans and Africans were allowed religious freedom (Agawu 1995, 103).  The social 
restrictions followed formal legal annexations.           
 Agawu (1995) examined the colonial activities from the 17th to 19th centuries, but 
the bulk of the activities occurred during the 19th century.  Agawu remarked that treaties 
involving African nations existed prior to the 17th century however most treaties were 
signed from 1866 to 1870 (Agawu 1995, 72).   From 1778 to 1894, 95% of the African 
continent was under European imperial rule (Agawu 1995, 45).  Africa, similar to Latin 
America could not build political and social infrastructures without European institutions, 
which downgraded the status of native populations.  In Asia, only a few formal colonies 
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that mainly the Japanese colonized existed in the early 20th century.  In both cases, the 
steps used to occupy the territory referenced legal treaties that operated under the 
surveillance of other nations in the European community.   
 As Fieldhouse noted, the major acquisitions in Africa after the 1840’s occurred 
following 3 main events - 1) a rivalry between France and Great Britain over the Middle 
East, 2) the budget restrictions to maintain colonies (Agawu 1995, 196), and 3) the 
signing of the Anglo-French Treaty of 1889, 1890, and 1891 (Agawu 1995, 199).  Agawu 
noted that the British imperial policy was not to provide support for explorers.  But 
eventually, the British to maintain natural resources in Africa, the British governed more 
closely.  In 1899, the British annexed Transvaal, modern day South Africa, which in 1897 
produced 24% of the world’s gold supply.  The French were “sub-imperial” where 
annexed territories had colonial governors where governors had some autonomy in their 
actions.  Comparative colonial strategies among European nations produced like results 
of unrest in postcolonial contexts.    
 The treaties highlighted the African nations’ unequal relations to European states.  
Though the Europeans benefited from natural resources and labor in Africa, the 
inequality furthered to where African nations paid their colonizers.  In 24 out of 208 
treaties, Africans paid an annual tax to their colonizers (Agawu 1995, 64).  Long before 
the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, directly ruled colonies in Africa were outposts for 
cheap labor and raw materials such as peanuts, palm oil, and timber.  After 1869, passage 
through Africa facilitated trade to India and other parts of Asia.  Accessible trading 
opportunities elicited European nations to jostle for control in the region.   
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 The treaties in Africa centrally discussed economic issues.  Other topics involving 
political, military, and religious or humanitarian complexities between African and the 
European colonizers also appeared in treaties.  Humanitarian issues, which were of some 
concern during the Berlin West Africa conferences, were mentioned in treaties between 
Africans and Europeans.  Even so, Christian evangelism had nominal effect in Africa 
since 3.7% of the treaties mentioned religion and humanitarian issues themselves 
appeared in 3.1% of 524 treaties.  In terms of religion and language, European colonizers 
left indelible marks in Africa.  Economically, the stages of economic development in 
Africa suffered from poor transfer of European institutions.  Unequal bilateral trade 
agreements and foreign investiture agreements continue to extract resources out of Africa 
to industrialized and developing nations in other regions.   
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CHAPTER 3 
CHINA’S TURMOILS WITH UNEQUAL TREATIES 	  
 Leo Tolstoy’s famous opening to Anna Karenina stated, “All happy families are 
alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way,” (Tolstoy [1878] 1917).   Through 
the Oblonsky family, Tolstoy depicted the turmoil within Russia’s social and political 
systems.  Likewise, the metaphor for a family had been woven into international relations 
between Asia and Europe.  The Europeans organized around the concept of the “family 
of nations” during the 19th century. The analogy of a family involved the state affairs of 
Asian nation states.  The family was central to China’s Confucian order and that 
materialized in China’s tributary state relations.  China considered itself “elder brother” 
watching over Korea, the “younger brother.”  
 The tributary order of China during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) had 6 tribute 
groups.  The first category comprised 18 countries known as the southeast barbarians, 
which included Korea, Japan, the Liuqiu or Ryukus, Annam, Cambodia, Siam, Champa, 
Java. The second category of southeast barbarians comprised 44 countries, which 
included Sulu, Malacca, Sri Lanka.  The third category of northern barbarians had 8 
countries led by the kings of Datan.  The fourth category was the northeast barbarians of 
Nuezhi.  The fifth category was the first half of the Western barbarians, which had 58 
“west of Lanzhou in the northwest” and 38 other Western nations (Hamashita 2008, 15).  
The sixth category was the second half of the Western barbarians, which included 14 
groups from Turgan (Hamashita 2008, 15).  China’s tributary system regarded non-
Chinese lands as barbaric polities.  The term for barbarian, yi, became synonymous with 
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foreigners. The interchangeability of the terms offended the British. The Europeans and 
Americans that entered China and Japan in the 19th century paternalistically instructed the 
Asians to accept new practices in business, law, science, and governance.   
 Within Europe, the “Family of Nations” was a practical solution to 17th century 
restructuring for the balance of power.  The royal families of Europe were often bickering 
family members that resolved personal and political issues through diplomatic 
conferences.  The hereditary royal lineages that ruled France, Spain, Great Britain, 
Denmark, Sweden and Lombardy plus the five elective monarchies of the Holy Roman 
Empire, the Vatican, Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia and the four republics of Venice, the 
Republic of Italy, Switzerland, and Belgium had blood ties with leaders of other 
European nations (Wilson 1912).  The “family of nations” came to be known as the 
“standard of civilization” that the Asian states attempted to meet in the 19th century.   
 In this chapter, I discuss the foreign relations of pre-modern Asia with a particular 
focus on China.  Then I examine the major treaties that China signed.  The Treaty of 
Nerchinsk (1689) with Russia, Treaty of Nanking (1842) with Great Britain, Treaty of 
Tianjin (1858) with Great Britain, Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) with Japan highlight 
several key junctures in Chinese political regimes.  The dissent against foreigners also led 
to uprisings such as the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) and Boxer Rebellion (1900).  The 
international system of 19th Asia operated under different sets of norms than intra-
European relations had (Krasner 2001).  The differences were pronounced in China.  
Revisiting European Concepts of Statehood 
 China and Japan’s treaty relations with Western nations demonstrated how 
opening ports for commerce, establishing diplomatic posts, and approving the most 
favored nation clause were contentious processes.   The unfamiliarity with Western legal 
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forms disadvantaged Asian statesmen.  The Qing officials of the early 19th century 
initially considered the most favored nation to be beneficial in maintaining the balance of 
power and prevent a country from over-dominating (Auslin 2000, 23).  
 The Asian state-system in the 19th century differed from the European model of a 
state system.  Asia transformed from the Sino-centric tributary state system to reposition 
Japan as an imperial power in the early 20th century.  In the suzerain state system, China 
was the political, commercial, and cultural center in Asia.  China’s view of the world was 
one strictly divided among the “civilized” (hua) and “uncivilized” (yi) countries 
(Hamashita 2008, 91).  The Sino-centric world order allowed Korea, Japan, and Vietnam 
to have their own spheres of influences within the neighboring regions in Asia 
(Hamashita 2008, 88).  Here I argue that China’s path affected Japan and how these 
decisions in turn shaped Japan’s policies towards Korea.  
 In Europe, Westphalian sovereignty idealized sovereign equality where each 
nation had equal weight in accordance to the “law of nations” in diplomatic affairs.  At 
least legally, each side’s views were evaluated as valid and respectable in treaty 
negotiations.  The definition of Westphalian sovereignty as used in international relations 
focused on territoriality and the absence of external interference on domestic affairs. 
Treaties were formally legitimate means to influence another nation’s legal system.  
During the 19th century, poor relations with Western nations led to China’s downturn.  In 
comparison, Japan used Western contacts to improve educational and industrial 
infrastructures.  European and American merchants challenged China and Japan’s 
domestic sovereignties to restructure existing economic models in Asia.  Treaties led to 
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China’s demise and Japan’s rise as a major world power.  The processes were multi-
faceted based on each nation’s readiness to accept the terms of the treaties.   
  Treaties affected micro and macro-level international governance.  The changes 
influenced individuals at the interactional level too.  Especially in developing the 
language for law, inter-personal skills crucially affected legislation.  Language mediated 
conversations between scholars and translators.  Because language shaped the concepts 
that individuals could reference, developments in terminologies bridged some cultural 
rifts that existed between Asian and European thinkers.  Translations of legal treatises 
further transmitted the concepts of international law (Gong 1984, Liu 1999).  
Hypothetically, translations tried to make words equivalent in meaning but translations 
could never be perfect replications.  The conditions during which these translations were 
made in Asia reified some power differentials that were present in economics, military 
capacity, and science.17  Historicity also changed meaning in texts.  Because texts from 
the period still remain, the conflation of legal philosophy and practice challenge historical 
legacies.  
 With the treaties, Europeans hoped to secure trade, protect civil liberties, and gain 
access to certain port cities in Asia.  A particularly contentious issue included 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.  The Europeans extended extraterritoriality to protect their 
citizens from local authorities.  In practice, consular jurisdiction often cloaked illegal 
activities such as smuggling, murders, and rapes (Cassel 2012, Peters 2007).  China 
endured years of unequal extraterritorial jurisdiction until 1943.  Even a decade or so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Furthermore, feminist scholars debate how the masculine pronouns of certain languages continue to 
provide relationships of “unequal exchange” (Liu 1999, 37). 
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after the commission in the 1920’s to overturn the unequal treaties, foreigners in China 
enjoyed privileges and operated under different sets of rules.   
China before the 19th century 
 A common misconception about Asia before the 19th century is that China, Japan, 
and Korea were completely closed off from Western contact.  The Ryukyu maritime 
trading networks connected China, Japan, and Korea starting in the 15th century 
(Hamashita 2008, 60).  By the 17th century, Portuguese missionaries and Dutch 
merchants settled in China and Japan, respectively.  Trade and commercial negotiations 
among Asian nations thrived at this time (Toby 1984, Hamashita 2002, Larsen 2008). 
Though formal treaty relations were infrequent up through the 19th century, European and 
Asian traders had contact with one another. 
 The Jesuits, who entered China in the 16th century, disturbed China’s unifying 
ideology of Confucianism.  Confucianism emphasized order and stability that was 
achieved due to one’s respect for others based on five major human relationships.  The 
five bonds (pinyin: wǔlún, 五倫) privileged obedience and respect.  The bonds dictated 
actions for the ruler to his minister, father to son, husband to wife, and elder brother to 
younger brother, and friend to friend.  The concepts guided domestic life as well as 
international affairs.  Familial terms represented international relations. The emperor of 
China viewed the Korean nation as “Little Brother” (Gries 2005).  
   Europeans’ diplomatic contacts with China established intellectual and 
commercial exchanges.  China’s earliest contact with a European state dated back to the 
14th century.  During the latter part of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), the first Portuguese 
ship arrived in 1514, and by 1517, Portugal sent to China its first ambassador, Tomé Pires 
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(Roberts 2006, 131). The settlement of Jesuits in 1582 provided the Chinese with access 
to European science, philosophy, and theology.  During the period of Manchu rule, the 
Jesuits curried the favor of the Chinese when missionaries treated the emperor Kangxi of 
malaria (Roberts 2006, 146).  European contact changed scientific and other intellectual 
endeavors in Asia.  
 The differing notions of sovereignty blazed the path towards misunderstandings at 
the interpersonal to international levels. Though diplomatic relations with Europeans 
existed for centuries, Asian states limited commerce and education to isolated regions.  
Interactions with Westerners were quite limited.  The first diplomatic mission from a 
European state to China was from 1618-1619 when Russian ambassador Ivashko Petlin 
and Ondrushka Munoff visited Peking.  However, the Russian diplomats were 
unwelcome in China because they did not prepare tributary gifts for the emperor.  
Exchange of gifts, ketou,18 and numerous other gestures were part of the diplomatic 
repertoire in Asia.   Adopting these practices became a challenge for future European 
diplomats.  
 In 1653, when Russian ambassador Fedor Isakovich Baykov brought gifts but 
refused to ketou to the emperor, the Russians’ attempt to establish a fur trade with the 
Chinese was thwarted.  European diplomats also differed from the Chinese in their 
conceptualization of sovereignty and statehood. Sovereignty that established after the 
Peace at Westphalia in 1648 affected the development of international law.  The variance 
between Asian and European view of international relations was based on concepts of 
tributary versus domestic sovereignty state systems.  In the suzerain state structure, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ketou (sometimes appearing in texts as kowtow) was a customary bow that involved kneeling on the 
floor and touching the forehead down to the ground.  
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tributary states revolved around China, and to the Chinese all other nations including 
European empires were subordinate states.19   The Europeans, who in turn, perceived 
themselves to be superior over the Chinese, wanted the Chinese to accept sovereign 
equality as a legal doctrine.  
Treaties of Nerchinsk (1689) and Kiakhta (1727) 
 Bilateral treaties between European and Asian states existed as early as the 17th 
century.  The point less emphasized in historical accounts of the treaty referred to the four 
parties – Russians, Mongols, Manchus, and Jesuits – that agreed to settle the ambiguous 
border issues in the treaty (Perdue 2005, 163).   Diplomats transcribed the text of the 
treaty into Russian, Chinese, Manchu, Mongol, and Latin.20  At this time, neither 
Russians nor the Qing expected state relations to occur among equals. Therefore, the 
concept of Westphalian sovereignty did not determine the negotiations.  The Treaty of 
Nipchu (or Nerchinsk) in 1689 between China and Russia established the two nations’ 
borders on the river Gorbitza (MC 1917, art. 1).   
 Similarly, territory located left of the Argon River was under Chinese controls 
(art. 2).  By quelling past disputes between the Chinese and Russians along the border, 
the two nations desired an amicable relationship (art. 6). Article 6 mentioned the right of 
the “Sovereigns of both Powers” (MC 1917, 7) but “Sovereigns” in this treaty implied the 
will of the rulers rather than the citizenry and empires.21  The Treaty of Nerchinsk, unlike 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In the 18th century, Qing China territorially doubled in size. China did not industrialize during the time of 
Europe’s Industrial Revolution.  According to Kenneth Pomeranz, Europe had the advantage of coal and 
silver reserves, which precipitated Europe’s industrial development (Roberts 2006, 154). Though domestic 
trends in China changed to diversify popular culture and to include women’s voices into social discourse 
(Ko 1994), China’s contact with Western culture and economies disrupted China’s society. 
20 The version analyzed here was the original approved copy in French.   
21 Additional treaties between Russia and China were signed in 1727, 1768, and 1792, which did not 
address Westphalian sovereignty.  
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many treaties of the 19th century, received mutually beneficial results from the treaty 
between Asian and European nations. 
 A few decades later, the Treaty of Kiakhta (1727) between China and Russia 
implied equal standing between the two nations (Hamashita 2008).  The Treaty of 
Kiakhta between Russia and China in 1727 established a form of equality between the 
two kingdoms. China accepted other Asian nations as tributary states.  Russia was 
considered more equal in stature and exchanged letters reciprocally (art. 6).  With opened 
trade with Russia came an influx of silver from South America via Spain and the rest of 
Europe.  China made efforts to accept new currency.  The Russians brought both silver 
and gold coinage into China in the late 18th century (Hamashita 2008, 43).  The shortage 
of silver coinage in the 19th century pushed the Chinese and British to practice bartering 
(Hamashita 2008, 143), which had been practiced for centuries.  
 The Canton system in China privileged an exclusive group of cohong merchants 
to trade with Westerners.  The Treaty of Kiakhta (1727) and the later treaties that China 
signed with Western nations directly addressed the issue of the Canton system and 
cohong merchants.  The Russians benefited from trade following Kiakhta (Lukin 2006).  
Through 1850, the Kiakhta trade accounted for 15 to 20% of the total customs revenue 
for the Russian Empire (Lukin 2006, 19).  The topics covered in the 1689 and 1727 
treaties shaped Russia’s rivalry with Great Britain to maintain power in Northeast Asia.  
The emperor formally recognized the Canton system with a decree in 1759 (Tignor et al. 
2008).   By the 1720’s, the cohong merchants formed a monopolistic guild in Canton 
(present-day Guangzhou).  The merchants charged European merchants with 
nonnegotiable fees. The Canton system left trade with Westerners exclusively in the 
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hands of cohong merchants who controlled prices and trading conditions without 
regulatory interference.    
 In 1760, Canton was the only open port available to foreign nationals.22  The 
British made attempts to strengthen trade relations with the Chinese but proved to be 
difficult.  In 1792, Lord Macartney of Great Britain sent an embassy to China to secure 
the tea trade. The British show of hospitality, which included gifts for the emperor, was 
insufficient for the Qianlong Emperor who expected the British gentlemen to perform a 
ketou.  Such hospitality errors embarrassed British diplomats.  In 1793, the Qianlong 
Emperor rejected King George III’s envoys.  The Chinese emperor’s conception of 
himself as a supreme central figure went unchallenged for centuries until the Europeans 
approached him for offers of trade.   The emperor reprimanded the British king for being 
“ignorant of [China’s] dynastic regulations” (Shurmann and Milton 1967, 112).    The 
Chinese emperor displeased with “barbarian merchants” for failing to “Tremblingly 
obey” Chinese laws and customs rejected the proposal from the British (Shurmann and 
Milton 1967, 113).  Nonetheless, the British did not leave China after the harsh 
admonitions and managed to establish some trade relations.  
 The diplomatic foul or hospitality error tarnished China’s future exchanges with 
Great Britain.  When the emperor in 1816 denied Lord Amherst’s embassy request to 
expand trade with China, opium smuggling heightened.  China’s stance against Western 
intrusion partly kept Asia unified under a strictly hierarchical unit that China had 
envisioned.  The Chinese avoided what they considered to be the adulterating influences 
of merchant based economies and Christian thinking that would disrupt the five major 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Pan-Asianism of the 18th century was primarily anti-Western.  The Chinese emphasized their imperial 
centrality to keep out Europeans further. 
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social relations of Confucianism. Even so, China like many European economies that 
shifted from agriculture to industry centuries earlier and moved into a trade-based 
economy with some resistance.  
 In 1834, the East India Company’s monopoly on trade within China ended.  
Several skirmishes in Guangzhou between British sailors and Chinese authorities incited 
the First Opium War.  The British, on September 21, 1839, wanted China to compensate 
them for the loss of opium due to the detention of sailors.  The British naval forces easily 
defeated the Chinese.  After the First Opium War (1839-1842), the Treaty of Nanjing 
(1842) between the two empires fiscally destroyed the Qing Dynasty.  Furthermore, the 
Chinese government’s trust in the international system as a fair institution, worthy of 
adoption, seemed less desirable after the treaty.  
 China’s trade relations signified the importance of commerce for diplomatic 
affairs.  By the 1840’s, China traded triangularly with Great Britain and India.  In the 
1850’s, Karl Marx debated the origins of the Opium War in the New York Daily Tribune 
and stated that the Opium trade caused the war. Other scholars, Fieldhouse and Trocki, 
supported Marx in his identification of commerce as a central impetus for war.23  
Although Fieldhouse believed that colonies were taken as a last resort to save the 
peripheries from self-destruction (Howe 1998), imperialism served economic interests.  
Fairbank disagreed with Marx. Fairbank presumed through Western normative lenses that 
the Chinese becoming civilized and stated that the Opium War was due to clashes 
between Chinese and Western cultures.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 As Karl Marx stated in the New York Daily Tribune article, “Trade or Opium,” on September 20, 1858, 
the cause of the Opium War to further British commercial gains in China 
(http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1858/09/20.htm). 
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 As for the effects of the war, impact was economic and cultural.  From 1842 to 
1949, China signed over 1000 treaties and agreements with 18 different nations (Peters 
2007).  Of them 13 treaty partners were European24 - United Kingdom, France, Sweden-
Norway, Prussia, Portugal, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Austria-
Hungary, Russia, and Switzerland.  Additionally, Japan, Peru, Brazil, Mexico, and the 
United States concluded treaties in China. 64 treaties in the dataset involved China.  53 of 
64 treaties were signed with Western nations, 9 involved another Asian state, and 2 were 
with South American states.  
Table 13. Distribution of Chinese Treaties by binned decades 
Binned Decades Count 
4) 1841 to 1860 13 
5) 1861 to 1880 13 
6) 1881 to 1900 23 
7) 1901 to 1912 15 
 
Table 14. Distribution of Chinese Treaties by Type 
Types of Treaties Count 
1) Peace 7 
2) Commerce and navigation 11 
3) Friendship 24 
5) Arbitration 2 
6) Delimitation and protectorate 2 
7) Consular conventions and other  18 
  
 Scholars of China reflected upon the period between 1842-1943 as the “treaty 
century” (Fairbank 1992), which was also known as guochi, the time of national 
humiliation (D. Wang 2005, 1).  Fairbank’s interpretation of the treaties represented an 
older historiography of the clash between the Eastern versus the Western cultural norms.  
The fractured perspective of world cultures returned with Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Peters (2007) did not include Russia as a European nation. I took the liberty of grouping Russia as such. 
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Civilizations” thesis, but the position agreed with Marxian analysis of viewing 
imperialism as a fulfillment of British economic goals.  
  In terms of economic development, how the Europeans succeeded is debatable.  
According to Pomeranz (2000), the Chinese farmers produced less nitrous soils than 
European farmers and the Chinese farmer consumed more calories per day than European 
farmers before the 19th century.  The growth of Europe in the 19th century was surprising 
due to China and Japan’s high standards of living and life expectancies which were better 
than European standards of that time. The Chinese empire was capable of mobilizing a 
workforce comparable to the Industrial Revolution in Europe. Up through the 19th 
century, China’s wealth was like those of Europeans in terms of key industrial and 
technological advances. The Asian merchants did not expand their markets in comparison 
to their Western counterparts during the late 19th and early 20th centuries because Asian 
merchants did not use techniques such as arbitrage or speculation (Pomeranz 2000). In an 
antiquated line of argument the rationale for not developing industrially was due to 
constructions interfering with the fengshui, the harmony between man and nature 
(Fairbank 1992).   
 Europe’s innovations in scientific knowledge propelled technological 
developments in navigation and industry.  Goldstone (2012) noted how ideological rifts 
yielded European success and Asian stagnation. Europeans advanced due to a stark break 
from its intellectual past whereas China seemed reluctant to break from the past 
(Goldstone 2012). Confucianism’s disapproval of commerce prevented China from 
developing mines, railroads, and telegraph lines. The Chinese attempted to integrate 
European enlightenment with Confucianism (Fairbank 1992).  Teaching both schools of 
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thought without contradictions was abandoned in 1881 (Fairbank 1992, 219).  Europeans’ 
primary goals in economic gains changed drastically differed from Asians’ lowly regard 
towards the merchant class.   
 How law functioned as a discipline differed in East Asia and Europe.  A standard 
Western historiography on China deemphasized traditional Chinese laws as a mere model 
that could not be followed strictly as a code of behaviors.  Recent scholarship questions 
the misleading assessment of China’s lawlessness (Nakamura 2004, Bourgon 2007 and 
2008).  A differentiation existed between conceptualizing law as an idea and law as a 
model. Law was practiced differently according to national standards and for the Chinese, 
the power of written law, which was paramount in the European context, remained less 
significant for them. Translating European laws into Chinese imbued new cultural 
registers.  Further, the Japanese language developed words to accommodate concepts for 
“independence” (zìzhǔ,自主) and “sovereignty” (dúlì, 獨立).  Chinese foreign minister Li 
Hongzhang considered signing treaties to be merely a symbolic act that had little material 
consequences (Larsen 2008).  However, after several treaties, costly restructuring ensued.  
 The discourse between the Chinese diplomat, Li Hongzhang and the Japanese 
diplomat, Mori Arinori resolved,  
 “Treaties would do for ordinary commercial relations. But great national 
 decisions were made according to comparative national strength, not according to 
 treaties” (Larsen 2008, 283).  
Mori spoke in realist terms and justified his disregard for treaties because of power 
differentials.  Li replied, “This is heresy. To rely upon strength and violate treaties was 
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not tolerated by international law” (ibid). Mori replied, “International law is also useless” 
(ibid).  Such an account illuminated early interpretations of international law in Asia.  
 Treaties as representative features of international relations demonstrated how 
external forces affected domestic politics.  Information on treaties written earlier between 
European and Asian nations illustrated how Europeans operated on the primacy of 
written law and the Asians, the Chinese in particular, differently conceived law more as 
an ideal type. Since treaties largely dealt with economic themes, how those stipulations 
were interpreted became important. Foreign signatories included instructions on how to 
conduct business and draft formal written communications; but Chinese officials 
disregarded the procedural elements.   
Treaty of Nanking (1842) 
 Besides the tales of wealth and riches that Marco Polo brought back to Europe 
from Cathay, a classical name for China, the Europeans needed motivation to contact 
China for trade.  The Spanish and Portuguese explorers in the 15th century traveled 
westward to colonize the West Indies and Latin America.  In the 18th century, the 
European motives to expand to India and China was tied to commercial interests of the 
Dutch and later the British East India Company.  To protect the interest of trade, the East 
India Tea Company had quasi-sovereign powers (Scully 2000, 22).   
 Treaties between China and European states included protections for peace and 
for foreigners residing and traveling in China.  The protection of citizens developed laws 
for extraterritoriality, employment restrictions, and religious freedoms.  British officials 
made encouraged trade as ports were opened, buildings erected, tonnage rates were set, 
and efforts to teach the Chinese how to conduct business was laid out.  Specifically 
pertinent to the Treaty of Nanking (1842) was China paying war indemnities to Britain, 
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withdrawing British troops from China, and establishing posts for formal 
communications.  
 Extraterritoriality involving Chinese and treaty-power nationals, which allowed 
for the defendant’s nationality to dictate trial procedures, was established.  25 treaties out 
of 64 that involved China mentioned extraterritoriality.  Of the 25 only 3 (12%) of the 
treaties reflected a symmetric extraterritorial jurisdiction.  In cases where a foreign 
national was the plaintiff, an assessor was allowed to proceed along with the Chinese 
magistrate (D. Wang 2005, 11).  Extraterritoriality (chih-wai fa-ch’uean) and consular 
jurisdiction (ling-shih ts-ai-p’an ch’uean) were practically synonyms (Scully 2000, 13). 
The Chinese government confronted attack from British officials surrendering British 
subjects for crimes against Chinese subjects after 1784.  That year, in the Lady Hughes 
case, the Chinese officials wrongfully executed a British citizen accused of the crime 
(Cassel 2012, 43).  Issues regarding jurisdiction persisted between the British and the 
Chinese.   
 Extradition and criminal prosecution involving opium smugglers were prominent.  
Regarding opium traders, Lin Zexu, a Qing official, addressed Queen Victoria directly to 
ward off more extensive Western intrusions.  Lin, who was against Western imperialism 
argued for China’s right to “law and order” (fadu) although the term did not appear in 
Qing codes (Cassel 2012, 49).  Lin’s plan to expunge the drug trade was to have 
merchants be accountable for the goods they sold.  In China, Lin attempted to have 
British merchants sign bonds (gangjie, qiejie) promising not to sell opium (Cassel 2012, 
50).  When Lin destroyed the confiscated opium in May 1839, debate over property rights 
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ensued.  The British government felt entitled to their property and required the Chinese to 
pay the British for the destroyed opium in the Treaty of Nanjing (1842) after the war.  
 The negotiation process for the Treaty of Nanjing began on July 23, 1842 after 
China lost the Battle of Zhenjiang.  All negotiations and ratifications of the treaty took 
place in about one month.  The final version of the treaty was signed on August 29, 1842 
on the British battleship, the Cornwallis.  The strong British navy resoundingly defeated 
the Chinese.  Severe financial mandates dominated the treaty. The British extracted 
material resources from China as a result of the Treaty of Nanjing. Qi Ying, the imperial 
commissioner of the Emperor Daoguang, and Yi Libu negotiated the terms of the treaty 
with Henry Pottinger.  The emperor communicated his concern regarding the 
ramifications of the treaty to Qi Ying that Britain was hospitable to the Chinese for 
centuries (D. Wang 2005, 12).25  The emperor described how price variance in trade is 
unavoidable and therefore, “trade and commerce in different places should go by the old 
rules and there is no need to make changes” (D. Wang 2005, 12).  
 The Treaty of Nanjing expanded Britain’s commercial interests in China. The 
stipulations of the treaty included the opening of five additional treaty ports in, China: 
Guangzhou (Canton), Xiamen (Amoy), Fuzhou (Foochow), Ningbo (Ningpo), and 
Shanghai in article 2.26  Article 5 directly addressed the abolition of cohong merchant 
privileges in order for British merchants to have greater access to markets in China. 
Trade stipulations are further addressed in article 10, which gave free reign to British 
merchants to set up tariffs as they saw fit.  In addition to opening access, the British 
gained strategic territories in Asia.  Article 3 ceded the territory of Hong Kong for British 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Wang translated this excerpt from the Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’an’guan, Yapian shansheng dang’an 
shiliao, 6:114-15. 
26 The names of the port within the parentheses are how the ports appeared in the 1842 treaty.  
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use,27 which affected the development of Hong Kong.  The war indemnities that China 
had to pay totaled 21 million silver dollars; articles 4 through 7 directly addressed 
indemnities.  The Chinese had to pay the British “the sum of 6,000,000 of dollars, as the 
value of the opium” lost in the war (art. 4, Hertslet 1908, 8). Article 6 requested China to 
pay 12,000,000 for war indemnities, and article 7 instructed China of the payment plan.  
 Article 10 spelled out the primacy of trade.  The standards for fair and transparent 
trading regulations were left intentionally ambiguous. The treaty did not define “regular 
tariff of export and import customs and other dues” that are to be “publicly notified and 
promulgated for general information” (D. Wang 2005, 13).   
 Even with economic claims being central to the treaty.  The tone of the treaty was 
gain preeminent control over the Chinese in a paternalistic nature.  The first article of the 
treaty, similar to others in the study inserted a statement of peace and friendship between 
contracting nations. It mutually defined an interest in peace.  The British language 
version of the treaty used in some cases comical phrasings such as in article 3 such as “It 
being obviously necessary and desirable that British subjects should have some port at 
which they may careen and refit their ships” (Hertslet 1908, 8). The phrasing of such 
requests demonstrated the mixture of pedantic mannerism in which the British 
approached treaty negotiations with the Chinese and the freer style for legal writing that 
existed in the 19th century.   
 The imperial commissioner, Qi Ying, and British representative residing in Hong 
Kong, Henry Pottinger, signed a supplemental treaty to the Nanjing agreement on July 
22, 1843.  The Treaty of Bogue in 1843 ensured the five ports of Canton, Fuchow, Amoy, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Article 4 of the Convention of October 24, 1860 (No. 8) and the Convention of June 9, 1898 extended the 
use of Hong Kong. 
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Ningpo, and Shanghai were the sole ports open for trade (art. 4, MC 1917, 391).  
According to the British, the most-favored nation clause was a necessity at Bogue (Cassel 
2012, 52).  British subjects were allowed to rent property and reside “without molestation 
or restraint” in the five port cities according to the “Treaty of perpetual Peace and 
Friendship” (MC 1917, art.7).  The “lawless Natives of China” who might have 
committed crimes against the Chinese government cannot take refuge on British vessels 
or in British residences (MC 1917, 393, art. 9). The British government stipulated that 
extradition rights should be symmetric.  Extraterritoriality was an explicit condition of 
article 13, but it did not introduce personal jurisdiction (Cassel 2012, 52).  Most of the 17 
articles in the Treaty of Bogue referred to the matters of trade and commerce.   
 The treaty between the United States and China distinguished criminal activities 
versus civil jurisdiction. The United States government signed the Treaty of Wangxia 
(1844) to take advantage of terms that the British negotiated with the Chinese. Here the 
drafters wrote that the two nations hoped to establish friendly relations “by means of a 
Treaty or general convention of peace, amity, and commerce” (MC 1917, 677), since it 
was difficult to inculcate the Chinese with European tenets of international relations that 
was based on contractual agreements. The second article of the treaties permitted the U.S. 
the right to enter the five treaty ports, which Great Britain gained access to after the 
Treaty of Nanjing.  U.S. government’s aim with the treaty was to gain trading and 
commercial resilience in China. The Americans also clarified the language on 
extraterritoriality.  In article 21, the treaty stated the principles of consular jurisdiction 
(Cassel 2012, 53), where the United States government stipulated that Chinese citizens 
who committed a crime against Americans should be tried under Chinese law. 
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Conversely, Americans who committed crimes against the Chinese should be tried under 
American law.  Opium was banned for trading and the U.S. government had to turn over 
any American smugglers to the Chinese authorities (Cassel 2012). But the measure to 
curb the opium trade remained ineffective (Cassel 2012, 54). Similarly, the Treaty of 
Huangpu between the French and the Chinese in 1844 stipulated more clearly which acts 
were considered crimes (Cassel 2012, 54).  The treaty also resulted in decriminalizing 
Christian activities in China.   
 In sum, the treaty of Nanjing made China pay for a war that it had lost. Also 
China’s interiors were damaged and the central government lost control as an 
authoritative anchor.  The treaty introduced new concepts such as the most favored nation 
clause that other foreign countries used in China to benefit from low trade tariffs.  The 
treaty also extended consular jurisdiction and extraterritoriality to foreign nationals who 
may have committed crimes in China.  After the treaty, China was unable to block the 
influx of foreigners interested in trade, proselytization, and intellectual exchanges.  The 
treaties were unequal because the British uprooted past forms and required the Chinese to 
learn new methods under the guise of progress because the British promoted that distinct 
mode.  The mode followed suit with the world society approaches to nation-state 
formations.  For China, the process of adopting Western laws was slow and painful.  
 The next trial in China’s relations with the British was the Arrow War.  The 
Arrow War (1856-1860) began when Qing officials arrested 12 Chinese crewmen aboard 
Arrow on suspicion of piracy with an expired British registration.  Sir John Bowring, the 
Governor of Xianggang, attacked Guangzhou after the incident. The Treaty of Tianjin 
(Tientsin) concluded the war. Many other countries, including the United States, France, 
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Germany, Portugal, Denmark, Spain, Japan, Peru, and Brazil, signed a version of the 
Treaty of Tianjin with China after Great Britain.  
Treaty of Tianjin (1858) 
 The Sino-British Treaty of Tianjin further laid out the types of trading and tariff 
regulations that signified the period of unequal treaties in China.  Even though China had 
signed several prior treaties, the Treaty of Tianjin (1858) was still considered a mere 
formality to the Chinese government.28 The treaty to Chinese officials was performative 
and it was used to have foreign troops withdraw from China quickly (D. Wang 2005, 17).  
One Chinese negotiator at the time, Gui Liang, wrote that “the treaties of peace with 
Britain and France cannot be taken as real,” and dismissed the treaties merely as a “few 
sheets of paper,” and that they can “henceforth be treated as rubbish” (D. Wang 2005, 
17).  This and other proceeding treaties frequently mandated that the Chinese cared about 
written communications in legal and commerce intercourse.  The Europeans, who at this 
time in China were mostly British, found China’s unwritten but locally understood rules 
of commerce difficult to follow.  The emphasis on documentation in business 
necessitated articles to provide detailed instructions for the Chinese.  Reciprocity was not 
a main emphasis.  Westerners did not have to adopt Chinese customs: for instance, 
English merchants were not required to understand Chinese business norms such as 
verbal agreements or the performance of ceremonial acts of deference to the emperor.  
Treaties had standing in the international community, in particular among other Western 
nations though treaties were less important in Asia.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  An important issue worked out in the treaty dealt with the residence of British officers in Beijing, which 
had special significance in the “Forbidden City.” The non-indigenous customs were not respected because 
foreigners were barred from entering Chinese communities.  
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 The Treaty of Tianjin in 1858 signed with Britain accounted for the “existing 
misunderstanding” between the two empires (Hertslet 1908, 19, art.1). The emphasis in 
the Treaty of Tianjin sounded paternalistic.  The economic primacy of the 1842 treaty 
was reinforced.  Adding to the prior arrangements, several other ports, Newchwang, 
Taengchow, Taiwan [Formosa], Chawchow [Swatow] and Kiungchow [Hainan], were 
opened for trade, residence, and for even building churches in 1858 (art. 11). Article 24 
and 26 revised the tariff on import and export duties.  There the 5% ad valorem tax was 
considered unreasonable due to the falling value of merchandises.29  Article 31 exempted 
British owned vessels from paying tonnage fees if the ship left within 48 hours of arrival.  
Foreigners trading within China had privileges such as avoiding the payment of likin, 
which is a form on transit tax that provincial officials devised (D. Wang 2005, 18).  Likin 
dated back to 1853 but the British officials were allowed to pay a 2.5% fixed ad valorem 
according to article 28, rule 7 of the Treaty of Tianjin (Gray 2002, 91).  
  The Treaty of Nanjing and the supplemental agreements confirmed the nature of 
binding contracts.  The British instructed the Chinese on the practices of international 
law.  The prior Chinese ministers’ approaches of considering treaties as “rubbish” was 
unacceptable (Wang 2005, 17).  After appeasing to the increased demands of the British, 
the mystique of the “Forbidden City” was disassembled. China accommodated foreign 
agents of Great Britain in service of “Her Majesty’s Mission” (MC 1917, 405, art. 3). The 
representatives were “at liberty to choose his own Servants and Attendants, who shall not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 This article was further revised in the Agreement of November 8, 1858 (no. 7) and again in the Tariff 
Agreement on August 29, 1902 (no. 27). 
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be subjected to any kind of molestation whatever” (art. 3, MC 1917, 406).30  The third 
article of the treaty allowed British agents to reside in the capital city of Beijing, where 
the agent “shall not be called upon to perform any ceremony derogatory to him as 
representing the Sovereign of an independent nation” (MC 1917, 405). The explicit 
indication against interference exhibited how transgressions had been a problem in the 
past.  The British hoped to erase the stigma of Chinese citizens who worked for 
foreigners and requested that the Chinese government “place no restrictions” for such 
employment (art. 13, MC 1917, 409).  The British Treaty of Tianjin did not assure 
reciprocal treatment of Chinese citizens in Great Britain if there were any. The 
opportunity for the Chinese to travel to Great Britain was not discussed in writing. 
Articles 4 through 7 indicated more specifications regarding the conduct of British 
nationals in China and the privileges allowed to them.  
 Proper social behaviors were prescribed for criminal procedures.  Laws on 
extraterritoriality remained similar to the Treaty of Nanjing where altercations between 
Chinese and British nationals required representatives from both nations to act as 
adjudicators.  Disputes in business affairs such as outstanding debts required cooperation 
from officials of the alleged criminals’ nationality.   
 To further Britain’s cultural reach in China, special arrangements were made for 
religious freedoms.  With article 8, the British government secured the right to practice 
the Christianity in China because it “inculcates the practice of virtue and teaches man to 
do as he would be done by” (MC 1917, 407).  The mission of the British extended 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The Chinese language of the text does not imply a sexual connotation as close to the “molestation” 
translation in the English. Further, molestation in its 21st century usage is different from the writers’ use in 
the early 20th century.  
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beyond trade, and an effort to “correct” the existing social norms of China became 
implicit in the treaties.   
 Language is a primary expression of national culture (Anderson 1991).  The 
British requested the use English as an official language for communication (art. 50, MC 
1917).  The request exemplified systematically heralding English customs to the Chinese 
and requiring the Chinese to learn English for international transactions.  The British 
government requested that Chinese official documents not refer to the British with the 
character “yi” 夷 which was often translated to mean “barbarian.”  Lydia Liu’s research 
of the term “yi” demonstrated how the meaning shifted over time. Liu noted that “yi” at 
times meant foreigner or foreign. Translations near the time of conflict rendered “yi” to 
mean barbarian (Liu 1999).  China called foreigners barbarians, which the British took as 
an extreme insult.  That form of address, however, was common towards any foreign 
states (MC 1917, 419).   
 Developing the new language for law occurred gradually in China.  William 
Martin published the Chinese translation of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International 
Law (1836) as Wanguo Gongfa in 1865.  Martin, a Presbyterian missionary, was an 
interpreter for the Sino-American Treaty of Tianjin (1858). He completed the translation 
in Shanghai in 1862 and acquired proficiency on diplomatic procedures through the 
work.  Wheaton’s work reflected a transition from natural to positive law in Europe 
(Fassbender and Peters 2012, 460) and the conceptual shift was also introduced in Asia.  
The translation of legal treatises added linguistic-legal dimensions to the cultural 
exchanges.  Additionally, the increased contacts between Westerners and the Chinese 
started legally before an aggregate of people could travel.    
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Commercial Treaty for Maritime and Overland Trade (1882) 
 After Japan opened Korea to international treaties in 1876, China wrote “unequal” 
treaties that downgraded Korea’s sovereign status.  The 1882 treaty between Korea and 
China recalled past tributary relations of inequality rather than implementing Western 
ideology of sovereign equality.  Dating back to the 12th century, Chinese rulers called 
Korea, the “little brother” (Rockhill [1905] 1970, 3, Gries 2005, Gries et al. 2009).  The 
tribute system, according to China, provided Korea with guidance and economic aid.31  
The 1882 and 1883 treaties reinstated China’s role as a guardian.  The Chinese situated 
Korea as a “tributary Kingdom” that received “certain advantages” via association with 
China (MC 1917, 847).   
 The “modern” treaties suspended past advantages although the Sino-Korean 
treaties differed stylistically from other “Western” treaties in Asia.  The treaties fashioned 
relational changes.  The Sino-Korean treaties established rules instead of articles, started 
with specific claims of historical exchanges instead of stating a general premise of 
sovereign equality and friendly relations, and did not conclude with procedural 
instructions on ratification and amendments to the treaties.  In terms of content, China 
wanted the past relations to continue.  But China’s power in the region diminished due to 
its inability to create reliable trading conditions into the interior.  Specifically, the 
Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade (1882) affected Sino-Korean relations in 
four ways – 1) the Chinese included reciprocal provisions despite labeling Korea, a 
tributary state, 2) travel into the interior of either country appeared difficult, 3) fixed 
tariffs were set, and 4) ban on opium and munitions of war remained crucial.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The Ming dynasty considered China to be the “father to Korea” whereas the Manchu leaders considered 
their role to be “elder brother” (Rockhill [1905] 1970, 3).  
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Table 15 – 1882 Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade  
Articles Summary of the Final Version of the Treaty 
Art. 1 Two sides appoint commissions for ports in Korea 
Art. 2 Extraterritoriality – Chinese criminals go to a Chinese judge; Korean 
criminals go to a Korean judge “for the sake of fairness” 
Art. 3 Fixed rates for trade is to be determined; distressed vessels can dock for 
necessary repairs; in Shantung and Liadong vessels from either country could 
cruise for trade 
Art. 4 Merchants of either country living abroad may rent homes in the port of the 
other; those traveling into the interior would need passports; transporting 
native produce from one port to another will accrue a re-importation tax on 
export duties 
Art. 5 People from the interior are free to travel to the ports and back; more rules are 
sent to “the Throne for decision” 
Art. 6 Both sides are forbidden to sell opium and firearms; Korean ginseng in China 
must come with a written permission 
Art. 7 China give Korea temporary loan on steam vessels; Chinese on warships are 
to be treated as equals to local Korean officials 
Art. 8 Treaty has main points only so details are to come 
Korea 1891.  
  First, China relegated Korea’s position as a tributary state (MC 1917, 847).  
Despite hierarchical language at the beginning of the document, the phrase “on a footing 
of equality” appeared for appointed port officials (art. 1) and local officials (art. 4, MC 
1917, 852).  The two sides exchanged diplomats to secure trade (art. 1) and agreed to 
reciprocal extraterritorial rights (art. 2).  Secondly, Chinese officials emphasized the 
difficulty of traveling into China for land trade. Officials in ports of both countries 
checked permits for those traveling further, but in China, travels were restricted (art. 4). 
Custom stations handled smugglers and outlaws and charged outlaws 5% ad valorem on 
all goods in China (art. 5). China’s geography, new regulations, and slow transfer for 
information posed a challenge for traveling into China.  
 The third key change included new tariffs for fishers and taxes for merchants.  In 
general, the 1882 treaty dealt with duties for access to passageways and taxes on goods.  
The Chinese officials established customs at Hunchun and the border of the Dunhua 
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County (art. 2).  Instead of waiting until the Yalu River froze to engage in trade, the 
provision allowed for ferries to dock. In P’yŏngyang and Hwanghae in Korea and 
Shandong and Fengtian in China, the fishermen needed special permits and tax payments 
that were not required before. Finally, the two sides prohibited the sell of opium and 
firearms (art. 6) and taxed ginseng at 15% ad valorem.  By the 1880s, most Asian nations 
banned opium trade.  One exception was found in the Treaty of Peking (1869) where the 
Austro-Hungarians could sell opium in China if the Austro-Hungarians paid a tax.  
  Unlike treaties between European and Asian countries in the 19th century, where 
the two sides were biased because they were unfamiliar with each other, a history of 
inequalities promulgated new forms of biases between China and Korea.  The historical 
legacy created a “durable inequality” (Tilly 1998, Shin 2010).  The increased intrusion of 
European foreigners in China strengthened China’s resolve to maintain dominance over 
Korea.  In sum, the treaty poised China as a suzerain state that benevolently granted 
Korea reciprocal access to extraterritorial jurisdictions but wrote rules that protected 
China’s interiors and rituals.  The Chinese discouraged travel into the interiors except 
when officials paid tributary gifts.  The tariffs on goods such as horses, hides, paper, and 
cotton were set at 5% ad valorem and fishermen paid biennially for port permits.  The 
mutual ban on opium and munitions trade oriented the two countries towards peace.  
 Diplomacy served commercial goals.  The joint commissions near the Korean 
ports were to follow “observance of etiquette” (art. 1, Korea 1891, 64) and the diplomats 
were to act “on a footing of equality” (art. 1, Korea 1891, 65).  The 1st article of the 
Treaty agreed to send diplomats and commercial envoys to the other’s country.  The 2nd 
article of the treaty discussed manners for settling disputes and who had jurisdiction over 
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claims.  With the 4th article, the cities of Beijing and Seoul were designated as open cities 
that allowed Americans and Europeans to enter for trading purposes as well.  Passports 
were required for other forms of travel (MC 1917, 851).  With increased foot traffic of 
foreigners in China, the legal procedures after criminal incidences tightened.  The 
extraterritorial jurisdiction favored the Chinese in that a Chinese convicted in Korean 
ports then the Chinese had jurisdiction over the matter but the reverse was not true.  If a 
Korean was accused of crimes in a Chinese port then the Chinese still had full 
jurisdiction.   
 Commercial stipulations dominated the bulk of the treaty.  The 3rd article 
addressed customs issues such as fishing rights.  The article also discussed measures to 
aid in cases of natural disasters and equipment failure. In the past, China had allowed 
fishermen from Korea to travel without paying taxes as partial condition of their tributary 
state relations.  Even for returning distressed vessels, the Chinese accrued the cost of the 
damages.  Because Westerners weakened China’s economy, the costly burden of the 
tributary state relations were abandoned and the trade along the Yellow Sea and Bohai 
coasts were opened to incite the Chinese economy.  
 The fourth article of the treaty discussed the taxes applied on goods for trade.  
Korean merchants had to pay a Chinese domestic tax called lijin as a result of this treaty.  
The 5th article discussed procedures to tighten the frontier trade to tariff trade.  A 5 per 
cent ad valorem tax was applied to all goods except red ginseng (hongshen), a medicinal 
plant from Korea.  In the 6th article of the treaty the ginseng was permitted for trade at 15 
per cent ad valorem.  The two countries forbade opium trade.  As discussed in chapter 2, 
many treaties involving different nations also banned the opium trade.  In the 6th article, 
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the issue of clandestine trade was also mentioned. The goods if traded clandestinely were 
to be confiscated (MC 1917, 852).  
 Portions of the treaty explicitly underlined China’s infantilizing treatment towards 
Korea.  In article 7, the Chinese officials addressed how “[K]orea does not yet possess 
ships of war or mercantile steamers” (art. 7, MC 1917). The lack of technological 
advances kept Koreans from accessing more convenient travel routes.  Korea was 
allowed to borrow steamships that the Chinese would guide through proper trading ports 
but the Koreans would pay all expenses involved for the transport.  The 8th and final 
article of the treaty recognized that the Superintendent of the Northern Trade and the 
King of Korea could revise the treaty, implying that the treaty ended on a customary note.   
 The past under the Chinese suzerain rule may have established Korea as “little 
brother” to China, but the tribute system granted Koreans more aid from the Chinese in 
matters of trade. The 1882 treaty demanded the Koreans to pay more tariffs.  The 
tributary state relations had allowed Koreans to trade without paying the tariffs, but the 
new legal arrangements required Koreans to follow procedures similar to what the British 
had in place for the Chinese a few decades earlier.    
Twenty four rules for the traffic on the Frontier (1883)  
 The “durable inequalities” (Tilly 1998) perpetuated with the Twenty-four Rules 
for the Traffic (1883).   Three major themes of the 1883 agreement included 1) receiving 
tributary gifts, 2) empowering local authorities, and 3) clarifying trade conditions.  The 
conditions of the 1883 document challenged the prominence of sovereign equality noted 
in international relations because China mentioned Korea’s status as a tributary state 
throughout the list of rules.  Additionally, Confucian law preferred centrality versus 
desperate pockets of power (Shaw 1981).  China’s central government reluctantly granted 
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more autonomy to local officials.  The rest of the rules focused on new tariffs and 
regulations that Korea withstood.  In 1883, China established free trade at the ports while 
re-appropriating Korea as a technologically backward and preferentially subordinate 
nation in Asia.   
 The Chinese wrote how Korea benefited as a tributary state to China (rule 1, 
1883, MC 1917, 854).  Korea as a “quasi-Chinese territory” (Rule 14, MC 1917, 860) 
stopped enjoying past privileges.  The 24 rules noted how ports differed from overland 
trade.  With regards to traveling into the interior of China, diplomats traveling with 
tributary gifts had special assistance (Rules 8, 11, 15, and 19).  Though tribute trips 
required passports (Rule 8), the travellers had permissions to use old tribute routes that 
were not open for commercial activity (Rule 11).  Peppering the rules with the tribute 
customs juxtaposed the changing conditions for trade with classical hierarchies of 
China’s cultural dominance.   
 Careful attention to language in the legal document highlighted China’s desire to 
formalize the hierarchy. China re-established itself as the acme of Asian society based on 
how China mandated their “official” name.  Korea addressed China as tiāncháo 
(heavenly court) or shàngguó (superior country). China was not called zhōng (center), 
and Korea was not dōng (east) (Rule 23, MC 1917, 863). Korea was cháo xiǎn guó 
(imperial court country) and guìguó (your respected country).  Heavenly and superior to 
Korea, China transposed the hierarchy into domestic governance.  
 China’s domestic law followed order that suited the goals of the dynasty at a 
given time (Nakamura 2004).  In 1882, the officials sent details to the “Throne for 
decisions” (art. 5, MC 1917, 851).  China’s vastness required the central bureaucracy to 
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delegate powers to local authorities.  Still, the checks on the bureaucrats slowed 
commercial reforms in China.  However, the 1883 rules established ways for local 
officials to maintain borders (Rule 4), collect duties (Rule 5), investigate robberies (Rule 
7), confiscate illegal goods (Rule 16), and directly deal with sellers and purchasers (Rule 
22).  Ultimately, local authorities were to use their best judgments to decide on rules 
unmentioned in the document (Rule 24).  Wisdom of the throne dissipated to keep pace 
with trade.   
 The 1883 Treaty between Korea and China further instilled an unequal 
relationship that highlighted the intra-Asian relations of this time period.  The document 
established 24 rules, but the document better handled the recognition of mutuality and 
reciprocity than what was articulated in the 1882 document.  In 1883, the Jilin province 
of China was reorganized to facilitate trade around the borders.  With the first article of 
the document, the merchants of Jilin could travel to Hoeryong and from there to 
Kyongwon periodically to expand the reach of the trade.  The Chinese officials hoped 
that the measure would increase the profits for merchants of Ningguta, the provincial 
capital of the Jilin district.  
Table 16 - 24 Rules for Frontier Trade of 1883 
Rules Summary of the Final Version of the Regulations 
Rule 1 Both sides are on the same footing though Korea benefited as a tributary state 
Rule 2 In Liaodong, merchants need permissions to move goods to any parts of 
China; foreigners are forbidden from entering the frontiers 
Rule 3 Chinese have rights to sacred fishing areas in the Yalu River and Koreans are 
forbidden to fish there 
Rule 4 Koreans cannot build homes in Liaodong 
Rule 5 Superintendents used to collect duties on customs, there will be additional 
collectors plus military and civil governors in Moukden 
Rule 6 Local authorities will deal with offenses regarding money based on existing 
laws 
Rule 7 Investigation of robberies will exist at custom stations; proper examination of 
papers needed 
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Rule 8 Tributes from Korea to China are exempt from payment of duties 
Rule 9 Red ginseng from Korea taxed at 15% ad valorem; cows and hides are 5% ad 
valorem; necessities of life such as food are duty free 
Rule 10 Trade use to be free but now both must pay full duty initially 
Rule 11 Old tribute roads are closed for all purposes except for trade 
Rule 12 You can use frozen rivers as roads 
Rule 13 Reciprocal trade where both sides should present passports with notes on what 
the merchant intends to buy 
Rule 14 “[K]orea is regarded as quasi-Chinese territory” yet Liaodong merchants 
cannot trespass into Korea 
Rule 15 Diplomatic officials traveling with goods are exempt from tax; for merchants, 
it is illegal to buy goods at a Korean port and transport it overland 
Rule 16 Clandestine trade for goods such as opium and munitions of war are to be 
confiscated 
Rule 17 Gold and silver can be brought in for exchange; bullions, leafs, etc are taxed 
at 5% ad valorem 
Rule 18 5% ad valorem for most goods – products of the sea, hides, leather, cotton per 
piece, paper, copperware, chinaware etc 
Rule 19 Chinese military will accommodate Korean tribute gift givers 
Rule 20 Promise to use standard scales for weights and measurements at both ports of 
Chung-kiang and I-Chou (Yi-jiu) 
Rule 21 Night traffic is dangerous; avoid traveling at night to reduce fraud 
Rule 22 Deal with official brokers; in Chung-kiang do away with brokerage at frontier 
stations; seller and purchaser shall deal with the other directly 
Rule 23 Korea may refer to China as 天朝 [tiāncháo] (heavenly court) or 上國	 
[shàngguó]. China is not to be referred as 中[zhōng] and Korea is not 東 
[dōng]. Korea is known as 朝鮮國[cháo xiǎn guó] (imperial court country) 
and 貴國 [guìguó] (your respected country).  
Rule 24 Local authorities on either side will settle disputes not listed in the regulations 
 
 The 1883 document as an extension of the 1882 treaty shaped China’s efforts to 
establish free-trade in the interiors the while re-appropriating Korea’s position in the 
Asian international system as a nation that was technologically behind and preferentially 
subordinate to Chinese demands.  Permits to travel into Korea’s interior has been made 
19 times in 1884 and about that many were filed in 1885 (Larsen 2008, 119).  After 
losing a war to Japan, China’s position within Asia was recognizably weak.  
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Consequences of the Treaties 
 China’s two agreements with Korea demonstrated three themes.  First, China 
maintained its role as a suzerain state for Korea. Second, the documents illustrated 
China’s weakening central bureaucracy. Third, after 1883, Koreans paid “new” 
commercial taxes and “old” tributary gifts to the Chinese.  China reluctantly adopted new 
customs and embraced their standing in the old Asian structures.  Sino-Korean treaties 
omitted finessed passages regarding friendly relations and equal sovereignty. The 
direction of Sino-Korean relations disappointed Japan because Japan wished to trade with 
Korea directly without China’s interference.   
 Beyond Asia, China’s presence in the international treaty systems multiplied.  
China’s relations with Latin America yielded symmetric relationships unlike the 
asymmetries that China endured from European states.  The Sino-Peruvian Treaty of 
Tianjin (1874) exemplified China’s reactionary approach to foreign policy.  Chinese 
citizens worked in Peru for years, mainly mining guano, but the 1874 treaty created 
protections for Chinese citizens after years of mistreatment (Kagami 2001).  The Treaty 
of Washington (1899) between China and Mexico granted each side reciprocal MFN 
status, disaster relief, consular representation, residential rights, and property protections.  
China and postcolonial Latin American states’ comparable status in the international 
system generated the mutually beneficial treaties.  Structurally equivalent partners at the 
international and regional arenas motivated China’s economic growth (Borgatti and 
Everett 2000, Snyder and Kick 1979, Zhou and Park 2012).  
 By the early 20th century, China wrote treaties with over 17 nations (D. Wang 
2005, 10).  The Western intellectuals referenced the “childlikeness of the yellow race” 
(Chamberlain 1912) of Chinese and denigrated the ethnicity as “double-tongued” cheats 
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(Steinmetz 2003). The Taiping (1850-1864) and Boxer (1900) Rebellions confirmed 
China’s resistance towards Western influences.  Europeans failed to address the Chinese 
as equal statesmen (Gong 1984), so China’s avoidance of Western legal systems 
highlighted China’s comfort with the past tributary system.   
 In sum, even during the early 19th century, China viewed itself as a centrally 
located, culturally refined, and morally superior nation compared to Great Britain, the 
United States or Japan.  The 1882 treaty between Korea and China reaffirmed rather than 
adopt new international legal norms, namely of sovereign equality. China’s self-
assessment did not preserve its national welfare as the lure of commercial riches lessened 
the stigma of working as a merchant among the Chinese.32  China’s late and reluctant 
adoption of the legal arrangements such as lowered tariff rates and open trade, the 
Chinese lost time and opportunity to benefit from the system.  Falling behind the new 
ideology of the era, the Qing dynasty of China failed to adapt to a new process of 
globalization, which emphasized commerce.    
 China’s role in Asia transformed in the 19th century.  In practice, extraterritoriality 
did not end in China until 1946 (Chang 1984).  China’s treaties with Korea in 1882 and 
1883 indicated China’s role in implementing international reforms in Korea even without 
much consultation with the Korean government (D. Kim 1976).  The tragedy of the 
various rebellions, which occurred after the opium wars, stalled China’s friendships from 
developing with Western nations.  Before and as a result of the insurrections, Western 
officials castigated Chinese citizens as untrustworthy partners.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Confucian society did not consider trade as noble work.  
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Taiping and Boxer Rebellions 
 The Taiping (1850-1864) and Boxer (1900) Rebellions confronted head-on the 
grave struggles that the Chinese felt towards the foreigners.  The Taiping Rebellion 
having Christian origins is debatable (Gray 2002, 61).  In 1859, Hong Rengan wanted to 
distill more orthodox definitions of Christianity in China (Gray 2002, 71).  The Chinese 
were manufacturing claims about Christianity to gain sympathy from Westerners.  The 
leaders idealized equality yet women in the group were treated as property and 
exchanged as rewards after military victories (Gray 2002, 61).  The Taiping Rebellion 
was a form of nativist revolt and managed to takeover Nanjing in 1853.  Initial retellings 
of the Taiping Rebellion emphasized the rebellion as a political movement resulting from 
the rebels’ renouncement of the Tartars’ oppression (Mason 1939, 78).  The Taipings 
planned a northern attack on Beijing and a Western attack on the Yangtze River (Gray 
2002, 65).  The Taiping rebels reigned in Nanjing from 1853 to 1864, but the Qing army 
bombed the city to remove the rebels (Wooldridge 2009, 84).  After the destruction of 
Nanjing in 1864, Zeng Guofang organized a reconstruction plan from 1864 to 1872.  
Total number of casualties is approximately 20 million (Michael and Taylor 1956).  
 The Boxer Rebellion started in northern China in 1899.  Members of secret sects 
coopted to form the Boxer Rebellion.  In 1899, the rebels attacked Chinese Christian 
converts.  In the central and southern reaches of Chinese, the rebels were quickly 
suppressed (Gray 2002, 137).  Foreign troops fought off the rebels.  From June 14 to 
August 14, the rebels were in Beijing where the foreign troops battled the Boxers until 
the imperial troops arrived.  Rummel (1991) estimated that 250,000 persons who were 
Chinese civilians, foreign soldiers, foreign civilians, Christian missionaries, and rebels, 
died from 1899 to 1901 (40). The multiple rebellions urged the Chinese government to 
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open bureaus devoted to selling titles, offices, and degrees to raise funds to defend 
against the rebels (Kaske 2011).  The insurrections prevented China upholding 
appearances that acknowledged them for meeting “standard of civilization” (Gong 1984).  
The Boxer Rebellion directly attacked foreigners, which created more tensions between 
China and Western states interested in establishing commercial and diplomatic ties.  
Conclusion 
 The European legal system was not welcomed in China.  While China had a 
streak of unfavorable treaties, mostly involving Great Britain, in the mid 19th century, the 
Qing bureaucracy’s resistance to change accentuated China’s downfall.   After losing the 
Sino-Japanese War in 1895, the Chinese handed over the control of Taiwan to the 
Japanese.  China and Taiwan became agricultural outposts for the Japanese to produce 
rice as an export crop to feed the Japanese.  Japan’s agricultural policy included 
improved seeds and fertilizers to outsource growing crops (Myers and Yamada 1984). 
The later development of Japanese industries in China signaled the de facto colonial 
status of China.   
 In the early 20th century, China fell prey to multiple spheres of influences that 
included British, German, and Japanese entrepreneurs and diplomats.  Extraterritorial 
protections for foreigners in China existed until 1928 and mandated the Chinese to 
become second-class citizens in their own nation.  China’s weakness strengthened 
Japan’s ability to withstand colonialism on its own.  Further, Japan’s ability to defeat 
Russia in 1905 signaled to Western nations that Japan desired diplomatic equality with 
European nations.  China nor Japan were not immediately accepted into the “family of 
nations;” however, the economic growth that Asia achieved in the late 19th century made 
Asian nation-states valuable trading partners.  In the next chapter, I explore Japan’s 
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navigation of the unequal treaties.  Japan overcame initially poor trading conditions to 
later pave a path towards becoming an imperial power in the Pacific.   	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CHAPTER 4 
JAPAN: THE MODERNIZING LEGAL FORCE 
 
 Japan had not been a hegemonic power in Asia prior to the 19th century.  Japan’s 
turn towards imperialism is surprising.  Japan’s treaty with China in 1871 was mutually 
beneficial and equal (Fogel 2009, 6).  But after a few years, the dynamics between Japan 
and China shifted towards asymmetries that benefitted the Japanese.  Japan explored 
Taiwan in 1874 to scope out the potential colony, forced Korea to the Treaty of Ganghwa 
in 1876, and annexed the Ryukyu kingdom as the Okinawa prefecture (Zachmann 2011, 
53).  The changes within the Japanese ruling elites reoriented national goals towards 
imperialism.  
Background on Japanese National Identity 
 Unlike Korea, Japan did not live in China’s shadow. Confucianism and 
Buddhism, according to Prince Shotoku in the 7th century, were “only secondary to 
Shintoism” (Totman 2000, 189).  Japan’s state sponsored religion of Shintoism added to 
national variants of Buddhism set Japan apart from China. Still Confucianism influenced 
much classical philosophies in Japan.  A strong national culture developed around the 
16th century; intellectuals indebted to the Chinese bemoaned a weakness in Japan’s 
national ideology.  The Mito School of the 18th century revised narratives on Japan’s 
foundational history.  Intellectually, Japanese scholarships distinguished themselves from 
Chinese ideologies that supremely upheld the emperor.  Japanese scholars such as Miwa 
(1973) considered Japan to be the “Middle Kingdom” not China (Saaler and Szpilman 
2011, 9).   
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 In response to Chinese Confucianism, bifurcated sovereignty of the 18th century 
carved out Japanese scholars’ intellectual position.  In Japan, Confucian scholars such as 
Hakuseki Arai (1657-1725) discussed the bifurcation in reference to the two ruling 
figures of Japan, who was the emperor in Kyoto and the shogun in Edo.  Though the 
emperor’s authority was merely nominal, Hakuseki discussed the Japanese government in 
terms of “substance” and “name” elements, which were derived from Confucian political 
philosophies (Nakai 2005, 392).  The use of the term sovereignty was situated in the 
Confucian context and not akin to Westphalian sovereignty.   
 Around the 16th century, Portuguese and Dutch citizens resided in Nagasaki and 
Hirado, respectively.  Early European settlers were Christian missionaries. Christianity 
was banned in 1587 and harsh persecutions occurred starting in 1597.  In the 1780s, 
“Dutch Learning” (rangaku) influenced the study of medicine and astronomy. The 
shogun limited scholars’ contact with rangaku to disrupt the attempts to promote 
Christianity (Inoguchi 2006, 7).  The shogun planned to curb Christian activities in the 
17th century.33  The access to information was key in the economic and intellectual 
reconfiguration of Japan.  Ultimately, the shogun issued five decrees between 1633 and 
1639, which led to national seclusion and closed Japan from international trade (Hiroshi 
and Akira 1990).  In the 1640, Japan became a closed country (sakoku), which fostered 
Japan to develop its own interpretations of Dutch and Chinese teachings.34  The Japanese 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Whereas Chinese scholarship entered Japan during the Tang era (618-906) and took centuries before 
Japanese scholars accepted them as truthful, Dutch teachings in the sciences became highly regarded in 
Japan after two centuries.   
34 Rangaku developed and became popular among scholars such as Kato Hiroyuki in the 19th century. 
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rarely travelled westward, but Dutch merchants were present in isolated regions, and 
diplomatic relations with Korea and China continued (Toby 1984).35    
 Even though Dutch and Portuguese merchants abounded in Asia, Chinese and 
Japanese merchants were unable communicate in European languages.  The ways in 
which Asians acquired knowledge from Europeans were multilayered.  Pro-Europeanists 
such as Honda Toshiaki (1744-1821) learned Western methods for astronomy and 
geography while maintaining a belief in Confucianism and Japanese social order.  Much 
of the accepted Dutch studies were syncretic blends of new and native beliefs.  In 1720, 
foreign books were no longer banned in Japan and new medical treatises, such as The 
New Book of Dissection, were translated into Japanese for wider use. A Dutch-English 
dictionary appeared in print in 1745.  Maeno Ryotaku and Sugita Genpaku dissected a 
corpse in 1771 to further their studies of Dutch texts.  Japanese scholars such as Sugita 
Genpaku compared Dutch learning with Chinese learning, which too was once foreign to 
the Japanese.  Sugita Genpaku, who wrote during the 17th century, was surprised with the 
rapidity with which Dutch teachings in the sciences were accepted in Japan, since 
Chinese learning took centuries to become assimilated into Japanese learning, beginning 
in the Tang era (618-906). 
 Mito scholars of the 18th century promoted nationalist ideologies that permutated 
towards imperialism of the 19th century.  Aizawa Yasushi wrote of Japan as the  
 “Divine Land – the realm where the sun rises, where spirits are high, where the 
 grandson of the sun goddess rules as a supreme emperor since time immemorial… 
 [Emperor] has been the leader of the earth and is to rule over all countries of the 
 world” (Aizawa from Shinron [New Theses, 1825] in Joos 2011, 67). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Also in 1640, the Japanese were mandated to register at a Buddhist temple (Tignor et al. 2008, 615). 
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Aizawa explained that while the emperor had limitless benevolence, the “Western 
barbarians” trampled the Asian landscape (Joos 2011, 67).  Granted, the opinions of the 
right-wing scholars associated with Genyosa (Dark Ocean Society) proposed the 
expansion based on jingoistic tendencies, the views became pronounced as the Japanese 
military sent troops to explore Taiwan, Korea, and northern China.  
  Confucianism distinguished four hereditary statuses of “warrior-rulers, peasants, 
artisans, and merchants (shinokosho)” (Totman 2000, 225).  In China, Korea, and 
Vietnam, the Confucian literati loomed superior to the warrior (D. Kang 2010).  Because 
of this slight distinction, Japan departed from Confucian interests towards commerce. 
Confucianism served as the model for organizing the political sphere of Japan. The 
Japanese feudal system based on allegiances and loyalties interpreted Western laws to be 
disrespectful at times.  Japan’s conception of international relations did not conform to 
the Sino-centric worldview that China and Korea accepted.  Zen Buddhism, which the 
Chinese influenced, grew throughout the 13th century but the nationalistic religion of 
Shintoism intensified in Japan. Within Japan the absolutism of sovereign rule was 
contested so imagining the Chinese emperor as the central authority figure became 
difficult.  
 Though Huntington (1993) defined Japan as a civilization separate from the Sino-
Confucian order, Confucianism influenced conduct within Japanese society historically.  
Even if the official stance was to avoid Chinese teachings, the pervasiveness of Chinese 
philosophy was so great that Confucianism colored Japanese philosophies.  Allegiances 
and loyalties, which were prominent in neo-Confucianism, were the basis of Japanese 
feudalism.  Confucianism could have conceptually unified Asia.  Trimberger (1972) 
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rather simplistically stated that the Japanese were “racially, religiously, and culturally 
homogenous” (192).  The homogenous theory has been widely refuted.  
 The Japanese had never had a singular religion.  Buddhism, Shintoism, and 
Confucian beliefs existed contemporaneously.  Furthermore, the ethnic homogeneity was 
forcibly realized with the extermination of the Ainu people (Hirano 2009). Japan, 
according to Fukuzawa Yukichi, insisted on leading the rest of Asia towards progress 
instead of waiting for the rest of Asia towards Western models (Inoguchi 2006).36  
Specifically in the realm of pan-Asianism, Fukuzawa sought to improve conditions for 
other Asian countries by adopting Western models.  Fukuzawa’s “Depart from Asia” 
(Datsu A-ron) attributed Asia as backwards and the West as progress.  Fukuzawa’s Datsu 
A-ron challenged Japanese leaders to guide other Asian countries towards Western 
progress (Jiji Shimpo, March 16, 1885).   
 The ideology of pan-Asianism appeared later as the Japanese promoted a strong 
regional identity through colonialism.  Through the process of assimilation known as 
doka, distinct identities of each nation-state were diminished in favor of Japanese 
perceptions.  Assimilation artificially injected the flavor of creating kinship analogous to 
the colonial mission.  Matsuda Koichiro (2011) attributed the rise of pan-Asianism as a 
result of the Opium Wars in China.  Some scholars traced Pan-Asianism further back to 
the 16th century.  Yi Ki-Baek (1984) interpreted the Hideyoshi invasions of Korea in 
1592 as an early unification endeavor in Asia.  Conroy’s account of Japan’s annexation 
of Korea insisted that Japan had planned the colonization for centuries (Conroy 1960), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Fukuzawa stated that “We cannot wait for our neighbor countries to become so civilized that all may 
combine together to make Asia progress. We must rather break out of formation and behave in the same 
way as the civilized countries of the West are doing… We would do better to treat China and Korea in the 
same way as do the western nations” (Inoguchi 2006, 10).
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however the theory has been widely rejected (Dickinson 2002).  Nationalism alone did 
not explain the implications for trade that territorial expansion posed.37   
 Even if nationalism motivated Japanese territorial expansion, the Japanese needed 
material resources to do so.  The transition from rice to money economy took form in the 
18th century.  Hiroshi and Akira noted that the Tokugawa (1600-1868) economic model 
was unable to sustain the growing population and the expanding basis of production 
through the cumbersome manner of a rice based economy.  The rice production system 
dictated how the samurai class collected taxes from farmers and merchants. Transporting 
rice from outer regions to Edo created logistical challenges.  Japan’s unstable economy 
from 1789 and 1853 fueled a transition from rice based to coin based currency.  Though a 
few daimyos had authority to mint coins used within their jurisdictions, the shogun had 
sole legitimacy in minting currency and had control over the national mines.  The silver 
mines in Japan were depleted in the 1680s.  Rice prices fell in 1819 and 1820, which 
weakened the shoguns’ rights on rice levies, impoverishing feudal houses.  From 1818 
and 1830, the officials made a poor decision to debase coin currency to make rice more 
valuable (Cullen 2003, 136).  The decision precipitated discontent among the merchants.  
Japan’s currency eventually shifted from a rice-based agricultural economy to a coin-
based money economy.  The influx of silver that the Chinese experienced also entered 
into Japan and Korea slowly.  
 External threats grew as news of China’s trade and wars with Western powers 
reached Japan. Similar to China’s experience, Japan’s earliest treaties with Western 
nations signaled moments of national humiliation.  In the early 19th century, Japan was an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 In 1609, Japan and Korea signed the Kiyu Agreement, which guided interstate relations until 1876.  It 
advantaged Korea as a mediator to China. 
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isolated nation with different feudal factions warring with one another for land and 
resources.  The Tokugawa shogunate, residing in Edo, defended strict class hierarchies.  
He passed several laws dictating dress codes and acceptable festivals for subjects of 
varying social classes (Shively 1965). The strict adherence to duty in Japan was not due 
to longstanding beliefs in neo-Confucianism.  Instilling the mentality of a status hierarchy 
was key.  The founders of the Tokugawa regime inculcated a sense of duty to young 
children and subjects to make an ideological distinction from the preceding regime.  
 The ideology of the Tokugawa regime increasingly departed from the realities of 
the situation in Japan.  The low ranking samurais wanted change as much as the Western 
envoys that wished to enter Japan.  Merchants began to eclipse the wealth of low ranking 
samurais.  By the mid 1850s, many low ranking samurai held no land.  The low ranking 
samurai were outsiders within the elite class; the samurai class no longer had strong 
group cohesion nor a sense of belonging.  Near the end of Tokugawa rule, farmers shifted 
to new cultivation methods such as grafting, irrigating fields, and planting more cash 
crops.  Japanese commoners began to hoard rice after the Ansei treaties because the fall 
of the political economy seemed viable as feudal lords were losing power (Auslin 2000, 
77).  Farmers did not rely on subsistence agriculture.  The merchant class capably 
influenced the low ranking samurai and grew dissatisfied with the low status attributed to 
the merchant class.  
 Exploring the options for trade with more Western partners emerged in the early 
19th century.  The Russians pressured the Japanese to open its ports for trade, but the 
Japanese government feared food shortages resulting from exportation of rice crops. 
Because rice was tied with currency, rice trade was prohibited.  Ezo, a modern-day 
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Hokkaido, grew wary of Russian naval threats.  The Japanese experienced a few 
incidents involving foreign vessels in the early 19th century.  In 1808, the British warship, 
Phaeton, appeared off the coast of Nagasaki.  The American merchant vessel of Morrison 
appeared in Uraga and Kagoshima in 1837.  These efforts did not result in official 
diplomatic communications.  The Tokugawa bafuku did not want foreigners to enter 
Japan.  He preferred to maintain the social structure’s legitimacy so that the samurai 
could remain at the top of the hierarchy (Pratt 2007, 86).  Also, the bafuku were weary of 
national security as Catholic missionaries in the 17th century disrupted Japan’s traditional 
value structures (Pratt 2007, 87).    From 1854 to 1874, Japan’s treaty relations with other 
nations reflected net losses for the Japanese.  By opening ports for foreigners to use and 
allowing the foreigners to reside and conduct business inside Japan, the Japanese made 
concessions to the treaty partners.  
Table 17. General Distribution of Japanese Treaties by Decades 
Binned Decades Count 
4) 1841 to 1860 5 
5) 1861 to 1880 7 
6) 1881 to 1900 29 
7) 1901 to 1912 15 
 
Table 18. Distribution of Japanese Treaties by Type 
 
 
 
 
Treaty of Kanagawa (1854)  
 Studying Japan from the Western perspective is rife with interpretive challenges, 
which are difficult to bridge conceptually.  As Harootunian noted, the emergence of 
Types of Treaties Count 
1) Peace 1 
2) Commerce and navigation 10 
3) Friendship 20 
4) Extradition 0 
5) Arbitration 1 
6) Delimitation and protectorate 12 
7) Consular conventions and other  12 
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modernization theory during the Cold War did a disservice to English language histories 
of Japan in five major ways.  The modernization theory drew attention to Japan’s 
accomplishments as an economically powerful nation in the 1960s (Vogel 1979).  First, 
the linear (teleological) history became favored (Conroy 1960, Fairbank 1992).  Second, 
modernization theorists glossed over Japanese imperialism and fascism as mere 
digressions to Japan’s mode of progression.  Third, in some instances, scholars (Shin and 
Robinson 1999) depicted Japanese colonialism as beneficial to countries such as Korea, 
Taiwan, and Manchuria.  Fourth, modernization theory also wrongly assumed that Japan 
was an exceptional case that heralded traditional values from the 18th century into the 20th 
century.  Casting Japan as a unique historical instance detracts scholars from scrutinizing 
the institutional changes that marked sociological analyses of macro-level revolutions 
(Goldstone 1991, Skocpol 1979).  Finally, modernization theory’s explanans are rife with 
rhetoric on Japanese nationalism.  Different interpretations of Japanese history include 
Marxist perspectives and modernist interpretations, which aligned the Japanese with 
greater agency.   
 Narratives regarding modern Japan often begin with the arrival of Commodore 
Matthew Perry in 1853, after 49 years without contact with Western states.  In 1853, the 
bakufu wished to postpone the signing of the treaty after violent attacks against 
foreigners ensued in Yokohama, but the United States Secretary of State, William 
Seward, asserted that the postponement would hurt the Japanese citizens (Auslin 2000, 
85).  The letters from Seward and British diplomat, Rutherford Alcock, privately 
admonished the Japanese for their culture of secrecy regarding diplomatic affairs (Stead 
1904, Tsiang 1933, 2).  Townsend Harris signed the first “unequal treaty,” the Treaty of 
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Kanagawa, with Japan as a representative of the U.S. government on March 31, 1854.38  
The treaty was unequal first and foremost because the Japanese did not want to sign 
contracts with foreign nationals.  Thereafter, the content of the treaties allowed 
Westerners to enter Japan without accommodating for the inverse relationship.  
Commodore Matthew Perry wrote the curt treaty with the permission of President 
Fillmore.  The first article of the Treaty of Kanagawa designated the “cordial amity” 
between the two nations. The treaty opened the port of Shimoda in the Yedo harbor and 
the port of Hakodade (art. 2).    
 In the treaty, the United States demanded treatment different from the 
“restrictions and confinement as the Dutch and Chinese are at Nagasaki” (art. 5) and 
opened the Harbor of Yedo for future trade.  The United States banned opium trade in 
Japan (Cassel 2012, 54).  The treaty granted foreigners access to the ports of Shimoda 
and Hakodade, and it also established exchange standards for coins (Cortazzi 2008, 3). 
Article 10 of the treaty allowed American vessels to dock at any port of Japan if the 
vessel was distressed. The treaty also requested that an American be appointed as a 
consul or agent to reside in Shimoda to oversee the terms of the treaty (art. 11).  
Townsend Harris eventually filled the position of U.S. consul to Japan in 1856. The 1854 
treaty also emphasized maintaining peace, opening ports for trade, and facilitating 
commerce.  The treaty displeased the Japanese because the Americans demanded free 
trade, denied Asia’s ritual hierarchies, and denounced Japanese legal customs in favor of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction (Duus 1995).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The full-text of the treaty is found at http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/teach/pearl/kanagawa/ 
friends5.htm. 
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Treaty of Shimoda (1855) 
 Russia’s involvement in pre-modern Asian international relations drew on 
centuries of past encounters.  The treaty of Shimoda renegotiated past fishery rights.  
Russia and Japan voiced interest in north China.  Establishing trade relations and 
discussing China led to regional ploys for power in the early 20th century that culminated 
into the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 and 1905.  
 In the Treaty of Shimoda (1855) between Russia and Japan the terms between the 
two nations were not symmetric. Russia had privileges to have consular representation in 
Japan and have Japan help if a vessel was in distress, whereas the Russians did not clarify 
which ports the Japanese vessels could use in the case of emergencies.  The protection of 
property was symmetric in the treaty.  In the 1st article of the Treaty of Shimoda, both 
sides promised to honor a lasting friendship and maintain the “personal security” of 
personnel from either country.   
 Ports were open for commerce.  With article 3, the Russians gained access to 3 
Japanese ports: Shimoda in the Province of Izu, Hakodate in the Province of Hokkaido, 
and Nagasaki in the Province of Hizen.  At the ports, the Russians were allowed to trade 
with silver and gold coins, repair distressed vessels, and obtain necessary supplies.  In 
article 4, the two sides shared reciprocal rights to use the ports of the other in case of 
emergencies involving shipping vessels.  The 5th article detailed how in Shimoda and 
Hakodate, the Russians could exchange either merchandise or coins with the Japanese.  
 Territories were exchanged.  The 2nd article emphasized the territorial rights of the 
Japanese as the possessors of the Islands of Etorofu. The Russians owned the Islands of 
Uruppu and Kuriles.  The Sakhalin islands were under the joint control of the Russians 
and the Japanese. The Russians appointed counselors to be stationed at the ports in the 6th 
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article.  Article 7 mentioned the possibility of Japanese counselors being consulted for 
any future affairs in question.  In the 9th article, the two sides were given 10 months to 
ratify the treaty.  Criminals were given similar conditions.  Article 8 granted 
extraterritorial jurisdiction for those traveling in the others’ country but wished mostly 
that the foreigners “shall never be subject to any kind of annoyance” (Harrison 1953).  
 In the additional articles to the treaty, the Russian travelers were allowed a radius 
of 7 ri (about 14 miles) outside the port area of Shimoda and 5 ri (about 10 miles) outside 
of Hakodate to travel in addition to article 1.  Also as an addition to article 1, the 
Russians were allowed to visit shops, temples, and home-stays but the travelers were not 
allowed to enter private homes unless they were invited.  And special burial sites were 
designated around each treaty port.  In article 6, the Russian special consul was appointed 
in 1856 and the Japanese government could designate the areas where the Russians 
should reside.  Article 9 of the treaty was similar to a most favored nation clause.  The 
Russians wanted the “rights and privileges recognized for the other nations” to also 
extend to the Russians in accordance to the rule of “dispensing with the necessity of 
entering new negotiations” (Harrison 1953, 168).   
 Later in 1867, the Russians and the Japanese signed another agreement to reaffirm 
the co-possession of the Sakhalin Islands.  Russians and Japanese were allowed to travel 
around the islands freely (art. 2).  In 1874, the Russians proposed that the mixed 
dwellings of the Japanese and the Russians in the Sakhalin Islands be abolished.  The 
Japanese are given permissions to stay in the islands. But by 1875, the Russians traded 
the Kurile Islands for sole possession of the Sakhalin Islands.  In the Treaty of Exchange 
of Sakhalin with the Kurile Islands (1875), the 5th article granted religious freedoms to 
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those who wished to stay in the islands instead of returning to their country of origin.  
Further in the Supplementary Treaty of 1875, also known as the Treaty of St. Petersburg, 
the natives of both the Kuriles and the Sakhalin islands could maintain fishery rights for 
only three years (art. D) (Call 1992).  The natives of the islands were asked to leave their 
domiciles.  However, religious freedom was granted to Japanese, Russian, and native 
islanders (art. C and E).   
Though interaction with the Russians existed in Asia for centuries, the Japanese 
like the Chinese were slow to adopt standard practices that the Europeans had in terms of 
philosophical and scientific beliefs because the interaction with the Westerners were 
limited to the elites.  From the 1850’s to the 1860’s, the Tokugawa Bafuku attempted to 
westernize the Japanese military by creating infantry, cavalry, and artillery divisions 
(Kornicki 1998, xxiv).  The military enhancements affected Japan’s future standing in the 
international system. 
Ansei Treaties (1858) 
 In 1858, Japan signed a series of treaties known as the Ansei treaties with four 
other Western nations, which were the Netherlands, Russia, Great Britain, and France.39  
The Ansei or unequal treaties further damaged the crumbling institution of Japanese 
feudalism.  Japan’s history of treaty relations benefited from the increasing number of 
historians that examined Japanese and English language documents of the time.  As 
Auslin (2000) reported, the problem of English language accounts of Japan is that much 
of the research relied on diplomatic transcripts and other English only resources (Beasley 
1995, Totman 2000).  The “hidden transcripts” as James Scott noted (Scott 1990) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The term Ansei refers to Japanese name for the year 1858. Though these treaties are commonly called 
unequal treaties, the word Ansei does not translate into unequal.  
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required a deeper contextual knowledge surrounding the legal interactions.  The analysis 
of the documents interspersed with economic trends added new meaning to the legal 
arrangements. 
 The treaties of the 19th century also looked to promote peace, security for trade, 
methods to handle business, and protections for foreigners abroad. Though the 1858 
treaty made the 1854 Treaty of Kanagawa negligible (art.12 of 1858 treaty), similar 
issues reemerged.  The text of the U.S.-Japan treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1858 
allowed for long-term residence of American citizens in the city of Yedo (art. 3). Opium 
was prohibited (art. 4). The practice of Christianity was allowed; however, proselytizing 
was restricted (art. 8).  Not until the Iwakura missions of 1871-1872, where Japanese 
officials traveled to Western states to observe factories, schools, and other social 
institutions, the Meiji government lifted the ban on Christianity that existed since 1597.  
 Regarding extraterritoriality rights, American citizens alleged to have committed 
a crime against a Japanese citizen were to be tried in American Consular courts (art. 6). 
The Ansei treaties with Western nations protected foreigners residing in Japan against 
punishment under Japanese law.40  Of the 55 Japanese treaties in the dataset, 13 of them 
mentioned extraterritoriality.  In only 5 of the 13 cases, the Japanese included a reciprocal 
claim for extraterritoriality.  In cases when the extraterritorial jurisdiction favored one 
side, Japan suffered in the treaties of Shimoda (1855), Yedo (1858), and the Treaty of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Also in 1858, the British Treaty of Yedo similarly restricted the Japanese government from punishing 
British citizens for transgressions against a Japanese citizen (art. 7).  Britain appended “Regulations under 
which British Trade is to be conducted in Japan” to the Treaty of Yedo (art. 20).  The right of British 
citizens to practice whichever religion and to erect places of worship was briefly mentioned (art. 9). Japan’s 
earliest treaties with Western powers slightly differed from China’s in that Japan restricted certain activities 
within Japan. Though Treaty and Regulations conspicuously omitted the mention of opium, earlier treaties 
prohibited the trading of opium. 
 	  
	   J.M.	  Park	  172	  
Amity and Commerce with the United States (1858).41  But in 1857, the Japan’s 
longstanding cultural contact with the Dutch aided with the negotiation of symmetric 
extraterritorial protections.  Richard Chang (1984) assessed Japan’s British and American 
consular courts and found that of the 3,500 trials held and only 1% of them could be 
considered unequal.  Thomas Stephens (1992) similarly concluded that British consular 
courts in Japan were far more sensitive to local customs and practices than the British 
were in China (Scully 2000, 14).   
The Treaty of Yedo (1858), which was ratified on July 11, 1859, between Great 
Britain and Japan discussed diplomatic affairs, criminal procedures, social freedoms, and 
employment rights.  The treaty allowed for both sides to establish consular representation 
(art. 2).42  Extraterritoriality extended to both sides (art. 4 and 5). British citizens were 
given free religious freedoms (art. 9) and allowed to employ Japanese natives (art. 8). 
Yokohama was opened for free trade to limit the traffic in Kanagawa, which was already 
a busy Japanese port city.  In 1861, 126 foreigners lived in Yokohama and 31 lived in 
Nagasaki (Auslin 2000, 66).43  Ii Naosuke attempted to curb the number of foreigners that 
the Japanese would have to engage. The Japanese negotiated to postpone the opening of 
Simoda and Hakodade until 1862 (Auslin 2000, 67).  
 Even with some specifications, Japan’s elite class was not in agreement with the 
role of international treaties. The opening of Japan infuriated the samurai who after 
ending ties with domain homes fomented uprisings in the countryside (Allinson 1999, 
11).  A key negotiator of the 1858 treaty, Ii Naosuke, was assassinated in 1860.  Ii had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The Treaty of Kanagawa (1854) did not mention extraterritoriality.  
42 The full text of the treaty is found at http://www.archive.org/stream/cu31924023437837/cu3192402343 
7837djvu.txt.   
43 55 out of the 126 in Yokohama were British. 
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many enemies from within and outside the bafuku offices after he purged the offices of 
dissenting officials after the 1858 treaties.  The Satsuma and Choshu domains purchased 
guns from Great Britain as fighting escalated. The shogun relied on an alliance with 
France. By 1867, the shogun chose to step down when forces against him became too 
strong.  The Meiji Ishin (明治維新), on January 3, 1868, reinstated the Emperor of 
Japan.  
 The Meiji Ishin was almost a coup d’etat. The troops of Satsuma and Choshu 
seized the palace of Kyoto announcing the “imperial restoration” of the emperor.  
Yoshinobu Minamoto who wrote, “treaties are the basis of international relations” 
expressed how treaties helped to equalize the power differentials of large versus small 
and strong versus weak states (Totman 1980, 30).  Yoshinobu’s sentiments differed from 
the Chinese diplomat, Gui Liang’s statement that treaties were “rubbish.”  Yoshinobu 
emphasized the significance of treaties.  In his letter of resignation, Yoshinobu, indicated 
that unequal treaties and contact with Western powers led to his. He wrote, “Now that 
foreign intercourse becomes daily more extensive, unless the government is directed from 
one central authority, the foundations of the state will fall to pieces” (de Bary et al. 2005, 
671).44 Losing his position as a central authority figure, he contemplated the future 
restructuring that Japan envisioned.  
 The abolition of feudalism and the centralization of the Meiji state focused on the 
notion of “one sovereign authority” (Debary et al. 2005, 675)45 or “one universal 
authority” (McLaren [1914] 1979, 30). The recognition of the Emperor as the sole 
authority figure in Japan to foreign leaders did not come quickly. The emperor, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 From Horei zensho, 1867, p.1; McLaren, Japanese Government Documents, pgs. 2-3 
45 From the text of the “Memorial on the Proposal to Return the Register”, Horei zensho, 1869, p.42.  
 	  
	   J.M.	  Park	  174	  
Mutshuhito, announced that the Tokugawa Shogun, Yoshinobu, would return to govern 
Japan’s internal and external affairs. However, the new title for Yoshinobu was Tycoon 
and should be addressed as such in treaties (Debary et al. 2005, 671).  
 At the critical point of departure for the historical actors of the Meiji Ishin the 
Western envoys and popular revivalists wanted to integrate Japan into the Western family 
of nations. The bakufu, the daimyo, and the imperial loyalists, according to Wilson 
(1998, 39), wanted to remove the Western envoys and keep Japan insular.  A strong effort 
to integrate Japan unfolded with the governments’ decimation of the Ainu people in the 
Ryukyu Islands (Dudden 2005, 75, Hirano 2009). Japan’s internal colonial plans became 
international soon thereafter.  
 The Charter Oath (1868) was Japan’s step towards modernization.  The content of 
the oath enunciated a departure from traditions.  The fourth oath stated that “Evil customs 
of the past shall be broken off and everything based upon the just laws of Nature” should 
be observed (Debary et al. 2005, 672).46 A system for levying taxes on “territorial lords, 
farmers, artisans, and merchants” was planned (Debary et al. 2005, 674).47  Again, the 
language of the law affected attributes affixed to laws.  The Japanese rewrote laws in 
1868 with compounds of Chinese characters (jukugo) and adopted older Chinese terms 
for Western law (Cassel 2012, 35).  The Constitution of 1868 set measures for 
restructuring the Japanese government into a centralized bureaucracy, placing new 
measures for airing regional grievances, and establishing national standards for levying 
and collecting taxes (art. 10).  The cascading effect of the unequal treaties reformed 
domestic policies made a strong case for the transposibility of schemas (Sewell 1996) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 From Meiji boshin, pgs.81-82; McLaren, Japanese Government Documents, p. 8 
47 From Meiji boshin, pgs.87-89; McLaren, Japanese Government Documents, pgs. 8-10 
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where externally promoted institutions changed domestic institutions.  Similar to 
Sewell’s notion of history emerging as a set of event (1996), Berezin strengthened the 
argument to assess events as providing templates of possibilities (2012). 
 Although some factions were directly opposed to the intrusions of international 
law writ large, the Satsuma leader Shimazu Hisamitsu commissioned the translation and 
dissemination of international law in Japanese in the mid-1860’s.  In general, Japan 
contacted representatives of multiple nations, which led to the development of Japan’s 
high degree of cosmopolitanism.  Iwakura, a member of the faction opposing the 
Tokugawa Shogunate, renounced the 1858 treaties. In 1869, Iwakura Tomomi tried to 
convince Westerners that Japan’s “public laws of nations” (bankoku koho) were 
congruent with European legal structures (Duus 1989, 29).  He and a small group of 
Tokugawa elites left for a mission in 1872 with the intent to renegotiate Japan’s treaties 
with Western powers but insights into Western schools, factories, and living quarters 
drew much interest in Japan as well. Iwakura Tomomi’s diplomatic mission exemplified 
Japan’s eagerness to learn from Western nation-states  
 Though many participants of the mission had strong anti-foreign biases, what the 
Japanese diplomats observed were possibilities for social and technological 
improvements that could be learned from the West.  Kido Takayoshi lauded the education 
system of the United States as one that truly “pa[id] a great deal of attention to the 
children” (Debary et al. 2005, 678).  Kido emphasized how the Japanese are “no different 
from Americans or Europeans of today” (Debary et al. 2005, 678). Other letters 
necessitated a constitutional government that would provide “unshakable fundamental 
law” (Debary et al. 679). In addition, Kido expressed in awe the wealth of Europeans and 
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the ubiquity of clothing made out of cotton. From the Iwakura missions, Kido noticed 
how “Confucian biases against industrial and commercial growth” were detriments to 
Japan’s growth in power as a nation-state (Mayo 1972, 813). Kume Kunitake’s 
observations of London dealt with the wealth and industrial developments. Kume wrote, 
“It has taken scarcely forty years to produce such conditions” in Europe (Debary et al. 
2005, 679).48  Kume’s observations of the developments became an observable finding in 
the process of modernizing Japan.  They accepted the “importance of law” and “extensive 
foreign contacts” for future survival (Mayo 1972, 813). 
 How Westerners regarded Japan created problems in fulfilling the terms of 
equality and sovereignty in its future treaties. The treaties that Japan signed with other 
East Asian states are described among historians as Western style treaties because of its 
similarities to earlier unequal treaties that Asian nations signed with European states.  
Acting in the economic and political interest of one’s nation is not necessarily Eastern or 
Western; qualifying a type of treaty as Western refers more to the formatting.  Japan’s 
replication of Western style treaties included admonishments from Western nations.  In 
his remarks, F.O. Adams noted,  
"The great aim of the Japanese rulers is to make it appear that their country is the 
 equal of all other nations…and nothing would flatter their vanity more than to 
 have a great Conference in Europe, assembled, as it were, at the bidding of the 
 Japanese…The Ambassadors, too, would naturally be elated with the idea of this 
 European Congress, where the affairs of their country would be discussed by 
 them in the eyes of the whole civilized world" (Auslin 2004, 188).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 From Kume Kunitake, Tokumei, vol.2, pp. 58-59. 
 	  
	   J.M.	  Park	  177	  
Keeping in mind the three forms of treaty interpretation – 1) textualist (reading 
the text on its own), 2) intentionalist (approximating the intent of the authors), and 3) 
teleological (the treaty’s goals), British-Japanese treaties demonstrated differences in how 
the documents were perceived.  If treaties between Great Britain and Japan were read 
with a textual interpretation mode, Adams’s statement would contradict the legal 
documents. The intentionalist reading would suggest that Britain’s interest was in trade 
and not in the civilizing mission.49 Also the teleological reading would suggest that in 
terms of commerce, Japan industrialized though other social practices such as 
Christianity was never popular, especially when compared to cases such as Korea (Kane 
and Park 2009).   
Legal Entries to Korea 
Intellectual partnerships with Western states were favored.  In the 1870’s and 
1880’s, Gustave Boissonade, the Meiji government’s French legal advisor gave lectures 
and taught students civil and criminal codes.  The Justice Minister, Eto Shinpei, sent 
students to Paris in 1873 to learn the Napoleonic Codes of 1810 deeply (Dudden 2005, 
105).  In 1872, Mori Arinori, an educator, wanted Yale professor William Whitney to 
help invent a language for the Japanese. Mori compared the Japanese language to a form 
of “deranged Chinese” and wanted a new language that suited the “modern nation” 
(Dudden 1999, 165).  Also in 1873, the debate loomed around Japan’s possible invasion 
of Korea. The councilors assumed that the Japanese needed to handle the Korean 
“children” as they had the Russian “bullies” 1972, 813).  Though the connotation of 
Russian aggression came after Russians had murdered Japanese nationals in the Sakhalin 
Islands, the Russians were not denoted as immature or juvenile in comparison to other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 The intention of the treaty appears to focus on commerce rather social and cultural exchanges.  
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citizens.  Koreans were described as children who had to be guided through the process 
of international negotiations and because they were unable to understand the break free 
from tributary ties to China. As children may not always know what is best for them, both 
the Chinese and the Japanese were pulling the Koreans towards them for allegiance.50  
In 1894, Prince Matsukata Masayoshi extolled the development of 4 goals in 
Korea.  First, Korea should open 3 additional ports and establish foreign residential 
zones.  Second, Japan should secure the rights to mine coal in Korea. Third, Matsukata 
proposed monopolizing the telegraph lines.  Fourth, the prince wished to secure rights to 
build a railroad from Seoul to Pusan (Duus 1984, 138).  Even though the Japanese 
government did not promote all these terms, Japan’s infiltration into Korea emphasized 
commercial goals.  Japan’s concrete goals for Korea included 1) constructing a railroad 
line from Seoul to Pusan, 2) building a railroad line from Seoul to Uiju for military use, 
and 3) securing the rights to build transit lines from Kyongsan and Gensan to Unggi Bay 
(Duus 1984, 140).  The Japanese proposed for 4) “indirect or direct control over the 
Masan-Samlangjin line” (Duus 1984, 140) and 5) direct control over the post, telegraph, 
telephones, and for these to merge with the Japanese system (Duus 1984, 141).  
Developing infrastructure signified Japanese plans to send their excess population to the 
colonies.   
Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895)  
The Japanese were interested in material gain, but they focused on gaining 
territorial possessions across Asia.  Japan’s military strength developed the mental and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Characterizing an ethnicity as childlike occurred regularly in the early 20th century when Gabriel Tarde 
(1903), a sociologist, identified native Filipinos as children imitating adults (Go 2012).   
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physical readiness of the soldier.51  With resolve, the Japanese defeated the Chinese in the 
Sino-Japanese war of 1894 through 1895.  The Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) concluded 
after Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese war granted Japan access to colonize small 
nations in the Pacific.  However, the first article of the treaty noted the “full and complete 
independence and autonomy of Korea” which was Japan’s effort to end legally Korea’s 
longstanding tributary relationship to China.52  After Japan opened Korea for Western 
style treaties, China wrote an unequal treaty with Korea in 1882 that denigrated Korea 
into a low level tributary state.   
 Japan gained territories as the victor.  The war’s end furthered economic growth 
in Japan. The Japanese gained control of the southern portion of the Feng-tien and the 
eastern portion of the Liao-tung” (MC 1917, 591, art. 2). The island of Formosa (current 
day Taiwan) and the Pescadores Group were also ceded. The inhabitants of the ceded 
territories were allowed to stay for 2 years and if they have not left after the 2 years then 
the residents will be deemed Japanese citizens (art. 5). Both sides created a joint 
commission to investigate delimitations (art. 3).   
 With increased territories Japan’s access to multiple ports augmented.  To trade 
with China fluidly, Japan gained the most favored nation status (art. 6).  China opened 
Shashih, in the province of Hupeh, Chungking, in the province of Szechwan, Suchow, in 
the province of Kiangsu, and Hangchow, in the province of Chekiang to the Japanese 
(art. 6).  Japanese merchants were allowed to travel onto the Upper Yangtze and to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Japan’s military ascendency came from top-down measures to build a stronger military.  To do so, the 
military worked at the individual level to strengthen the soldiers (M. Anderson 2009).  Handbooks on such 
as Mori’s A Handbook on Military Gymnastics (Heishiki taiso ni kansuru kengen en) appeared in 1887 (M. 
Anderson 2009, 56).   
52 The full-text of the treaty with 11 articles is found on http://www.taiwanbasic.com/treaties/Shimonoseki. 
htm.   
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Woosung Rivers and were able to trade within China’s interiors.  Additionally, the 1896 
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between China and Japan emphasized Japan’s 
extensively trade with the Chinese. The 25th article of the 1896 further confirms Japan’s 
desires to maintain most favored nation status. 
 In the peace treaty, the stop of military action (art. 10) was crucial for the Chinese 
and the Japanese desired indemnities from the war.  China agreed to pay war indemnities 
of 200,000,000 Kuping taels, a form of silver currency, in 8 installments (art. 4).  
Following the release of all prisoners of war (art. 9) and the payment of two installments 
of war indemnities to Japan, the Japanese would withdraw troops from China (art. 7 and 
art. 8).   
 The Japanese operated as many firms as the British in China around 1899.  By 
1914, direct trade with Japan was the core of China’s economy. Direct trade China 
amounted to 113.3 million taels for Great Britain and 184.9 million for Japan (Duus 
1989, 3).  590 British firms and 1269 Japanese firms were in China in 1914.  In terms of 
investments in China, Japan spent $1 million U.S. dollars while Great Britain spent 
$260.3 million U.S. dollars in 1899.  By 1914, the amount rose to $219.6 million U.S. 
dollars for the Japanese and $607.5 million U.S. dollars for the British in China.  By 
1931, the Japanese dominated economic activity in China.  The amount of direct trade 
with China rose to 543.7 million taels for the Japanese and 170.9 million taels for the 
British.  Also the number of Japanese citizens residing in China increased from 2,440 in 
1899 to 80,219 in 1914 to 255,686 in 1931.   The British population in China grew at a 
slower rate from 5,562 in 1899 to 8,966 in 1914 to 13,015 in 1931.  British investments 
in China were concentrated in areas south of the Great Wall.  Much interest in northern 
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China expanded Japan’s commercial growth in Asia.  Japan’s interest in China grew 
while Britain’s economic activities were also strong in China.  
 By 1898, Japan was able to renegotiate the unequal treaties of decades before.  
The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland (1894), also known as the Aoki-Kimberley Treaty, removed extraterritorial 
rights of British citizens in Japan. In Japan, Western nationals’ exercise of 
extraterritoriality ended in 1899.  Since 1875, the Western consular courts adjudicated 65 
mixed court cases mostly involving the British (33 cases) and the Americans (19) (Chang 
1984, 18).  According to the Japan Weekly Mail, other trials involved German (5), 
Portuguese (4), French (2), Swedish-Norwegian (1), and Dutch (1) citizens (Chang 1984, 
18).   
 During the early 20th century, Japan benefited from treaties to develop territorial 
and economical advantages in Asia (Adams 1974, 5).  Japanese officials used treaties for 
material gains, particularly after the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance (1902). 
According to Adams, the Japanese viewed the international systems as a hierarchy of 
unequal states where Western powers were at the apex.  By expanding territorially in East 
Asia, Japan maneuvered to become a member of the family of nations.  However, Adams 
argued that Japan retracted from attempts of replicating Westerners and later bolstered 
itself as modernizer of East Asia (1974, 6).  World polity model scholars would view 
Japanese success in the 19th century as the result of successfully imitating Western 
nations (Meyer et al. 1997, 164).      
 After the Sino-Japanese War, the Russians grew concerned about their position in 
Asia.  In a secret memorandum on December 15, 1897, Prince A. Volkonskii, a general 
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chief officer expressed concerns for “the strategic significance of Korea” and how the 
Russian navy should have a stronger presence (Lukin 2006, 27).  Meanwhile, with the 
secret Taft-Katsura agreement between the U.S. and Japan in 1905, Japan expanded 
colonial interests towards Korea.53  
Treaty of Portsmouth (1905) 
 The 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth recognized Japan’s emerging status as a major 
world power.  The Russo-Japanese War signified two nations following the rules of 
international law in war (Howland 2011).  Controversy arose as to whether the Japanese 
acted in accordance to international law when declaring the start of the Russo-Japanese 
war (Howland 2011, 71).  The war refined Japan’s understanding of sovereignty and 
rules of engagement.  Internally, Russia had been growing weak due to class warfare and 
increasing factionalism among the elites.  But other European states were less aware of 
Japan’s rapid adoption of Western military techniques.  The war was fought over 
territorial possessions in Korea and the Manchuria region in China. In the 2nd article of 
the treaty of Portsmouth, Russia granted Japan “paramount political, military and 
economical interests” in Korea.54  The two sides agreed to exit Manchuria and Russia 
renounced any territorial claims to Manchuria (art. 3).  
 The Japanese gained the rights to operate the “railway between Chang-chunfu and 
Kuanchangtsu and Port Arthur” and the coalmines nearby (art. 6).  Both sides hope to 
maintain the property rights of the inhabitants (art. 10) and allow fishery rights for the 
Japanese near Okhotsk and Bering Seas (art. 11).  Once the prisoners of war are returned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 The Taft-Katsura agreement (1905) secretly acknowledged the United States’ colonial ambitions in the 
Philippines and Japan’s interest in Korea.  With the Lansing-Ishii Agreement (1917) between the United 
States and Japan, the Japanese colonized Manchuria (Dudden 2005, 142) while the United States’ access to 
Asia remained open.  
54 The full text is found on http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Portsmouth and the treaty was 
signed on September 5, 1905. 
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(art. 13), the Russians would assess the cost owed to the Japanese for the care and 
maintenance of the prisoners. The sub-article to article 3 promised the simultaneous 
withdrawal of troops from Manchuria.  And two parties would appoint a joint 
commission to discuss the delimitation and boundaries found in the treaty (sub-article to 
art. 9).  The joint commission on delimitation was also mentioned in the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki (1895).  Japan gained territorial gains and industries to control.  
Japan’s Growth in the late 19th century 
 Japan’s precarious position at the world political stage shifted through trade 
relations.  Acceptance into the civilized standard of nations came after Japan’s military 
and economic successes occurred (Gong 1984).  Historian Hilary Conroy in the 1950’s 
discredited economic motives for Japanese colonialism (Duus 1984, 129).  State capital 
aided the development of Japan’s empire (Duus 1984, 130).  In the 1980’s, Peattie, Duus, 
and others explored the economic dimensions of the Japanese empire.  The legal 
ramifications of Japan’s unequal treaties of the 1850’s promulgated a “competition 
through commercial and industrial activity” with interest in expanding export markets 
(Komura Jutaro [1902] in Duus 1984, 133).   
 Treaties are applied as scripts according to the World Society model that 
transferred from more powerful to less powerful nations.  Japan’s adoption of the laws 
existed not as an imitation a la neo-institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) because 
postcolonial theories of hybridity “enunciated” (Bhabha 1994) the laws into Japanese. 
The Japanese officials used their knowledge of treaties to renegotiate reciprocal terms 
from Western nations in the late 19th century (Auslin 2004).  Treaties of 1894 accorded 
the Japanese with trading conditions, but Western officials did not consider the Japanese 
government as equals (Auslin 2004).  The Japanese engaged European and South 
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American states through international law even though the Japanese considered the 
international system as a Janus-faced model that voiced equality while not granting equal 
relations to Asian nations.  
 Within Asia, on the other hand, Japan gained economic and technological 
prowess.  From 1883 to 1913, 20% of Japan’s net national product was in agriculture 
(Harootunian 2000, 4).  Japanese manufacturers flourished in China.  Taiwan and Korea 
developed into agricultural outposts for Japan.  International laws were instrumental to 
Japanese outward expansion to gain territories and inward modifications to “modernize” 
its subjects.  The codes for children’s education, dress codes (Shively 1965), production 
of popular culture, regulations on gambling and so forth added to the Japanese cultivating 
a positive image for the Western nationals.  The French, with the leadership of Gustave 
Boissonade (1825-1910), redesigned Japan’s legal lexicon. Official government titles of 
the Meiji period (1868-1912) employed European nomenclature of Baron, Viscount, 
Minister, and Count. The Meiji government restored a defunct dynasty while adopting 
many Western customs such as language, vocabulary, dress, and military organization.  
Exhuming the past to model itself closer to “modern” and “Western” state allowed the 
Japanese government to craft precisely a national ideology.  
Western Reactions to Japanese Colonialism  
 Western observers received Japan’s adoption of wearing Western suits, ridding 
traditional social classes, and restructuring legal systems favorably.  Publications such as 
Journal of Race Development operated until 1919 and promoted measures to “improve” 
non-Caucasian societies.  Some authors noted how “Western” imitation was a necessary 
step towards “progress” (Ladd 1918, Wilson 1912).  Though officials of Great Britain 
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observed Japan’s call for equality with the Europeans as sheer vanity, the Japanese 
continually succeeded commercially and militarily.  
 Japan’s relationship with the United States was highly cooperative. Applauding 
Japan’s revised treaties, President McKinley discussed “Japan’s position as a fully 
independent sovereign power” equipped with “Comprehensive codes of civil and 
criminal procedures” (Wilson 1912, 254).  Wilson who excerpted the McKinley’s 
announcement in an article entitled “The Family of Nations Idea and Japan,” shared a 
popular academic conception of the era that modernizing even through colonialism was a 
principled act.  
 As Western nations openly applauded Japan’s prominence in the international 
community, Japanese scholars adopted the voice of the European intellectuals. World 
Society scholars theorized that Western ideology would permeate to the peripheries.  The 
implementation of international law and justifications for colonialism intrigued Japanese 
scholars of the early 20th century.  Nitobe Inazo (1912) discussed the role of “Japan as a 
Colonizer.”  Nitobe described tales of “savages living in a primitive life” from Tainan 
and Taihoku disrupted the peace of Chinese settlers in Taiwan (Nitobe 1912, 349).  The 
brigands sacked the villages and demanded tributes.  In addition to accounts of paupers 
lining the streets in Moukden, Nitobe recounted chilling tales of head-hunters who were 
“very partial to Chinese heads” (Nitobe 1912, 350) frequently terrorizing villagers.  
Table 19 - Japan’s objectives for Colonization by Nitobe (1912, Dudden 2005, 359-360)  
1 To defend the territory as it was gained as a spoil of war 
2 To protect property and life and disseminate legal institutions 
3 To protect and improve the health of the colonized 
4 To encourage the growth of industries in the colonies 
5 To educate the colonized 
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 Nitobe taught his students at the University of Tokyo in the 1910’s that 
“Colonization is the spread of civilization” (植民地は文明の伝播) (Dudden 2005, 134) 
and could also be seen as a means “to plant people” (shokumin, 植民) and “to increase 
people” (jouyoumin, 殖民) (Dudden 2005, 137).55  With the economic impetus added to 
the fabricated moral rationale for colonialism, Korea, Taiwan, and other polities were 
colonized. The Japanese unofficially ruled Manchuko while formulating policies towards 
Pan-Asianism in the 1930’s (Saaler and Koschmann 2007).   Through legal treatises, 
other nations of the international system officially condoned the actions.   
 Japanese scholars affinity to German cosmopolitanism encouraged a form of 
internationalism that yielded a campaign towards Pan-Asianism.  Pan-Asianism relished 
on Japan’s mythical past of divine imperial dynasties.  Japanese scholars legitimized 
Japanese governments in other parts of Asia not as an imperialism in the Western sense 
but an effort to “make the world one household” according to the logic of co-prosperity 
(Matsuzawa 1939, Saaler and Szpilman 2011, 11).  The koa policy for Raising Asia 
retooled educational and commercial activities in Japan to restore wealth in Asia 
(Schneider 2011, 72).  
Conclusion 
 The treaties of the 19th century significantly changed the ways in which Asia 
perceived itself with respect to the rest of the world.  Even through the early part of the 
19th century, China viewed itself as a centrally located, culturally refined, and morally 
superior nation in comparison to the British, American or Japanese states.  China’s self-
assessment did little to help preserve its national welfare as the lure of commercial riches 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 To plant people can be Romanized “shokumin” and the to increase people, the Romanization is 
“jouyoumin” which is in modern Japanese, the combination of these two Kanji characters are less common. 
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lessened the stigma of working as a merchant.56  Falling behind the new ideology of the 
era, the Qing dynasty of China failed to adapt to a new form of global supremacy that 
emphasized commerce.   China, slowly, undid the damages of the unequal treaties.  The 
1865 treaty with Belgium where Belgium was allowed to trade opium into China was 
unilaterally terminated in 1928 (http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/ 
1928.02.21_belgium_china.htm).  China adopted a new legal code to accommodate 
Western legal traditions in 1928. And it was not until 1943, when China was able to have 
Western states relinquish extraterritoriality within China (Peters 2007).  Even though 
China and Russia had longstanding treaty relations, Russia concluded an unequal treaty 
with China’ which took away China’s rights to outer Mongolia in 1945.  
 Unlike China, Japan succeeded in creating an industrial infrastructure, advancing 
militarily, and gaining territorial possessions but the transition was tumultuous.  The 
leaders of the old samurai order strongly resisted a move towards Westernization.  Even 
though Japanese officials adopted Western dress and employed written legal treaties 
heavily, Japan distinguished themselves from other nations that met the standard of 
“civilization.”  The old hereditary monarchy was reinstated all the while a more liberal 
and democratic charter oath became national law.  Japanese scholars and officials 
rebranded Japanese nationalism as a form of pan-Asianism that hoped to combat Western 
colonization of Asia.  Japan, in turn, became a colonizing power in Asia and shortly 
before World War II controlled 27 possessions.  The imperial mentality developed 
precipitously in the 19th century. 
 The early exposure to the Dutch scientists in the 17th century allowed the Japanese 
to extract knowledge from Westerners.  The Japanese did not passively accept Western 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Confucian society did not consider trade as noble work.  
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laws in the 19th century.  Japanese “passivism” in international law was attributed to 
Japan’s acceptance of legal methodologies after World War II (Koh 1997, 2626 fn130).  
Further, the contact with the Russian “barbarians” in the early 19th century, French legal 
scholars in the 1870s and 1880s, German physicians of the late 19th century (H.E. Kim 
2006), and so forth contributed towards Japan’s development as a modern nation-state. 
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CHAPTER 5 
VARIETIES OF IMPERIALISMS IN KOREA 
 
  In this chapter, I will analyze the key treaties that Korea signed which 
transformed Korea from a relatively unknown polity to a recognized sovereignty and to 
an annexed territory.  Korea transitioned from a dependency upon Chinese suzerainty to 
Japanese imperialism.  The reluctance for Korea to divorce itself from the Chinese 
empire paled in comparison to Korea’s resistance to Japanese rule.  By the 20th century, 
the Koreans were indebted to Japan for industrial infrastructures.  
Table 20 - Treaty centered timeline of Korea 
2/26/1876 Treaty of Ganghwa  (with Japan) 
5/19/1882 Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Treaty of Jenchuan) (with the United States) 
7/23/1882 Imo Mutiny  (within Korea) 
8/30/1882 Additional Convention of Jenchuan (with Japan) 
9/1/1882 Regulations for Maritime Commerce and Overland Trade  (with China) 
1/1/1883 Twenty four rules for the traffic on the Frontier between 
Liao-tung and Korea  
(with China) 
11/26/1883 Treaty of Friendship and Commerce  (with Great Britain) 
11/26/1883 Treaty of Seoul  (with Germany) 
6/26/1884 Treaty of Friendship and Commerce  (with Italy) 
10/3/1884 Agreement respecting a general foreign settlement at 
Jenchuan 
General announcement 
7/7/1884 Treaty of Seoul (with Russia) 
1/9/1885 Treaty of Hanseong  (with Japan) 
6/4/1886 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation  (with France) 
11/12/1889 Korean and Japanese Fishery regulations (with Japan) 
6/23/1892 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation  (with Austria-Hungary) 
9/11/1899 Commercial Treaty  (with China) 
3/23/1901 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation  (with Belgium) 
4/17/1901 Postal Agreement  (with France) 
7/15/1902 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation  (with Denmark) 
11/17/1905 Protectorate Treaty  (with Japan) 
7/24/1907 Protectorate Treaty for Internal Administration  (with Japan) 
1/1/1909 Memorandum concerning administration of Justice and 
prisons in Korea  
(with Japan) 
10/1/1909 Memorandum concerning establishment of Bank of Korea (with Japan) 
8/29/1910 Annexation Treaty  (with Japan) 
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  The analysis on Korea in the 19th century took either a civilizational or national 
approach (Hahm 2006, 36).  The civilizational approach examined how Asia as a 
civilization conflicted with Western norms.  The national approach in Korean studies 
discussed mostly internal developments.  The development of Korea’s national ethnic 
identity, minjok, took form due to the struggles that Koreans endured mainly after being 
colonized.  The expedition that the American vessel, General Sherman, did of the Korean 
coast in 1866 was a disappointment for the Americans.  The treaties opened ports 
primarily to establish trade. Prior to the Ganghwa treaty, Koreans and Japanese traded via 
the Japanese House, waegwan, in Tsushima (Larsen 2006, 54). The prospects of 
economic development in Korea seemed weak but the Japanese proceeded to enter into 
treaty relations with the Koreans.  
Historical assessment of 19th century Korea 
 The legacies of imperialism in Korea had three distinct pasts – Chinese 
Confucianism, Japanese industrial colonialism, and American Protestantism.  Korea 
related to the Qing court via sadae (serving the great or big country).  Korea’s relations to 
Japan were further based on kyorin (neighboring states) (W. Kang 2005).  An 
examination of Korea in the 19th century will utilize theories of state-formation and the 
diffusion of international law.  To understand contemporary Korean society, one must 
become aware of its history.  At the most basic level, physical structures built in the 19th 
century still exist.  Institutions remain pertinent in Korean society.  Today, the prestige of 
foreigner-established institutions demonstrates how the legacies of imperialism resonate 
with contemporary Koreans.  For instance, Lee (2010) in 한국의 고등교육 (Korea’s 
Higher Education) explored the roles of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Protestantism in 
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educational institutions.  But in the 19th century the three powers that actively vied for 
power in Korea were Japanese, Chinese, and American governments.   
 Historians of early modern Korea evaluated multiple standpoints.  Martina 
Deuchler’s classic study of Western powers in Korea in Confucian Gentlemen and 
Barbarian Envoys (1977) highlighted Korea’s struggles to accept the “norm” of bilateral 
treaties and interactions with foreigners from the afar.   Kirk Larsen’s 2008 account, 
Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea 1850-1910, 
assessed how China kept Korea in an inferior position.  China resisted relinquishing 
power and Korea was reluctant to abandon the relationship as well (Inoguchi 2006).  The 
Qing dynasty’s treaty relations with Korea helped the Chinese retain tributary state 
relations with the Koreans.  
 In Japan’s Colonization of Korea (2005), Alexis Dudden studied the formulation 
of international terms into Japanese.  The new legal terminologies helped to create a 
discourse and a mindset for colonization.  Language formed the logic that allowed legally 
legitimate change in power to take place in Korea. The key to Japan’s colonization was to 
ease into the process through legal procedures such as not allowing the Koreans to 
contact foreign nations without Japanese officials acting as mediators, taking away 
extraterritorial rights for Koreans, and mandating protectorate and annexation treaties in 
the early 20th century.  Familial terms were used to describe Japan’s relationship to 
Korea.  China considered Korea “younger brother” throughout the 19th century.  Japan 
referred to Korea as “cousins” or “half-siblings” (Dudden 2005, 120).57   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Korea had been treated diplomatically as a stepchild.  The language of paternalism is not specific to 
colonialism in Asia.  German governors used explicitly paternalistic terms to address the Samoans as 
children (Steinmetz 2003, 58).   
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 Confucianism was the main but not the sole philosophy in premodern Asia.  Even 
western influences via the Dutch had been in place for centuries.  Retaining the 
Confucian ethic of saimin (“saving the people”), according to Tetsuo Najita, kept Dutch 
studies somewhat compatible to the official Confucian thought of maintaining order 
during the Tokugawa period (Dudden 2005, 39).  Dudden provided an intellectual 
historian’s account of how new legal terms blended into the Japanese language.  The new 
vocabulary for law allowed for the Japanese empire to create “a common sense” that 
developed a process for colonial conquest (Dudden 2005, 5).  The new vocabulary for 
international relations concurred with attempts to reorder the hierarchies of power in Asia 
(Dudden 1999, 165).  The term, “sovereignty,” Dudden argued, gave “new awareness 
that claiming land in international politics was a legally defined privilege” (Dudden 2005, 
41).  Throughout the book, Dudden reiterated how “independence” and “autonomy” were 
interchangeable terms. The language of law allowed ideas to lead into actions such as 
military intervention.  In classical Chinese, “sovereignty” (zìzhǔ, 自 主 ) and 
“independence” (dúlì, 獨立) were related terms.  In the new legal vocabulary for the 
Japanese, independent country (jishu) closely expressed “self-rule” and “sovereignty” 
(ken wo hoyu) (Dudden 2005, 54).    
Historical Background of Korea 
 Confucianism came to Korea in the 4th century.  The adoption of a new ideology 
was a common tactic for newly initiated regimes.  The first Confucian academy opened 
in A.D. 372 in Korea but the shamanistic indigenous relations and Buddhism were 
equally proscribed throughout the society.  Korea was not deeply embedded in the 
traditions of Confucianism until 1392 when the new Yi dynasty wanted to break from the 
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old dynast of the Koryo period. During the Choson dynasty (1392-1910), factionalism 
plagued the Korean bureaucracy.  Different interpretations of Confucian texts led to 
schisms. The ideological rifts fomented constantly (Deuchler 1992, Palais 1996).  
 By using morality as the ideological mechanism, Confucianism functionally 
created discipline.  Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the Koreans especially in rural 
areas adhered to shamanism and nativist beliefs in practice.  Though efforts of the Yi 
dynasty was to instill the moral teachings of Confucianism with picture books for the 
mostly illiterate populous that illustrated the five relations and respectful behaviors, the 
Confucian ideology was sincerest solely among the educated, bureaucrats, and the 
government functionaries.  The official state policy of Korea espoused neo-
Confucianism.  Therefore laws were in place to ban widows from remarrying, daughters 
or children born from concubines from inheriting property, and having unmarried 
daughters listed in the family registries.  Diplomatically, the Korean government 
promoted the notion of sadae, which meant to “serve the great.”   
 The legal system that emerged out of Confucianism privileged central 
bureaucracies and autocratic rule.  The legal norms of the Confucian state did not have a 
mystical quality (Shaw 1981).  The legal system in Korea partly relied on Chinese law 
from the Tang and Sung periods including the late 14th century Yuan codes (Shaw 1981, 
3).  But the developments occurred within Korea throughout the 18th century.  Principally, 
the Koreans accepted law that the Ming officers in China practiced.  The Chinese had 
power and authority ultimately that was “derived from the central government” (Shaw 
1981, 4).   
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 Korea’s earliest contact with Westerners occurred in the 15th century when 
shipwrecked Dutch sailors including Hendrik Hamel took refuge in Korea (Ledyard 
1971).  The incident bore little longstanding significance in Korea.  Japan’s agreements 
with Korea including the Kiyu Agreement of 1609 (Lewis 2003, Mayo 1972) had not 
benefited the Koreans much. The trend continued throughout the 19th century.  Even 
though the Korean government imposed strict isolationist policies to thwart clandestine 
and potentially subversive activities such as Christianity the Koreans sought out Christian 
doctrines.  Unlike other Asian states where European missionaries entered to proselytize, 
in 1785, the Koreans requested a priest living in Beijing, Gutzlaff, to teach in Korea 
(Kane and Park 2009).    
Early Western Encounters 
 Korea had brief encounters with Westerners in the middle of the 19th century.  In 
1855, a ship containing American, British, and Filipino men was stranded off the coast of 
Tongchon and another was stranded off the coast of Yonil in 1865.  France made two 
attempts to enter Korea in 1866 with Catholic missionaries, but the Koreans thwarted 
their efforts both times. Korea’s first official contact with a Western vessel involved the 
American vessel, Surprise, in 1866.  S. Wells Williams, the American chargé d’affaires 
in Peking, notified Secretary of State William Seward of the encounter with Koreans (W. 
Kang 2005, 6). When the ship, General Sherman, entered Korea’s Daedong River in 
1866, a skirmish broke out, but diplomatic exchanges between Korean, American, and 
Chinese governments kept the incident from escalating further.   
  In Pak Chehyong’s account of the French naval vessel approaching Korea in 
1866, voiced the fears and anxiety of how “our country will be in danger” (Pak 1997, 
223).  The officials in part felt they had failed in their duties to protect the King.  The 
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Koreans ambushed the French, killing dozens.  The French soon retreated.  In 1867, the 
American trading vessel, General Sherman, approached the coast of P’yongan.  Oppert, a 
German, arrived in P’almi Island in 1868 and Han Songgun of the Munsusan Fortress 
killed 3 Germans.  The efforts to expunge Westerners and their influences gave rise to 
widespread policing. Undercover agents were sent to villages to capture Korean Catholics 
and the converts were beheaded after capture (Pak 1997, 226).  The Great Persecution of 
1866 basically extinguished the Christian population of Korea.     
 Western officials conceptualized Korea as a sovereign nation-state.  The Koreans 
did not allowed vessels such as General Sherman to sail into Korea in the first place, but 
the killing of an American entangled the Korean government into an international 
scandal. Prince Kung of China corresponded with Williams regarding Korea. However, 
Prince Kung noted that “Although Korea [wa]s regarded as a subject state of China, she 
[wa]s completely sovereign” in terms of internal sovereignty (W. Kang 2005, 13).58  The 
Korean government handled domestic affairs without Chinese influence, and its tributary 
relations to China were largely customary at that point.  Korean intellectuals were eager 
to supplement the philosophy of Confucianism with metaphysical understanding of the 
world.  Scholars sought out Christianity to expand the logic to universality.  
Early Christian Activity in Korea 
 Factionalism marginalized elites who later devoted their lives to intellectual 
investigations of Christianity. Catholicism grew out of elitist debates on Neo-
Confucianism in 1784. Catholicism became a real threat to national security in 1801 
when Hwang Sa-yong carried a secret message to the bishop in Beijing within the lining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 From Ching-tai Chou-pan I-wu shihmo, Tung-chi-chao (The Complete Account of the Management of the 
Barbarian Affairs of Ching Dynasty, Tung-chi Period). Peiping: Old Palace Museum, 1930, Vol. 57, 7th 
year of the Tungchi, 2nd moon and 18th day (March 10, 1868)  
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of his jacket. The so-called “silk letter” listed the grievances of the clandestine Catholic 
community in Korea and asked for foreign troops to attack the Korean government so 
that Catholics could practice their religion freely.  
 The letter detailed the short but bloody history of the church in Korea and 
discussed the weakness of the Korean military. The letter revealed to the Western nations 
that “The king was still a child and cannot lead [the army] into combat” (Hwang 1801, 
135).  Additionally, the Catholics requested that the Pope “dispatch a fleet of several 
hundred ships, filled with fifty or sixty thousand of the best troops, along with lots of 
cannons and other deadly weapons” (Hwang 1801, 135). After the Catholic persecutions 
of 1801, other systematic persecutions followed in 1839 and 1866.  The civil unrest in 
Korea existed well before Western-style treaties.  The treaties added to the declining 
control of the Korean government.  
 In 1884, predominantly Methodists and Presbyterians missionaries from the 
United States flooded Korea.  In 1885, Dr. Horace Scranton started the Methodist 
Episcopal Mission to train Korean medical personnel.  With the arrival of female doctors 
from Western states, education extended to female students.59  In 1888, Mary Scranton 
founded what is known today as Ewha Women’s University, which remains one of 
world’s leading female university.  Western settlers who entered Korea in the late 19th 
century made long-lasting impact through the establishment of universities and medical 
facilities.  Educational improvements extended to serve the multiple strata of Korean 
society.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Historically, healers in Korea had been women, but the prestige of the medical profession grew with 
improved medical training. 
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 The missionaries helped to distance a few Koreans from strict adherence to 
Confucian rituals.  Deuchler’s assessment of Korea’s transformations of the late 19th 
century implies that the West’s role was minor in comparison to the Japanese and 
Chinese interests in the peninsula.  While Protestant missions flourished in Seoul and 
Pyongyang in comparison to their lackluster success in Nagasaki and Beijing, the 
Tonghak movement, which lost momentum after the death of its originator in 1864 
resurfaced in 1894.   
Early Nativism in Korea: Tonghak Rebellion  
Korea’s rigid social hierarchy was an underlying factor that contributed to the 
domestic unrest of the 19th century.  Korean peasants, farmers, and outcasts, unable to 
escape the classes they were born into, organized rebellions.  In the 1860’s, the Tonghak 
movement, which was started in the Southern province, disrupted existing Korean social 
hierarchies and practices.60  Ch’oe Che-u (1824-1864), who failed his bureaucratic 
entrance exams, started the Tonghak movement.61 The movement synthesized of Taoism, 
Buddhism, Confucianism, and mysticism.  Tonghak leaders promoted peasants’ rights. 
Slavery and ascriptive social hierarchies continued until the passage of the Gabo Reforms 
(1894) in Korea.   
Tonghak leaders organized protests, riots, and staged masked dance performances 
that encouraged violent uprising against wealthy aristocrats (yangban).  The syncretic and 
mystical religion of Tonghak (“Eastern Learning”) revolved around the charismatic 
leadership of Ch’oe.  Politically, he endorsed improved conditions for the commoners 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The capital city, Seoul, and other major cities of cultural importance such as Kaesong and Pyongyang 
were located in the Northern part of the Korean peninsula. Southern provinces were stereotyped to be rural 
philistines.  
61 Tonghak literally translates to Eastern learning. “Tong” means east and “hak” means learning.  
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based on pseudo-religious rationale.  He discussed that all people belong to God and 
should be treated equally.  Tonghak leader Chon Pong-jun claimed, “Man is the most 
precious being in the world because he has morality” (Hahm 2006, 38). Chon continued 
that the relationship between father and son is “the fundamental fabric of human 
morality” (Hahm 2006, 38).  Personally, he promoted the myth that he had magical 
powers similar to the shamans.  Ch’oe supposedly drank water mixed in with ashes of 
burned talisman and used the potion as a method to heal illnesses (Duncan 1997, 229).  
The movements’ audience was the illiterate and poorly educated commoners.  He wrote 
poems and political tracts in phonetic Korean instead of Chinese.  As Elias argued in The 
Civilizing Process ([1939] 2000), using the vernacular was a deliberate attack on elite 
structures.   
After Ch’oe Cheu was executed, Ch’oe Sihyong (1827-1898) transitioned to 
become the leader.  Ch’oe Sihyong believed in social equality and tapered the activities 
of the Tonghak movement after violent revolts of the 1860’s.  The Korean government 
executed key Tonghak leaders in 1864 and decimated the Catholics in 1866.  The elites 
perpetrated more violence after capturing the followers of the nativist Tonghak and 
foreign Christian philosophies that threatened the status quo. Korea’s rigid social 
structures prevented any activities that potentially threatened the dynasty.  The de facto 
regent of Korea from 1864 to 1873 was Daewongun, the father of the twelve year-old 
King Gojong.  Daewongun imposed an isolationist policy and grew increasingly wary of 
Western powers after the Opium (1839-1842) and Arrow (1856-1858) wars ravaged 
China.  
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 The peasants of the Tonghak army wanted to rid Korea of Western influence and 
wished to reinstate Daewongun to lead the government. The army defeated Korean troops 
in their campaign to the capital. The government negotiated a cease-fire with the army, 
while the Sino-Japanese war was undergoing.  By 1894, Japan controlled nearly every 
internal security matter in Korea. The jingoistic Tonghak army attempted to fight the 
Japanese in Konju but was defeated.  
Geopolitical context of Asia 
 China’s influence over Korea in foreign diplomacy allowed some to speculate that 
China wanted Korea to sign treaties with the U.S. to curb Japan’s growing power in the 
region (Dudden 2005).  However, Koreans were unable to stop Japan’s increasing 
control.  Japan represented a departure from the tributary state system that China and 
some factions of Korean elites wished to maintain.  Japan’s plans, after the Meiji Ishin of 
1868, represented a push towards the international system where Korea stood apart from 
China as a sovereign nation, but scholars suspected Japan’s imperialist motivations 
including its foreign policies (Suzuki 2009). 
The Meiji Council of State met in October 1873 to decide whether military action 
should be taken in Korea (seikan ron). In 1873, when the Meiji Diet decided to invade 
Korea, part of the rationale to do so was to manage Korea’s childish behavior.  
Councilors compared the Korean problem to the Sakhalin issues of the 1850s and 1860s.  
Officials such as Okuma took the stance that Koreans were children behaving badly 
while the Russians were treated as naturally aggressive and belligerent.62 Marlene Mayo 
reported,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Go (2004, 47) also noted how the Americans considered the Filipinos to be child-like. 
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“Okuma had said a few months earlier, the Koreans were behaving more like 
 children than responsible adults. Did one slap around children but not take on 
 bullies like the Russians?” (Mayo 1972, 813).  
The Chinese appraised Korea differently.  Huang Zunxian in 1880 prepared a 
policy for Korea that wanted to use Korea as an ally to keep Russia at bay (Deuchler 
1977, 88).  Deuchler wrote, “China and Korea really formed one and the same family” 
(ibid). The foreign policy initiative of sadae simply meant that Korea would serve the 
greater interests of China.   In the 19th century, Korea signed multiple treaties with China, 
Japan, and Western nations. In my analysis, I included 24 treaties with Asian and 
European partners.   
Table 21. Distribution of Korean Treaties by Region-based Dyad 
Region-based dyad Count 
1) Great Powers and Asian states 10 
3) Intra Asia 14 
 
Table 22. Distribution of Korean Treaties by Binned Decades 
Binned Decades Count 
5) 1861 to 1880 2 
6) 1881 to 1900 14 
7) 1901 to 1912 8 
 
Table 23. Distribution of Korean Treaties by Type 
Types of Treaties Count 
2) Commerce and navigation 5 
3) Friendship 10 
6) Delimitation and protectorate 6 
7) Consular conventions and other  3 
Treaty of Ganghwa (1876) 
The Treaty of Ganghwa opened Korea to economic trading as the Treaty of Yedo 
(1858) had done for the Japanese.  Japan broke the tributary bonds between Korea and 
China in 1876 with the Treaty of Ganghwa.  Pre-modern Asian diplomacy negotiated 
three predilections.  First, the Chinese considered themselves supreme over Korea, 
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Taiwan, and the Ryukyu islands (Inoguchi 2006).  Second, Korea considered itself 
central and did not want to communicate with the Japanese except in Tsushima, also 
known as Dokdo (Larsen 2006).  Third, the Japanese reoriented their policies to study 
Western institutions from 1871 to 1895 (Inoguchi 2006, 9). The country receiving a 
cultural form required motivation to acquire information.  A reluctance to adapt, as seen 
with China, reflected less on exposure but willingness.63  Korea’s treaty with Japan 
foreshadowed Korea’s future involvement with Japan.  The treaty not only dealt with 
Japan but also highlighted how Korea had to divorce itself from China’s imperial sphere.  
On February 22, 1876, Korea signed its first Western style treaty, the Ganghwa 
Treaty, and ended its isolationist policy.  Sin Hon of Korea and Kuroda Kiyotaka of 
Japan were the chief negotiators of the 1876 treaty.  Koreans did not expect the treaty to 
drastically effect the prior state relations with the Japanese (Larsen 2008, 63). The 
provision legally ended Korea’s ties as a tributary state to China.  The issue of Korea’s 
sovereignty interested members of Western nations who wished to engage in trade with 
Asian nations.  
Table 24 - Treaty of Ganghwa of 1876  
Articles Summary of the Final Version of the Regulations 
Art. 1 Korea is an independent state; Japan wants “friendship” and “perpetual 
peace” 
Art. 2 Within 15 months, both sides will send envoys 
Art. 3 Official communication between two nations will be in Japanese and for the 
next 10 years, the documents will require a Chinese translation 
Art. 4 Pusan and another port of Korea chosen at a later time will be open for trade 
Art. 5 Coasts of 5 Japanese provinces and 2 Korean ports will be open set 
according to the Japanese and Korean calendars 
Art. 6 Japanese vessels if stranded off the coast of Korea will be able to use ports 
that were not officially open; both countries ought to help other if in distress 
Art. 7 Japan will survey the coast of Korea 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Similarly, adopting Christianity in Asia mattered less with exposure to missionaries but receptiveness of 
communities based on geopolitical factors (Kane and Park 2009).  
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Art. 8 Japan will send an envoy to Chosen to settle disputes with local authorities 
Art. 9 Either government may investigate fraud owing to debt and be “friendly” 
Art. 10 Extraterritoriality applies reciprocally 
Art. 11 “Friendly” relations and 6 months to discuss any disagreements over articles 
Art. 12 To ensure “friendship” immediately ratify the treaty 
 
 The treaty between Japan and Korea contained 12 articles. The first article stated 
that Japan and Korea, referred to as Chosen, are independent and sovereign nations.  The 
second article indicated that from the signing of the treaty up to 15 months afterwards, 
Japan could send an envoy to Chosen at anytime and Chosen could likewise send an 
envoy to Tokyo. The negotiation for the treaty painfully illustrated how the Korean 
negotiator, Sin Hon, and others were simply unaware of the rules that guided the Law of 
Nations.  The preference of Japan was stated first.  The treaty established the official 
language for communication between the two parties would be Japanese and Chinese. 
For ten years after the signing of the treaty, Japan will send documents to Chosen in 
Japanese with a Chinese translation, while Chosen will send documents to Japan in 
Chinese (art. 3).  
As an event, the ratification of the treaty fractured Korean diplomacy.  The 
Ganghwa Treaty challenged Korean foreign policy in three key ways.  First, the 
document granted Korea legal status as a sovereign nation.  Second, the treaty introduced 
the decorum used for writing Western style treaties, which fixated on establishing 
“friendly” relations.  Third, Korea opened its ports to future trading partners including 
Western nations as a result of the treaty.   The economic impetus was clearly stated in the 
treaties.  
The treaty articulated Western legal concepts such as sovereignty and extradition 
to the Koreans.  The treaty included the recognition of Korean sovereignty and an end to 
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tributary ties with China.  Sovereignty also ended the practice of Japan paying tributes to 
Korea (art. 4).  Japan emphasized Korea’s status as an independent nation.  As 
independent nations, the two countries promised “perpetual peace” (art. 1) and 
“friendship” (art. 1, 9, 11, 12, and art. 10 supplemental). 64   Reciprocal rights to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction (art. 10) and symmetric aid for vessels in distress (art. 6 and 
art.1, 10 supplemental) signaled “friendly” conduct.65  Extradition rights applied for 
subjects of both nations (art. 10). The word for “extraterritoriality” (jigaiho) entered the 
Asian lexicon.  Extraterritoriality in Asia, as Cassel (2012) explored, incited debates 
regarding states’ rights to sovereignty and protection of private properties. The “friendly” 
wording stylistically distinguished Western treaties from Korea’s treaties with China.   
Japanese officials capitalized on Japan’s twenty years involvement writing 
treaties with Western nations.  In the supplemental treaty to Ganghwa, the Japanese 
officials explicated how Japan had “for many years back maintained friendly relations” 
with foreign countries (Chung 1919, 212, art. 10 supplemental). 66   Japan used 
“experience” to instruct Koreans of proper conduct when interacting with foreigners. The 
Japanese and Koreans made their communications available to Western officials.  
With the treaty of Ganghwa, the Japanese persons’ access to Korea extended 
beyond the port cities.  The three open ports (art. 5) were significant, but the ports are not 
at the forefront in the text.  The Ganghwa treaty opened Pusan and later Incheon and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Articles 11 and 12 justified the authoritative legality of the treaties. Like other Western treaties, the 
importance of trade with limited restrictions appeared to be the intent of the treaty.   
65 Article 6 was particularly beneficial to Japan.  The article stated that if a Japanese vessel could not reach 
one of the designated Korean ports due to weather, shortage of fuel or provision, and the vessels may enter 
any port of Chosen. The article also stated that if a vessel from either country was shipwrecked or stranded, 
either country should offer aid. 
66 The Japanese officials instructed Koreans to allow persons who took refuge in Korea, after a shipwreck, 
permissions to return to their native land.  In the 17th century, Hendrick Hamel’s briefly stayed in Korea 
after a Dutch vessel careened off the coast of Korea, but Hamel escaped (Ledyard and Hamel 1971).  
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Wonsan to foreigners.  Korea’s increased accessibility coincided with Japan’s micro-
management of Korea’s diplomatic conduct (art. 2, 8, 9 and art. 2 supplemental).67  
Through legal text, Japan aggrandized their facility to negotiate with Western officials.  
Legitimated first with words, Japan then used economic means to seize control.  
Opening treaty ports was naturally listed as one of the main objectives of the 
treaty.  Japan had Chosen open ports of Pusan and two additional cities for commercial 
trade with Japan (art. 4).  The designation of the two ports was granted to Japan (Yi 
1984). And the Japanese were able to lease land, rent buildings, and build on Chosen 
property.  The Koreans promised to open two from the list of five ports of Japan, which 
are Keikin, Chiusei, Jenra, Kensho, and Kankio for Chosen’s use (art. 5).   
 The supplementary treaty appended to the Ganghwa treaty on August 24, 1876 
indicated the direction that Korea and Japan’s relationship would be in decades to follow. 
The major points of the supplemental treaty extended the rights of Japanese citizens in 
Korea and even requested that the watch-gate erected by the Korean government in the 
Korean city of Pusan be removed so that borders could be redrawn (art. 3). Koreans 
required permission from the Japanese government to visit Japan (art. 5); permission was 
not needed for a Japanese citizen to visit Korea In terms of currencies, Korea had 
developed paper currency in the 15th century (Sukawa 2009) that the Japanese no longer 
wanted to accept; the Japanese required trade with Japanese coins (art. 7), but Korean 
currency unusable in Japan. Article 10 of the supplementary treaty interestingly noted 
Japan’s relations with foreign, i.e. Western, nations.68  The article requested that Korea 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 The two sides agreed to allow trade among subjects of each nation without interference of either 
government (art. 9). The Japanese government appointed officials to reside in ports of Chosen (art. 8).  
Furthermore, Japan wanted to survey the coastal lands of Chosen (art. 7). 
68 From Chung’s and Tong’s (1980) compilation of the treaties. 
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extend its treaty with Japan to include allies of Japan, in case of extenuating 
circumstances to help ships stranded off the coast of Korea. Koreans should request an 
agent of the Japanese government to help send the ship back to its native country.  Such 
practices ensured smoother economic exchanges.  
 Gradual improvements for trading conditions in Korea occurred years following 
the Ganghwa Treaty.  The telegraphy lines from Seoul to Pusan and Wonsan were built in 
1888 and 1891 respectively (Larsen 2006, 67).  The eastern Korean port city of Pusan 
had appearances of a Japanese port town (Larsen 2006, 55).  According to an eyewitness 
account in 1893 by Sakurai Gunnosuke, “Japanese-style shops lined the downtown 
streets” (Duus 1995, Larsen 2006, 55).   By 1897, Korea used the gold standard as Japan 
had begun using gold as well. But gold was not used as a medium for exchange (Larsen 
2006, 57).  Korea’s coastline grew more cosmopolitan to accommodate the higher 
volumes of trade.  
Consequences of the Treaty 
 Macro-level exchanges affected micro-level interactions for the merchants and 
farmers in Korea.  Other outcomes of the treaty affected daily conduct.  Korean 
merchants accepted Japanese coins and no longer circulated Korean paper currency (art. 
7 supplemental, Sukawa 2009).  The Japanese were allowed to bury their dead in Korean 
soil (art. 6 supplemental).69 Japanese envoys traveled further inland into Korea (art. 4 
supplemental).  Through travel into the interior, Japanese goods spread to commoners. 
Though the Japanese were unpopular, Koreans enjoyed high quality Japanese goods (art. 
8 supplemental). And the influx of trade after 1876 developed a native entrepreneurial 
class (Eckert et al. 1990, Haggard et al. 1997).  Korean political elites, however, rejected 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Intra-European treaties featured droit d’aubaine, the law regarding the dead, for inheritance and burial 
purposes.   
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Japan’s intrusion into Korea’s physical space for ideological reasons (Lefebvre [1974] 
1991). The intellectual debates had little effect on the lives of Korean commoners that 
preferred opportunity to gain materially.70  
 Japan helped to build the industrial infrastructures in Korea.  Years following the 
Ganghwa Treaty, gradual improvements for trade occurred.  The telegraphic lines from 
Seoul to Busan and Wonsan were built in 1888 and 1891 respectively (Larsen 2006, 67).  
Korea’s industries expanded and farming focused on exporting grains (Hong 1990). 
Japan took advantage of shorter legal contracts with Koreans to build infrastructure.  
Japan concluded shorter treaties often classified as memoranda on fisheries, telegraphs, 
and railroads to gain piecemeal control of Korea’s economic ventures before Korea or 
China grew aware of how crucial communications and travel infrastructures were for 
industrialization.  
 Coincidentally, Japan re-negotiated several treaties with Western nations in 1894 
and 1895 to undo earlier unequal treaties of the 1850s.  Japan’s rise militarily changed the 
minds of European diplomats over Asia’s role in the international system.  Soundly 
defeating the Chinese in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 gave Japan control over the 
Fêngtien province, which included modern day Taiwan (1895, art. 2).71  Japan carved out 
parts of Asia and masked their territorial expansion as an effort to build a unified Asia.  
The Japanese popularized pan-Asianism, which promoted advanced industrialization and 
cosmopolitan educational reforms in the 19th century (Hahm 2006, 46).  Korean scholars 
who were educated in Japan initially supported Japanese involvement in Korean affairs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 During the Colonial period, the Japanese hired Koreans of lower birth statuses to work as low ranking 
officials in Japan’s prisons and adminstrations.  
71 In the Sino-Japanese treaty, the two acknowledged Korea’s status as a sovereign nation (1895, art. 1). 
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but withdrew their support when dissent from the Koreans grew violent (Duus 1995, 
226). 
Table 25 - Supplemental Treaty of Ganghwa of 1876  
Articles Summary of the Final Version of the Regulations 
Art. 1 If stranded, Japanese vessels may proceeds into stations after telling local 
authorities 
Art. 2 Japanese officials can freely send letters within Korea 
Art. 3 Japanese subject may rent land in Korea; Shumon (watch-gate) and 
Shotsumon (barrier) that Koreans erected against Japan should be removed 
Art. 4 Japanese in Pusan can travel the radius of 10 ri (about 2.44 miles) freely but 
Japanese should be allowed to further into Torai 
Art. 5 Japanese may employ Korean natives 
Art. 6 Dead Japanese should be placed in proper burial sites  
Art. 7 Koreans pay using Japanese coins; Japanese may use Korean coins 
Art. 8 Koreans may enjoy what they purchased or received as gifts from the 
Japanese 
Art. 9 Japanese boats surveying Korea should be housed in Korea if the boats need 
to be docked 
Art. 10 Japan had “friendly” relations with Western nations longer so Japan 
recommends that Korea allow any persons from distressed vessels take refuge 
in Korea; Korea should help return home anyone that wishes to leave 
Art. 11 If the document causes an “embarrassment” to commercial relations then the 
contents of the treaty may be reviewed within 1 year 
 
 The Ganghwa treaty affected the geopolitical power dynamics in Asia.  Other 
countries including Russia wanted Korea to maintain its status as a sovereign nation 
(Lukin 2006, 25).  The 1882 treaty between China and Korea was another unequal treaty 
following the 1876 treaty for Korea with Japan. The Ganghwa treaty initiated a period 
when Korea signed many additional international treaties with Japan, the United States in 
1882, Germany in 1882, France in 1886, Italy in 1884, Russia in 1884, and other nations. 
The opening of Korea did not improve Korea’s economic basis substantially (Deuchler 
1977, 197).  As discussed in the previous chapter, the 1882 Treaty of Maritime and 
Overland Trade intensified an unequal relation between China and Korea. The Chinese 
character for sovereignty and independence was used interchangeably.   
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Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the United States (1882) 
 The Ganghwa treaty between Japan and Korea in 1876 promulgated subsequent 
events.  Berezin (2012) noted the events as “templates of possibility.”  Korea’s possible 
turn led to multiple treaties with similar economic implications in Korea.  The format of 
the Ganghwa treaty was replicated in Korea’s treaties with Western nations.  The Korea-
U.S. Treaty of 1882 had many names including the Treaty of Jemulpo (present day 
Incheon), Treaty of Jenchuan, and the Shufeldt Convention.  Korea’s Treaty of Amity 
and Commerce with the United States highlighted cultural differences, emphasized 
mutually beneficial trading conditions, and encouraged formal scholarly exchanges.   
 The United States and Korea interacted with each other mainly via legal 
documents because few Asians traveled to the West and only a handful of Westerners 
resided in Asia. The language of the bilateral treaties promoted equality, but each nation 
wanted greater advantages.  The United States requested that the Korean government to 
grant American citizens rights that were “to the benefit of the United States” in a draft 
version of the treaty, but the passage was edited out (draft version, art. 10, Korea 1891).  
The relations between the Korean and the American governments were relatively 
peaceful with the exception of isolated attacks against foreigners in Korea. 
Table 26 - 1882 Treaty of Amity and Commerce Summary 
Articles Summary of the Final Version of the Treaty 
Art. 1 Request for “perpetual peace and friendship”  
Art. 2 Both sides appoint diplomatic and consular representatives 
Art. 3 Both sides help vessels in distress but clandestine goods can be confiscated 
Art. 4 Americans enjoy personal freedoms without interference from local 
authorities; mutual extraterritoriality; King of Korea requested to amend laws 
in accordance to international standards 
Art. 5 United States granted the Most Favored Nation status 
Art. 6 Koreans in the United States may rent and purchase property; the same goes 
for Americans in Korea; Americans are prohibited from transporting native 
produce to different ports of Korea 
Art. 7 Ban opium trade 
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Art. 8 Ban the trade of ginseng; ban the export of food stuffs if the Korean King 
fears famine  
Art. 9 Strictly limit the sale of firearms and other weapons of war 
Art. 10 Citizens residing in either land have the right to employ natives 
Art. 11 “Students of either nationality” are encouraged to study abroad 
Art. 12 Every 5 years the two parties can reexamine the treaty 
Art. 13 Official communications will be done in Chinese or English with a Chinese 
translation 
Art. 14 Ratification within one year of the signing of the treaty 
 
 The treaty’s cultural and economic stipulations secured the Americans’ future 
presence in Korea.  The 1882 treaty secured the most favored nation status for Americans 
and also granted Koreans multiple mutually beneficial conditions.  First, conceptualizing 
the state as a sovereign and independent entity became a challenge for the Koreans.  The 
drafts of the 1882 U.S. and Korea treaty demonstrated the various meanings of 
nationhood according to the Western and non-Western context.  The Western concept of 
nationhood relied on the theory of sovereign equality.  The notion of sovereignty 
departed from the Asian view of the tributary state system, which China called, the 
“Brotherhood of Nations.”  Secondly, granting foreigners extraterritorial jurisdiction and 
religious freedoms created another challenge.  The different drafts of the 1882 treaty 
encapsulated the economic, political, and cultural cleavages that the two nations faced.   
 The core implications of the 1882 treaty between Korea and the United States was 
assuring reciprocal trade benefits, granting the Americans religious freedoms, and 
establishing roots for intellectual exchanges between the two nations.  The two countries 
interacted with each other mainly with legal documents because few Asians traveled to 
the West and only a handful of Westerners resided in Asia. The language of the bilateral 
treaties promoted equality but each nation wished to take actions that benefited one side 
more.  The United States attempted to gain more from the treaty and requested that the 
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Korean government to grant American citizens rights that are “to the benefit of the 
United States” without stating what the specific rights were (English version, art. 10, 
Korea 1891).  But the statement did not appear in the ratified version of the treaty.  The 
relations between the Korean and the American governments were relatively peaceful 
despite the street level that occurred against foreigners in Korea. 
The United States gained favorable trading conditions after entering Korea on 
friendly terms (Craven 2005, 345).  Korea was a rational destination. Also, the several 
wars and the Taiping Rebellion made Americans weary of entering China.  The 
Americans aggressively entered Japan but the Japanese government’s forceful 
modernizing campaign made the United States less necessary for trading purposes.  The 
English language version draft of the treaty imbued the hope of establishing trade 
“between the United Stated of America on the one part, and the Kingdom of Chosen on 
the other part” (instrok.org).  Americans in Korea pursued their callings and avocations 
as missionaries, doctors, and merchants near open ports.   
America’s geographic distance from Korea prevented the United States from 
investing heavily in Korea.  The United States’ practice of foreign diplomacy used 
economic relationships as a key feature.  The U.S. primarily desired the most-favored 
nation status from China, Japan, and Korea (Dennett 1922).  The 19th century roots linked 
to the United States’ usage of multilaterialism in the 20th century as a foreign relations 
policy (Beeson and Higgott 2005).   
Asian states’ reluctance to enter into free trade was the major obstacle for 
Western nations in the 19th century. Extraterritoriality, like the MFN clause, diminished 
Asian countries’ domestic sovereignty rights. Europeans considered Asian criminal 
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proceedings to be backward and inferior to Western legal systems.  Extraterritoriality 
meant that if an American committed a crime against a Korean in Korea, the American 
would be tried in an U.S. court bypassing Korean laws.  Between the U.S. and Korea, 
extraterritoriality was reciprocal because Koreans committing crimes against Americans 
were tried under Korean law. Extraterritoriality law highlighted cultural differences 
between the Americans and the Koreans.  
Korea was a rational destination for expanding trade.  The United States entered 
Korea on friendly terms and gained the most favored nation (MFN) status. Effectively, if 
Korea wrote a treaty with another nation after having granted the U.S. most favored 
nation status, the other nation’s trading terms and benefits will transfer to the U.S. as 
well.  The Chinese had already quarreled with the British on commercial matters.  
Several wars and the Taiping Rebellion made Americans weary of entering China.  The 
Americans attempted to enter Japan aggressively but the Japanese government’s forceful 
modernizing campaign made the United States less indispensible for trading purposes.  
The English language draft of the treaty imbued the hope of establishing trade between 
the United Stated of America and the “Kingdom of Chosen” (Korea 1891, 41).  Foreign 
diplomats had called Korea, Chosen at the time.  The social accommodations in the treaty 
allowed Americans in Korea to pursue their callings and avocations as missionaries, 
doctors, and merchants near open ports.  
Content of the Treaty 
The 1882 treaty emphasized six key building blocks to the American-Korean 
relations.  The content of the U.S.-Korean treaty highlighted 1) disparities in criminal 
procedures such as extraterritoriality.  The treaty also discussed the importance of 2) 
making maps and surveying coastal lands.  Further, 3) taxing business transactions and 4) 
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fighting clandestine trade stood as other issues.  Provisions 5) to accommodate 
Americans living abroad with social freedoms such as religious practice and efforts 6) to 
promote scholarly exchanges between the two nations enhanced the social reciprocity 
between the United States and Korea.  The conditions aided Korean acceptance of 
American diplomats and missionaries in Korea.  
Criminal Procedures 
The United States challenged Korean criminal law.  In the treaty, the high 
contracting powers “mutually agreed” that if Korea “modified and reformed the statutes 
and judicial procedure” domestically “in the judgment of the United States” to “conform 
to the laws and course of justice in the United States, the right of exterritorial jurisdiction 
over United States citizens in Chosen shall be abandoned” (art. 4). The United States 
disapproved cruel punishments such as vicarious liabilities, hangings, and public 
floggings, which were common in Korea.  Even though similar practices existed in the 
United States and Europe decided to chastise Asian courts.  The procedure acted in 
accordance to the world society model since the United States encouraged Koreans to 
conform to American standards.    
The United States acknowledged that change could not occur rapidly.  
Extraterritoriality protected Americans living abroad. Criminal activity such as trading 
firearms (art. 9) or Americans hiding Korean fugitives on American property (art. 10) 
judged the gravity of offence based on cultural relevance. 72   Since the Korean 
government feared internal disruptions such as the Imo Soldiers’ Mutiny, Koreans 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 The final version included articles 11 through 14. Article 11 discussed student exchanges and encouraged 
it as "evidence of cordial good will."  Further, the treaty included the possibility to renegotiate five years 
after ratification in 1887 (art. 12), requested the use of Chinese and English translations in future 
correspondences (art. 13), and required the ratification of the treaty within 1 year of May 22, 1882 (art. 14). 
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possessing illegal firearms suffered worse punishment than Americans trading munitions 
of war without proper permissions.  
Maps and Taxes 
 The United States established clear trading objectives with tax rates and mapping.  
The officials settled on import, export, and tonnage duties  (art. 5).73  Tonnage dues were 
set at five mace per ton, paid once every three months which were due “according to the 
Chinese calendar” (art. 5).74  By adopting the Chinese lunar calendar, the United States 
catered their trading interests to Korean customs.  The Americans desired to study 
Korean language (art. 11), customs, and geography.  
 As important as setting trading conditions were, the Americans were generally 
curious of the coastal geography.  Surveying of coastal lands eased future voyages and 
furthered potential access.  The treaty with Japan (1876, art. 7) and the United States 
(1882, art. 6) requested to survey Korea’s coasts.  The coastal survey was featured in 
many treaties including the 1882 treaty with the United States and the 1883 treaty with 
Germany.  Surveying the coast was also mentioned in article 7 of the 1876 Treaty of 
Ganghwa.  The legal conversation regarding the calendar, clandestine trade, native 
produce, and so forth, integrated cross-cultural expectations for commerce.   
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 The English language draft discussed plans for distressed vessels and payment for repairs.   
74 The Korean draft of the treaty’s fifth article stated that “daily use” goods would require 10% ad valorem 
duties, whereas the final version stated that daily use items “shall not exceed an ad valorem duty of thirty 
per centum” (art. 5 instrok.org).  The differences in syntax from the two versions that discussed trade also 
included how the Korean draft included a list of goods such as “foreign wine, tobacco, clocks[, and] 
watches,” to be luxury items that would take 30% ad valorem duty (instrok.org).  In both versions, the term 
“native produce” was used to indicate export goods requiring 5% ad valorem.  Although both versions set 
the tonnage dues at five mace per ton which are to be paid once every three months, the final version of the 
treaty stated that dates be marked “according to the Chinese calendar” (instrok.org).  The United States 
attempted to align their trading interests with Korean customs with the adoption of the Chinese lunar 
calendar.  Dictating the calendar helped to assure that both parties understood one another’s expectations. 
The U.S. drafters requested that the Koreans levy “no other kind or higher rates of tonnage dues or duties 
for imports or exports or coastwise trade” to citizens of the United States (art. 7, instrok.org). 
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Against Fraud 
 The final version banned clandestine trade, which the English language draft had 
mentioned.  The final version of the treaty strictly prohibited contraband goods and added 
protections (final version, art. 6).  Fraudulent trade was condemned (final version, art. 3). 
The U.S. and other Western nations feared that Asian nations could not properly follow 
Western normative procedures for trade.  In article 2 of the final version, the states 
detailed proper conducts, such as preventing merchants from performing the duties of 
officers and officers from partaking in commercial activities.  The separation of duties 
distinguished the correct traits of an officer according to Western standards. 
 Americans were permitted to reside in Korea.  The treaty mentioned foreign 
residents interacting with local authorities, establishing residences, and transporting 
goods around multiple ports. Article 3 in the English language draft included provisions 
for families to reside near the open ports; vessels were not allowed to abuse the American 
flag or violate Korea’s laws.  Americans were allowed to build residences near Korea’s 
open ports and to restrict trade to items “not declared contraband by law” (Korean 
version, art. 6).  
 Article 6 of the treaty banned clandestine trade, which the English language draft 
had mentioned.  The final version of the treaty strictly prohibited contraband goods and 
added protections (art. 6).  Fraudulent trade was condemned (art. 3). The U.S. and other 
Western nations feared that Asian nations could not properly follow Western normative 
procedures for trade.  In article 2 of the final version, the states detailed proper conducts, 
such as preventing merchants from performing the duties of an officer and officers from 
partaking in commercial activities.  The separation of duties distinguished the correct 
traits of an officer according to Western standards. 
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Accommodating Americans  
 The treaty expanded learning opportunities for students from each country. 
Students were encouraged to study abroad and learn the language and culture of the other 
nation (art. 12).75 Language training and student exchanges gave persons of one country 
greater exposure to the other country’s language, customs, and space.  This theme of 
language exchange also appeared in Korea’s treaty with Russia in 1884.  Article 13 in the 
final version stated that the future correspondences should be conducted in Chinese 
between the United States and Korea.76   
 In several key instances, the United States government tried to accommodate the 
needs of the Korean empire.  The U.S. accepted the usage of the lunar calendar for 
merchants to pay taxes (art. 5).  Even while the United States requested the king of Korea 
to modify the criminal law in Korea to reflect international standards in the same article.  
The treaty protected Korea’s native produce in case of famine and also granted a ban on 
opium (art. 7) and ginseng (art. 8).  The protection of Korean products appeased the royal 
negotiators. After the treaty, American officers, missionaries, and merchants entered 
Korea. Much internal intrigue developed around the growing number of foreigners on 
Korean soil.  
A key significance was the signing of the treaty itself.  The ratification signified 
Korea’s status as an independent and sovereign nation.  However, the Korean 
negotiator’s draft written in Chinese explicated how Korea, “being a dependent state of 
the Chinese Empire, ha[d] nevertheless hitherto exercised her own sovereignty in all 
matters of internal administration and foreign relations” (Chinese version, art.1, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Chinese draft of article 8 discussed rights to employ natives and open channels for student exchange.   
76 The Chinese version of article 10 discussed official languages for future correspondences—Chinese and 
English.   
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instrok.org).  The U.S., having written treaties in accordance to standards of international 
law for over a century, did not emphasize sovereignty because it was readily internalized.  
It appeared difficult for Korea to act in “perfect equality” (art.1, Korea 1891). The final 
version of the treaty omitted mention of “sovereignty” or “perfect equality” and requested 
perpetual peace between “their respective Governments” (art.1, Korea 1891, 41).  
The negotiators specified language use for future interactions.  The effort to 
establish “friendly relations” in the American’s draft of the treaty (art. 9) bolstered the 
Americans’ attempts to appoint two special committee members within the next 18 
months to assist merchants.  The Korean’s position emphasized future cultural and 
linguistic exchanges so that the two parties instead of a strong emphasis on trade (art. 9, 
Korea 1891).  Language training and student exchanges gave persons of one country 
greater exposure to the other country’s language, customs, and space.  Article 13 in the 
final version stated that the future correspondences should be conducted in Chinese.77  
The Chinese language draft included suggestions on how Korea could conform to 
“international law and without unequal discriminations on either part shall be had” (art. 9, 
instrok.org).  This draft showed how Korea wanted to adapt to the international model.  
Having “friendly relations” implied that countries conformed to the formal greetings 
found in Western style treaties.  The friendly discourse also appeared in article 11, which 
encouraged student exchanges.  The treaty expanded learning opportunities for students 
from each country. Students were encouraged to study abroad and learn the language and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 The Chinese version of article 10 discussed official languages for future correspondences—Chinese and 
English.   
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culture of the other nation (art. 12).78 Peace was mentioned in article 14 while stipulating 
the ratification process for the treaty. 
Christian Missionaries after the Treaties 
Europeans and Americans endeavored to increase Christian converts.  The Berlin 
West Africa conference (1884-1885) identified commerce and humanitarianism as the 
two main goals for colonial expansion.  The two motives similarly compelled the U.S. to 
enact legal ties and establish foreign missions.  As one of the two main missions of the 
Berlin West Africa Conference, the spread of Christianity was a main concern for 
Europeans. The Koreans granted the American freedom of religions but limited their 
economic activities in Korea. In the 1882 treaty, Americans were allowed to pursue their 
calling but were banned from transporting “native produce from one open port to another 
open port” or carrying import goods into the interior in Korea, so as to limit Americans’ 
mobility (art. 6, Korea 1891, 46).   
The trend of decolonization by the mid 20th century (Strang 1990, 1991) partly 
answered why the United States was not interested in colonizing Korea.79  Despite that 
trend, Germany (Steinmetz 2003, 2007), France, and Great Britain expanded or held onto 
colonies throughout the world.  Unlike an argument on American exceptionalism (Lipset 
1997), which suggests that America was borne on notions of liberty that far exceeded 
European states’ greed for domination and small economic gains, in Asia strategy 
prevented the Americans from an easy entry.  
Entering Korea on friendly terms granted the United States trading advantages 
through the most favored nation clause. The United States’ strategy relied on peaceful 
entry.  By the 1860s, the British had a strong hold over the major ports of China.  The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Chinese draft of article 8 discussed rights to employ natives and open channels for student exchange.   
79 Largely the decline Spanish, Portuguese, and French empires contributed to the decline of colonies.  
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Chinese had already quarreled with the British on commercial matters.  Even though 
Russia was dismantling from within, the Russian empire still had great interest in the 
northern border regions of China.  Further, Russia and Japan volleyed control over the 
Sakhalin Islands and the fisheries industry were dependent on each other.   
Granted, most nation-states wanted to build economic ties with other nations 
instead of heralding their arrival as conquerors.  Even to go back to Fieldhouse, 
colonialism was seen as the last resort in inter-state relations.  The legal relationship that 
developed via treaties was important because contracts in businesses became so 
prevalent.  As the disavowed Native American treaties indicated, the steps towards 
colonialism for the United States was also based on legal arrangements. Colonialism 
from within did not necessarily withhold the Americans from colonizing other nations.  
Japan had colonized the residents of the Ryukyu Islands, the Ainu after the Meiji Ishin 
(Hirano 2009) and expunged that nationality towards a new vision of unified Japan.  
Though not all colonial efforts were economic, the less materially valuable groups 
became more fungible.  
Further, Go (2008) and other scholars (Colas 2008, Ferguson 2005, Immerman 
2010) indicated that the U.S. was an imperial power.  Go (2008) and other scholars that 
focus on the Philippines trace American imperialism back to the 19th century even before 
the Spanish American (1898) and the Insular wars wherewith the United States ruled over 
the Philippines.  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the insular cases following the 
Spanish American war and the United States gained territories in Guam, Puerto Rico, and 
the Philippines. The United States also annexed Hawaii, which had been its own 
monarchy in 1898. Colas (2008) suggested that American imperialism started after World 
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War II.  Notwithstanding the various implied role of American foreign policy (Colas 
2008, Go 2008), Korea was not a colony of a Western state.  The United States did 
colonize Pacific islands. 
 After 1882, American officers, missionaries, and merchants entered Korea. Much 
internal intrigue developed around the growing number of foreigners on Korean soil.  
During the late 19th century, foreigners including the Chinese disrupted the isolationalist 
policies of the Korean king’s father, Daewongun.  The reaction towards the foreigners 
intensified the factions that formed within the Korean bureaucracy.  These factions often 
divided along the lines of how to interpret Confucian texts and address the most proper 
conduct in terms of domestic governance and foreign relations.  The “Easterners” and 
“Westerners” factions formed. Then the division between “Southerners” and 
“Northerners” followed.  The “Northerners” divided into “the Great North” and the 
“Small North.” After “the Easterners,” “the Westerners,” and “the Great North absolved, 
“the Old Doctrine,” “the Young Doctrine,” “the Southerners,” and the “Small North” 
formed.  By the 1880s, the dominant parties were “the Old Doctrine” (Noron), “the 
Young Doctrine” (Soron), “Southerners” (Namin), and “the Small North” (Sobuk).  The 
“Old Doctrine” had the most power followed by “the Young Doctrine” (HK Kim 1997, 
217).   Although the Qing government had upheld the policy of non-interference for 
Korea’s domestic policies, the Qing government found ways to use their trade relations to 
consistently inquire about Korea.  King Gojong’s father, Daewongun secretly helped the 
soldiers who plotted a mutiny against King Gojong and Queen Min (1851-1895).    
Consequences of the Treaties 
  In key instances, the United States government accommodated Korean goals for 
domestic autonomy.  Korea kept their native produce, maintained existing criminal 
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proceedings, and opened channels for economic and intellectual exchanges.  Thus, the 
U.S. used the lunar calendar for merchants to pay taxes (art. 5).  In conclusion, even 
while the United States requested the Korean king to modify the criminal law to reflect 
international standard, the treaty protected Korea’s native produce in case of famine (art. 
7), and banned trade of opium and ginseng (art. 8).  The protection of Korean produce 
appeased the royal negotiators. After the treaty, American officers, missionaries, and 
merchants entered Korea.  Korean elites aligned themselves with the American 
missionaries and sought refuge with the Americans after the Japanese overtook Seoul 
(Kane and Park 2009).  
 The modes of accommodation shown in the treaty addressed three theoretical 
insights related to 1) Steinmetz’s ethnographic field (2007), 2) Bhabha’s hybridity thesis 
(1994), and 3) Meyer’s top-down approach to cultural diffusion (Meyer et al. 1997).  
First, as Steinmetz noted, the work of the colonizer at a given site changed through 
interaction.  The American missionaries who interacted with elite to illiterate Koreans 
promoted protections for religious freedoms and expanded educational opportunities to 
women and persons born of low status.  Second, the dialogue between the Korean and 
American negotiations charted how Koreans valued domestic sovereignty despite its 
reminiscent allegiances to China.  The new laws promulgated a hybrid approach (Bhabha 
1994).   Third, American interests superseded Korean recommendations, which supported 
the world society theory (Meyer et al. 1997), but Americans criticized Korean law with 
few steps towards change.  Through the treaties with the United States, Koreans 
encountered economic and educational opportunities that forced Koreans to question 
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traditional practices.  Relations with China focused on past customs related to trade and 
tributes.  
How the Koreans appraised China 
The Chinese did not appraise Korea as an independent and sovereign nation, 
which was contrary to official policies.  Huang Zunxian in 1880 prepared a policy for 
Korea that wanted to use Korea as an ally to keep Russia at bay (Deuchler 1977, 88).  
Deuchler wrote, “China and Korea really formed one and the same family” (1977, 88). 
The foreign policy initiative of sadae simply meant that Korea would “serve the great” 
and the great at this period meant China.    
After later losing the 1895 war to Japan, China’s intra-Asia relationships was 
weaker than ever before.  In the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), China had to recognize its 
status as the former suzerain to Korea.  Scholars of China reflect upon the period between 
1842-1943 as the “treaty century” (Fairbank 1992, Gray 2002, D. Wang 2005) and the 
period is commonly known as guochi, the time of national humiliation (D. Wang 2005, 
1).  Fairbank’s interpretation of the treaties represented an older historiography of the 
clash between the cultural values of the “East” versus the “West.”  The distinction 
between Eastern versus Western values returned with Huntington’s “Clash of 
Civilizations” (1993) thesis.80  
 In Korea, incidents that disparaged the government occurred in the late 19th 
century.  The clashes within Korea were based on class restrictions to material resources.  
Infamously, the Imo Mutiny of 1882 highlighted the resource constraints that low-
ranking soldiers endured.  On July 23, 1882, Korean soldiers who were given inedible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 However, interpreting China as a weak state agreed with Marxian historians of research depletion as a 
key reason for conquering. 
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rice grains.  The angry band of soldiers grew in size as commoners, and downtrodden 
members of Korean society seized the opportunity to coalesce against the ruling party.  
Much resentment grew towards the aristocracy.  The Confucian literati were exempt from 
paying the poll tax (sinp’o).  Additionally, the commoners were required to contribute to 
private Confucian academies known as sowon when these institutions issued a kant’ong 
decreeing a need to perform ceremonial rituals rites.  The grain loans (hwanja) were in 
place to make up for the 1% wastage (mo) of grains.  The Imo Mutiny signified the 
breakdown in the aristocracy’s ability to maintain the military.  Daewongun’s coup in 
1884 that utilized the soldiers hoped to expel the Japanese out of Korea. He was 
displeased with the Min family gaining more wealth through the rice trade with Japan.    
 After the Imo Uprising, the Korean government wrote the Treaty of Chemulpo as 
an official apology to the Japanese.  Koreans agreed to pay 50,000 yen to the family of 
the victims. Furthermore, the treaty called to punish the culprits for 15 days, provided 
venerable funeral arrangements for the victims, paid the indemnities afflicted upon 
Japanese troops, and allowed the Japanese to establish a battalion to protect the 
diplomatic delegation for up to 5 years (Deuchler 1977, 135).  The treaty extended trade 
since persons were now allowed to travel up to 100 li around Inchon, Pusan, and Wonsan.  
Also, the town of Yanghwajin opened as a new marketplace.  Hamhung and Taegu 
allowed commercial trades.  The agreement permitted Japanese ministers, consuls, their 
retinue, and dependents to travel inland.  Lastly, the Koreans were to send a delegate to 
Japan to apologize in person for the incident (Deuchler 1977, 135).   
Breakdown of Confucian Legal Order 
 The Confucian ideals of harmony based on the ministers being loyal to the ruler 
weakened in Korea after the Imo Uprising of 1882.  The mutiny involved Chinese and 
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Japanese citizens on Korean soil.  The Korean royal family requested the Chinese 
emperor to send troops to quell the Imo gallun. The soldiers abducted 6 Japanese 
nationals, tortured and murdered them. The coup in 1884 also signaled the poor 
agricultural techniques that led to crop failures in Korea.  Symbolically, the coup, 
reinforced the Korean royalty’s obedience towards the Qing emperor.  All the while, 
Korea’s office of Extraordinary Affairs (T’ongni kimu amun) corresponded with 
neighboring nations and Western envoys from afar.  The U.S.-Korean treaty of 1882 
brought to Korea trading partners and religious leaders.  In 1883, Korea signed treaties 
with several other Western nations including Germany and Great Britain.  
 Years after the treaties granted Korea its rights to sovereignty, China disregarded 
Korea’s internal sovereignty and sent troops to quell a domestic uprising.  By August 6, 
1882, the Qing government dispatched troops to quell the uprising in Korea.  The king of 
Korea, who labeled himself the humble “servant,” conveyed a grateful message to the 
Emperor of China for sending General Wu and his troops to Korea for such as 
“worthless” purpose (Larsen 2008, 87).   Additionally, China’s foreign minister Li 
wanted the Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade to reflect the suzerain state 
relations.   The importance of agreeing to legal terms grew in the 19th century.  
Legal Training Systematized 
 With standard legal language came standard legal training.  To further instill this 
message of legal reforms, the standardization of language used in the treaties took form 
in the late 19th century.  Formalization of law came with the globalization of the legal 
profession (S. Liu 2013).  The profession grew over time and across space.   Even today, 
the impetus to standardize legal training despite language, national traditions, and 
procedural differences attested to the European efforts of the 19th century.  
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 Approaches to the sociological inquiry of lawyers examined functionalism, 
structuralism, interactionalism, and ecological institutionalism.   Social structures and the 
functional aspects of the legal profession added to developments in the United States.  
The functional approach examined the role of the profession within the society. The 
interactionalist approach focused on the workplace dynamics among lawyers.  As a form 
of collective action, the legal profession exhibited a degree of elite reproduction (S. Liu 
2013, 4). As a social process, the legal profession formed group boundaries.  
Treaty of Friendship with Germany (1883)  
 The German treaty with the Koreans was emblematic of a wave of treaties that 
Korea signed with other western nations.  The treaties with Western nations after the 
American treaty in 1882 followed a formula.  The formulaic treaties were near facsimiles 
of one another with only the names of contracting parties changed.  Great Britain, 
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and France signed treaties with Korea in the 1880s to 
broaden Korea’s presence in the international community.  Examining Germany’s treaty 
with Korea highlights the changing format of the international legal system.  The 
syntagmatic axes of the documents remained stable while the paratactic axes (i.e. the 
elements within the treaties) became interchangeable.    
 The government of Great Britain signed a treaty with the Koreans. The German 
treaty was a copy of the British-Korean Treaty of November 26, 1883 (Deuchler 1977, 
169).  In the British-Korean Treaty, known as the Willes Treaty, Great Britain gained 
better tariffs and were more flexible than the treaties that Korea signed with the 
Americans or the Japanese (ibid).  The British were able to negotiate much lower tariffs 
on goods such as textiles.  Britain’s minister in Tokyo, Parkes wrote,  
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 “It would be vain, I thought, for [K]orea to suppose that the Western Powers 
 would  accept interior terms to those which [K]orea had granted to China and 
 Japan, as it was obvious that their people could conduct no trade in [K]orea 
 unless they were placed, in regard to commercial advantages, on an equal footing 
 with the subjects of those two nations” (Larsen 2008, 92).  
 Even the Chinese minister, Li Hongzhang, approved the treaty’s contents for it 
did not inflict any discomfort for the Chinese.  The Qing administration’s interest was to 
keep Korea as a vassal state to China. And the format of the treaty was used with Italy on 
June 26, 1884, Russia on July 7, 1884, France on June 4, 1886, and Austria-Hungary on 
June 23, 1892.  It was part of Li’s strategy to have Korea write treaties with Western 
nations.  Li needed to convince the Korean minister, Yi Yu-won, to enter treaty relations.  
Yi wrote, “Trade with Japan is already concession under duress trade with the West 
would be unthinkable” in 1882 (Larsen 2008, 74).  Li understood that in order for Korea 
to not fully fall into Japan’s influence, competing international interest was necessary to 
not block out China completely.  Li also encouraged Korea to build up military readiness 
and to establish an office for foreign affairs, the Office of Extraordinary Affairs (Larsen 
2008, 70).  Li’s stance was most appropriate for the time period since the military 
rebellion in Korea led to domestic turmoil in the 1880’s.  
 Throughout the 19th century the treaties exhibited patterns of increasing 
complexity and increasing standardization.  In the literature on legislation and legal 
language, the exposure to earlier treaties and the writing of similar treaties with multiple 
nations allow for the formulaic nature of the text.  The treaties had been formalized as 
more nations established offices that handled multiple transactions of bilateral treaties 
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and trading agreements.  Textual discourse can be measured for their similarities and 
differences. 
 Messages come across more coherently if they are delivered in an extremely 
consistent format.  Strang and Bradburn (1999) studied the effects of neo-liberal 
discourse and HMO policies from 1970 to 1989 to uncover an organic formation of a 
monopoly.  The monopoly can occur for a language.  With the HMO policies, the content 
of the policies sounded similar from state to state.  With the treaties, the syntagmatic axes 
of the documents formalized a format for writing the treaties.  Thereafter the paratactic 
axes of the treaties also aligned in that the content of the treaties mirrored other treaties.  
The language of diplomatic discourse for Asians for centuries prior to the 19th century 
was Chinese. The new language of discourse in Asia expanded to be English.  The 
language for legal transaction used applications of Euro-centric “Law of Nations” 
conception of sovereignty.    
 The Treaty of Friendship with Germany exemplified the set of formulaic treaties 
that Korea signed with Western nations.  It highlighted similar points that Korea’s treaty 
with the United States did.  The issue of Korean sovereignty was of foremost importance.  
But recurring issues of trade and protection of foreigners in Korea emerged as well.  In 
the treaty, the Germans considered Korea a “tributary of China” (Chung 1919, 214).   The 
German-Korean relations still involved 1) laying out available treaty ports, 2) taxing 
trade, and 3) exchanging students for cross-cultural education.   
 Opening ports was a major part of the treaty.   The treaty opened the ports of 
Chemulpo (Jenchuan), Woensan (Gensan), and Pusan (Fusan) and the cities of Hanyang 
(Seoul) and Yanghwachin in Korea for foreigners to use (art. 4).  With opened ports, the 
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two nations forged paths to trade with each other.  Tonnage dues for vessels were set (art. 
5, part 7).  Germans were allowed to trade “all kinds of merchandise” without the 
interference of Korean officials if the foreigners paid the appropriate tariffs (art. 5).   
 The ebb and flow of foreigners increased with the passage of treaties with 
Western nations.  To facilitate trade between Germany and Korea, the diplomats were 
allowed to travel freely with a passport and an escort (art. 2) and foreigners were 
reciprocally allowed to reside “at the capital of the other” (art. 2, Chung 1919, 173).81  
The diplomats abstained from engaging in commercial activities (art. 2).  The political 
and economic realms had nominal spheres of separations.    
 The social and educational realms converged to meet the economic and 
diplomatic needs of the regions.  The two sides established cultural exchanges for future 
trade. Opened ports also opened avenues for cross-cultural exchanges.  Germans were 
allowed to hire Koreans as “teachers, interpreters, servants, or in any other lawful 
capacity” without interference from the Korean government (art. 9).  Koreans and 
Germans allowed students to study the “language, literature, laws, arts, or industries” and 
scientific research (art. 9).   
 Close examination of the treaties between Korea with Germany on November 26, 
1883 and Austria-Hungary on June 23, 1892 bear striking similarities between the two 
documents.  The syntagmatic axes of the treaties aligned in that the structure of the 
documents mirrored one another.  Both the 1883 and 1892 documents are treaties of 
friendship, commerce, and navigation.  Both treaties include 13 articles that start with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Germans were allowed to travel for 100 li without a passport and if they were traveling into the interiors 
for the purpose of trade, they were banned from trading books, printed materials and other items banned by 
the Korean government (art. 4, part 6). The fine of 100 Mexican dollars will be charged for foreigners 
traveling without a passport.    
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pledge of “perpetual peace and friendship” between the kings of the respective countries 
(Chung 1919, 1 and 107). The 2nd article from both of the treaties discussed the same 
topic of high contracting parties appointing consuls in the other’s country.  The 3rd article 
corresponded in the two treaties as well because they both discuss jurisdiction in the 
protection of the non-natives’ property while in Korea. Part 2 of the 3rd article appears in 
verbatim  
 “If the [K]orean Authorities or a [K]orean subject make any charge or complaint 
against a [German] subject in [K]orea, the case shall be heard and decided by the 
Authorities of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty” (Chung 1919, 108).82  
 Continually, the formatting and writing of the treaties are consistent. Article 4 
opens to the Austro-Hungarian empire treaty ports that were opened to the Germans 
almost a decade earlier. The ports of Chelmulpo or Jenchuan, Woensan or Gensan, and 
Pusan or Fusan along with access to Seoul, the capital of [K]orea, is available to 
foreigners.  Article 5 is describing the rights to import and export goods in the ports.   
 The paratactic axes of the treaties aligned as well.  Similar content was found in 
both the treaties.  Consistently, both treaties sequentially emphasize laws against 
smuggling (art. 6), describe procedures to help distressed vessels (art. 7), limit arms trade 
with ships of war (art. 8), have the right to employ native [K]oreans (art. 9), enjoy 
reciprocal diplomatic privileges (art. 10), revisit the treaty 10 years after the official 
ratification (art. 11), provide a Chinese text of the treaty (art. 12), and ratify the treaty 
within one year (art. 13).  Though this examples shares one country that is a signatory in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 The translation was made from classical Chinese by Chung.  The original text in German will be located 
for further analysis.  
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both treaties, other examples of generalizability in treaties come from other diverse 
nations across regions.   
 The Treaty of Friendship between Korea and Germany in 1883 patterned the 
treaty relations that Korea had with other Western nations.  In terms of structure and the 
wording, the language of the treaties modeled each other.  The reciprocal content of the 
treaties also emboldened Koreans’ searches for Western allies during the period of 
Japanese colonization of Korea.  Domestic turmoil in Korea resulted from the Korean 
aristocracy’s inability to combat Japanese rule.   
Kapshin Coup (1884) 
 In 1884, the distrust towards foreigners in Korea and trouble within the Korean 
bureaucracy enticed a small group of elites to lead a coup against the royal family. The 
sensational accounts of the murders elicited Koreans to distrust foreigners further.  The 
two incidents grabbed the public’s interest in these matters – the Yi family estate murder 
and the killing of a pharmacist. The Kapshin Coup came after the Yi Pom jin who refused 
to sell his portion of the family estate to a Chinese merchant although Yi’s brothers sold 
their shares. The inability to access the area freely led the Chinese to attack Yi Pom jin 
(Larsen 2008, 123).  Furthermore, citizens were enraged to learn of a Chinese soldier 
killing a Korean pharmacist’s son and attacked the pharmacist (Larsen 2008, 98).   The 
sensational accounts of the murders elicited Koreans to distrust foreigners further.  
 Within the Korean bureaucracy, the main impact of the coup affected the political 
elite of Korea most directly.  The efforts to improve Korea’s social conditions from 
within seemed impossible.  Marginalized elites had orchestrated the coup.  Park Yong-
hyo and Kim Ok-kyun, who were both educated in Japan but came back to Korea after 
their studies to find themselves disillusioned with the Korean ruling class and left out of 
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the inner circle unable to influence policy.  Along with So Chae-pil, who later settled in 
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, the men resorted to violence as means to create 
“enlightened” changes in Korea. The Min family, the queen of Korea’s clan, who were 
staunch loyalists to China, according to the Enlightenment Party kept Korea from 
modernizing the Japan had.   
 Social Darwinism influenced enlightenment leaders such as Yun Ch’iho (Chu 
2005, 58).  Hebert Spencer’s evolution of humanity particularly interested the Korean 
intellectuals who elevated Americans as more advanced, the Japanese as advancing, and 
the Koreans needing to attempt rising themselves above their current state.  Yun 
personally “deplore[d] the dominance of the strong over the weak” but expressed how 
there must be a reason why the English seized control over the Native Americans (Chu 
2005, 62).   
 The leaders of the Enlightenment Party (gaehwapa) who led the coup asked the 
Japanese for assistance since one of the main purposes of the coup was to thwart the 
Chinese and the Korean and aristocratic Min family.  The reformers timed the start of 
their assassinations with a party attended by Western officials such as Foote, Aston, and 
von Moellendorf that celebrated the opening of a Post Office.  On December 4, 
organizers of the coup murdered seven bureaucrats.  On December 5, the reformers 
seized power and drafted a 14-point proclamation.  The statement suggested reforms on 
land tax, measures to relieve the financial debt of the commoners, streamline the 
government, reduce government expenditures, eliminate government corruption and 
nepotism, and restructure the police and military systems (Deuchler 1977, 208).83  The 
Korean mobs on the streets killed the many Japanese nationals who were often 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Kim Yong-sop (2005, 40) contended that tax reform was underlying objective of the coup. 
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unaffiliated with politics once word broke out of the Japanese aiding the reformers in the 
coup.  
 As George C. Foulk, an American Naval officer who was stationed in Seoul from 
1884 to 1887 noted, the violence especially against the foreigners occurred on the streets. 
In his private letters, Foulk, stationed in Seoul from 1884 to 1887, he examined the 
Koreans mostly with a sympathetic gaze.  Though his goal was to work in Japan, where 
he could speak the language fluently, the navy nevertheless placed him in Korea.   
 He retold the events of December 4, 1884 that detailed the events of the Kapshin 
coup.  Word had gotten out on December 4, 1884 that the Japanese were collaborators of 
the coup and out on the streets, mobs “killed all the Japanese they found, stoning most of 
them to death” (Foulk 1884, 77). On December 20, 1884, Foulk described in a letter to 
his brothers and parents the “horrible calamity” developing in Korea where “Japanese 
people were being murdered” (Foulk 1884, 74).  Widespread looting, robbing, and 
general mayhem ensued. General infrastructures of Korean society were destroyed.  The 
Post Office that proudly opened in early December was utterly razed.  Foulk instructed 
his brother to sell some stamps from the Korean Post Office included with the letter that 
shall never be issued again.  Scott’s Stamp Shop on Broadway was identified as a 
potential buyer for the rare artifact (Foulk 1884, 79).  From what he saw, Foulk assessed 
the Koreans as “God-less” people “full of pagan cruelty” who even refused to take 
medical advice from Western doctors who advised for patient, Min Yong Ik, to take in 
milk during his convalescence.  The Korean caretakers disregarded the message and fed 
Min dog soup (Foulk January 5, 1885, 84).  Foulk’s letters helped lead Western scholars 
to commend Japan’s colonization of Korea in 1910 as a step towards progress.   
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 After the failure of the Kapshin Coup in 1884 in Korea, the Japanese government 
avenged the death of Japanese citizens with admonishments found in the Treaty of 
Hanseong.  In January 1885, the Koreans signed the Treaty of Hanseong with the 
Japanese.  The Koreans had to submit an “apologetic document” (art. 1), rebuild Japanese 
buildings destroyed in the coup (art. 4), pay for reparations of the Japanese victims of the 
coup (appendix to art. 2 and art. 3).  After the 1884 coup, Japan and China signed the 
Convention of Tianjin, also known as the Li-Ito Convention, on April 18, 1885.  The Li-
Ito Convention agreed upon a mutual troop withdrawal, and the two sides promised to 
contact each other before deploying troops (Larsen 2008, 126).  The unrest within Korea 
left a lasting impression for the Korean bureaucrats.  The discontent among the elites led 
to social reforms, which affected all strata of Korean society in 1894.   
 The French found the treaties of this format to be unacceptable. The 1886 treaty 
with the French asked to include an article that would allow Catholic missionaries to 
proselytize in Korea (Deuchler 1977, 127).  The actions of the French negotiators to 
ensure the safeguard of Christian missionaries is similar to the 1844 Treaty of Huangpu 
between China and France where the French ensured the repeal on the ban on Christianity 
in China.  But with the French-Korean treaty, the French were unsuccessful and failed to 
convince the Korean negotiators in Tianjin.  The French-Korean treaty did not allow for 
religious missions to take place.    
Gabo Reforms (1894)    
 Social reforms entered Korea through the Gabo Reforms of 1894, which 
promoted compulsory education, removal of traditional social castes, and land tax 
reforms.  In Korea, the treaties fomented new intellectualism where scholars directly 
engaged Japanese thinkers on the meaning of progress in Asia.  The intellectual affinities 
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to Japan aligned with improving Korea’s economy.  Japan’s industrial growth impressed 
the several Korean scholars.  Japan espoused ideas of pan-Asianism in the 19th century 
(Hahm 2006, 46).  Japan’s increased role in Asian diplomacy displeased European 
statesmen.  
 The Independence Club started in 1896 and comprised a handful of Koreans, 
many educated abroad.  The club published the first Korean vernacular newspaper, 
Dongnip Sinmun (“the Independent”) using Hangul.  The newspaper supported the 
Japanese early on.  It informed Koreans that the violence that occurred after the Sino-
Japanese War was attributed to illiterate Japanese and not to members of the Japanese 
government or elite class (Chu 2011, 96).  The paper also supported the inevitable need 
to use Japanese currency instead of Korean currency (Dongnip Sinmun April 4, 1898). In 
1898, the Independence Club abruptly disbanded because many Koreans disdained the 
club’s views, and many leaders, including So Chae-pil returned to the United States.  
However, Yun Chi-ho (1865-1946) and other members of the Independence Club resisted 
Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910.  The Japanese government later imprisoned Yun for 
6 years for plotting against Japan (New York Times March 21, 1913).84  Japanese entered 
Korea with for interest of the Theory of Uniting the Great East (Daito Gapporon). 
Korean intellectuals wanted Japanese modernization techniques to improve Korea from 
within (Chu 2011, 100).  Japan’s rule of Korea preceded advancements in Korea’s 
economy.  
 The pro-Japanese ministers, many of whom were associated with the Kapshin 
Coup in 1884, helped pass the Gabo Reforms of 1894, which can be seen as progressive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Yun Chi-ho, who had studied at Vanderbilt and Emory Universities, was also known to be Christian at 
the time he was convicted. His diary recounted racism in the United States (Yun and Song 2001).  
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reforms that brought Korea closer to standards of Western European civilization (Gong 
1984).  Gabo Reforms systematized silver currency and weights and measures for trade.  
It also eliminated traditional social classes of yangban or commoner status, abolished 
slavery, gave rights to outcasts known as paekchong, allowed widows to remarry, and 
reformed the criminal procedures (Yi 1984).  The Korean court previously tortured 
criminals and often extended corporal punishment to members of the criminal’s family if 
the crime was unusually heinous.  The implementation of vicarious liability was 
removed.  The reforms were so radical that members of the court opposed the measures 
and feared that the king had become too lenient towards his subjects.  
For different reasons, nativist and pro-Japanese factions of the Korean 
government rejected Chinese or Confucian influences in favor of cultivating “native” 
customs.  However, the longstanding cultural affinities with the Chinese were 
inescapable.  Unlike the Chinese governmental officials who actively resisted the 
international system and Japanese government who adapted to the international system, 
the Korean government suffered from being marginal in both the international system and 
suzerain state system.  Korea’s treaty relations in the 19th century remained an important 
case to examine because they juxtaposed the external influences of the international 
system and Asian suzerain state system in one domestic sphere.   
 Duncan and Kim (2011) highlighted the multifaceted features of the reforms.  The 
Gabo reforms “modernized” Korea.  The pulls were toward the Western model and the 
Japanese model of modernization.  The Royals along with the Gabo, Kapshin, 
Chŏngdong, and Taewŏn’gun factions illustrated how the late 19th century was a critical 
junctures for Korea domestically. As the voice of the Royals, King Gojong articulated on 
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August 5, 1882 how the Westerners were damaging Korea’s stability.  In his official 
records, he notes how the 1876 treaty with the Japanese opened three Korean ports.  He 
notes how the treaty resulted in other treaties with Western nations of United States, 
England, and Germany.  The exchanges with Westerners were considered off-putting 
“since the rituals of exchange with them are conducted as equals, there is nothing that 
violates the principles of morality” (Duncan and Kim 2011).  King Gojong was 
referencing the morality of Neo-Confucian tributary orders that guided past international 
exchanges mainly with the Chinese.  Some unprincipled manners of the Westerners 
involved stationing soldiers in Korea to protect commercial interests.   
 King Gojong was aware of the concept of international law.  Signing treaties and 
conducting business were conduits of international law.  But King Gojong wanted to 
reject Westerners’ efforts to “spreading their teachings” of Christianity in Korea (Gojong 
39, Duncan and Kim 2011).  Christianity, according to King Gojong, represented the 
“false way” which poisoned the true teachings of Confucius and Mencius. But he made 
the distinction between the bad teachings of Christianity and the useful skills of scientific 
and mechanical advances.  
 The Gabo Reforms did not protect Korea from Japan’s encroachments.  At the 
conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, China acknowledged in the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
of April 17, 1895 that Korea was an independent nation, legally ending Korea’s tributary 
relations to China.  The Treaty of Shimonoseki helped secure Japan gain authority over 
the Liaotung Peninsula and Taiwan.  Japan had plans to annex Korea at this time, but the 
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Russian-led Triple Intervention, pushed Japan back. Queen Min was assassinated on 
October 8, 1895, and Korean royals hid to take refuge with the Russian legation.85 
 The progressive idealists such Yun Chi-ho and So Chae-pil left for America 
temporarily because treaties with the U.S. government allowed for student exchanges and 
travel. So’s two year old son starved to death due to neglect after So’s parents and wife 
committed suicide (Hahm 2006, 42).  Koreans who stayed in Korea or traveled to 
Western states had exposure to Christianity.  The religion influenced the Progressives, 
who wanted to reinstate the Gabo reforms, because missionaries expanded educational 
opportunities to the various strata of Korean society and social reforms were a part of 
Christian teachings. Yun Ch’i-ho, So Chae-pil, Yu Kil-chun, Yi Seung-man, and Yi 
Sang-jae were all Protestants.  After the failed coup of 1884, the Chinese Exclusion Act 
of 1882 stood as another barrier to the Koreans who wanted to enter the United States.  
 Yun Ch’i-ho wrote in his diary that based on the Chinese Exclusion Act, the 
American’s “doctrine of equality” is “only skin deep” (February 14, 1890).  Yun said “to 
enjoy the so-called inalienable right of man in this ‘Land of Freedom’ you must be 
white” (February 14, 1890).  He went on to criticize America’s past dealings with Native 
Americans, African Americans in the South, and the Chinese in the West.  The utter 
“inconsistency between their acts full of the basest prejudice and their doctrine full of the 
loftiest and never to be realized catholicity” (Yun February 14, 1890) made America’s 
dealings in Korea not to come out of goodwill.    
Geopolitical context of East Asia  
 The geopolitical context in East Asia experienced another rupture in 1900 when 
the Boxer Rebellion broke out in China.  Russian troops mobilized to Manchuria and did 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 In 1896, the king and crown prince were smuggled out wearing women’s clothing to the Russian 
legation. The king’s escaped signaled an end to the Gabo reforms. 
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not retreat when the rebellion subsided.  Japan and Great Britain, displeased with 
Russia’s actions, signed an Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, which recognized Great 
Britain’s interest in China and Japan’s interest in Korea.  Japan signed a secret agreement 
with the United States, known as the Taft-Katsura Agreement of July 1905, 
acknowledging Japan’s goals to control Korea. The Treaty of Portsmouth in September 
1905 ended the Russo-Japanese war, where the victorious Japanese expanded their 
interests into Korea. 
 In the 20th century, Japan gained sway in Asia with the aid of international 
treaties.  Alexis Dudden described Japan’s adoption of international law; the process 
came via strong Western support especially from the French. Japanese legal scholars 
created terminologies based on kanji terms (Chinese characters used in Japanese). The 
Japanese rewrote laws in 1868 with compounds of Chinese characters (jukugo) and 
adopted older Chinese terms for Western law (Cassel 2012, 35).  They used a different 
set of alphabets called katakana to spell foreign words phonetically (Dudden 2005, 34).  
Dudden emphasized how the rapidity with which Japanese legal scholars wanted to adopt 
the international legal system was in part due to Japan’s pre-existing expansionist goals.  
Dudden’s argument presumed that the Japanese used international treaties and laws to 
annex Korea (Dudden 2005, 46).  According to Dudden, Japan was “Fully aware that the 
international arena sanctioned Japan’s increasing rule of Korea” (2005, 47).86  
 Japanese imperialism examined economic relationships, which extended beyond 
racial disparities.  The race played a less significant role in the imperial process although 
discourse against non-Japanese ethnicities existed.  As a member of the same race, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Other scholars of Korea (Yi 1984, Eckert et al. 1990, Dudden 2005) also suggested that Japan’s plans to 
take over Korea go as far back as the Imjin War of 1592 led by Hideyoshi (Lewis 2003). 
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Koreans considered that the Japanese should have worked with China and Korea to 
defend their nations against the West.  Japan used China’s weakened stature as an 
opportunity to invade neighboring countries (Hahm 2006, 47).  The Korean term, 
“tongmin tongjong,” meant same culture and race. In Japan, however the government 
promoted the slogan of “Do-so Do-shu (Same Origin, Same Race)” to legitimize directly 
ruling Korea (Shin 2010, 332).  Even as members of the mythological family, the 
Japanese considered Koreans to be “half-siblings” or “cousins” (Dudden 1998, 249), but 
it was merely rhetoric used to legitimize Japan’s goals. 87   
 Racial differentiation was a common practice within Japan.  How Japan observed 
Westerners and other Asians was valorized in popular culture. On July 18, 1907, the 
Yorozu Choho, a Japanese periodical published a cartoon of Ito Hirobumi dressed in a 
kimono chasing a diminutive and childlike Korean in ragged traditional dress without 
shoes while tall Western men observed. The cartoon referred to the 1907 Agreement 
prevented the Korean government from enacting any laws, horei, without approval from 
the Japanese resident-general.  Korean, An Chung-gun’s assassination of resident-general 
Ito Hirobumi in1909 precipitated harsh reaction from the Japanese government.  In short, 
the treaties of 1905 ended much of Korea’s sovereignty, but the assassination yielded the 
Annexation treaty, which made explicit, Japan’s reign over Korea. 
 The Japanese held racist beliefs against Korean ethnics, but the beliefs needed the 
legitimation of legal contracts for colonial process to hold.  The Japanese did not have the 
luxury as European colonists had over non-White Others in the early years of 
colonialism, so the need to contractually show Korea’s weakness in managing diplomatic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 I want to thank Hilary Holbrow for her insight into Japanese cultural rhetoric.  
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affairs, fishery rights, telecommunications and so forth extends law as another tool in 
examining colonial relations.     
Protectorate (1905) and Annexation (1910) Treaties 
 The treaties helped to gloss over racism and economic exploitation and therefore 
became powerful tool in 20th century colonialism. Several treaties in the early 20th 
century extended Japan’s involvement in Korea. The Protocol of February 23, 1904 
stated that Korea placed “full confidence” in Japan “For the purposes of maintaining a 
permanent and solid friendship between Japan and Korea and establishing peace in the 
Far East” (art. 1, Chung 1919, 213).  Japan’s sentiments in unifying Asia as a guardian or 
colonizer became evident in the wording of the treaty documents as well. Article 4 
granted Japan the right to occupy Korea if a third party attacks Korea.  Korea and Japan 
signed the Agreement relating to Financial and Diplomatic Advisers, which had only 3 
articles total on August 22, 1904. The treaty appointed a Japanese citizen to manage 
Korea’s financial affairs (art. 1) and prohibited Koreans from signing any treaties or 
conventions with foreign powers without the consult with the Japanese government (1904 
art.3, Ch’oe 2010).  The Japanese government curbed Korea’s presence in the 
international community.  
 A major diminishment of Korea’s sovereignty occurred in 1905 when Korea 
signed multiple treaties with the Japanese that discussed communication services, foreign 
affairs, and coastal trade in Korea.  The treaty mediated Korea’s communication with 
other nations because it transferred the control of telegraph and telephone services in 
Korea to the Japanese. The Koreans nominally controlled one telephone line in the 
imperial house. The agreement on November 17, 1905 put the Japanese in charge of 
foreign affairs in Korea. Foreign powers could no longer contact Korea directly.  Korea’s 
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window to the Western world was “through the medium of the Government of Japan” 
(Protectorate Treaty 1905, art. 2, Ch’oe 2010).  Without contact from other nations, 
Korea was omitted from the family of nations (Howland 2011, 71).  
 With international treaties, Korea experienced weakened domestic sovereignty 
rights.  The two sides negotiated the Protectorate Treaty, also known as the Ulsa Treaty, 
on November 17, 1905.88  By 1905, Ito Hirobumi, who later became the Governor-
General of Korea, addressed Korean cabinet ministers with international legal language 
to convince Koreans that “Korea is no longer a Chinese tributary state” (Dudden 2005).  
The “Declaration of the Japanese Government” on November 22, 1905 expressed the 
Japanese government’s sentiment to control Korea because the “experience of recent year 
has demonstrated the insufficiency of measures of guidance alone” (Chung 1919, 223).  
The Japanese “guidance” of the Koreans examined the post-racial permutations of 
colonialism.   The paternalistic manner of the Declaration assumed that the Koreans were 
in a “dangerous situation” and needed the Japanese to usher them into safety (ibid).   
Western Reaction to the Treaties   
 Treaties bound nations as a form of contract towards each other.  Treaties with 
strong implications such annexation treaties were closely examined. Annexation treaties 
appropriated colonialism as a legal action.  The United States’ annexation of Texas 
(1844) and Hawaii (1897) occurred not long before Japan’s annexation of Korea (1910).  
As a maneuver that Western legal scholars developed, the use of annexation treaties was 
mildly applauded. George Trumbull Ladd claimed that Japan made Korea’s economic 
improvements possible (Ladd 1918, 436). In 1907, after the protectorate treaty but before 
the annexation, Korea’s exports revenues were 8 million yen.  After the annexation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Ulsa is named after the 42nd year of the Korean calendar.  
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1910, Korea’s foreign trade increased threefold and exports grew six-fold according to 
Ladd.  Exports increased, but the net growth was negative in the 1920s because goods 
were exported and not appropriated to Korean workers.89  And only Koreans loyal to the 
Japanese could find employment (1910, art. 7).  
Table 27. Distribution of net commodity product by industrial origin  
(percent, based on 1936 prices)    
 Agriculture 
and fishery 
Mining Manufacturing 
1910-15  95.2  1.3 3.5 
1916-21  93.1  1.4  5.5 
1922-27  90.2  1.2 8.6 
1928-33  87.4  2.0 10.6 
1934-39  15.6  5.8 18.3 
1940  69.7 8.3 22.0 
Source: Suh, 1978, 46. Table 18 from Haggard et al. 1997 
Over 40% of total agricultural output in Korea were crops other than rice, however the 
Japanese refused to invest in crops other than rice (Haggard et al. 1997, 869).  It was well 
known by 1911 Japanese became the main language for instruction in elementary and 
high schools.  
 Ladd’s final paragraph from his note on “The Development of Korea in Most 
Recent Time” captured a view that most Western intellectuals shared (1918). It promoted 
the idea that colonization brought progress to Korea because 
 “On the whole, and especially since the Koreans themselves seem to be well 
 satisfied with the change of government, we do not see how the mead of praise 
 can be withheld from imperial Japan, for giving to the world notable example of  
 really "benevolent assimilation." (Ladd 1918, 438). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Japan’s economic policy in Korea restructured to improve mining and manufacturing instead of 
agriculture and fisheries (Haggard et al. 1997). 
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The form of assimilation that the Japanese proposed was a doctrine based on doka.  Ladd 
assumed that Koreans were pleased with the colonial process.  Ladd’s claim was 
unfounded because the Korean independence movement that culminated on March 1, 
1919 included many members of the 19th century Independence Club that were once pro-
Japanese.  The Japanese wanted their colonized populations to envision themselves as a 
part of the Japanese empire but as members with low status.  In durable inequality (Tilly 
1998) in the context of Asian colonialism (Shin 2010, 331) survived until after World 
War II.  
 Japan’s efforts to secure economic presence in Korea focused on trade and direct 
investments.  The trade industries incorporated cotton manufacturers and banking, while 
direct investments referred to railroads and agriculture (Duus 1984, 154).   The four 
industries examined are in cotton, banking, railroads, and agriculture.  First, the textile 
industry wanted to extend trade across Asia.  In 1896, Korea imported 29% in cotton 
tissues and 13% in cotton yarn from Japan.   Japanese textile manufacturers coordinated 
their efforts to flood the Korean markets; the government did not directly aid industry.  
Textile manufacturers nonetheless gained access after the Treaty of Kanagawa.  Second, 
the Japanese banks handled a large proportion of commerce in Korea.  The Dai-Ichi Bank 
of Japan’s profits rose annually 10.9% from 1896 to 1899.  From 1906 to 1909, the rate 
of increase was 37.1% per year in Korea (Duus 1984, 154).   
 Third, the direct investment of railroads coincided with additional means to 
standardize weights and measurements, currency, harbors, chipping routes, banks, and 
warehouses (Duus 1984, 155).   The Seoul-Pusan railroad company relied on public 
stocks and required the support of the government to complete the plan.   Fourth, the 
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direct investment of agriculture was the final key economic structure that signaled 
Japanese imperialism as a commercial venture.  Rice trade with Japan expanded in the 
1880s.  As Japan developed machine and technology industries, the Japanese relied on 
rice exports from China, Korea, and Taiwan in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  
Total imports on rice were at their peak from 1903 and 1905; however in 1904, out of 
12,162 (per 1,000 piculs) only 1% of the imports were from China, 2% were from Korea, 
and 4% were from Taiwan (Duus 1984, 171).  Reliance on China, Taiwan, and Korea 
were higher in 1896.   Of the 1,862 (per 1,000 piculs) in 1896, 21% were from China, 
51% were from Korea, and 21% were from Taiwan.  In Korea, the Japanese government 
established policing networks to protect Japanese properties (Chen 1984, 213). 
Crime and Punishment in Korea 
 The transformative power of treaties reformed domestic legal provisions.  The 
Japanese attacked Korea’s criminal justice system.  In 1905, King Gojong approved the 
new penal code, Hyonbop Taejon, in Korea that made criminal procedures more 
transparent.  Ito Hirobumi lauded Japan’s influences in Korean law because it abolished 
the “system of torture” (Ito in Dudden 1998).  A 1907 Report indicated how “Koreans 
had little or no concept of private rights as were understood elsewhere in the Orient” (as 
quoted in Dudden 1998).  The Japanese characterized Korea’s penal codes as barbaric. 
Beatings, imprisonment, and confinement in stocks, the Japanese claimed, were common 
punishment (1907 Annual Report quoted in Dudden 1998).   
 As another form of legal defense for colonization, the Japanese portrayed Korea’s 
criminal and justice system to be excessively violent. The Japanese reported that cruelty 
was built into Korean law and the actions were notably unbecoming for a civilized 
nation.  The Osaka Mainichi Shinbun wrote in May 15, 1905, “people are beheaded the 
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same way that hogs are slaughtered” (Dudden 1998, 228).  The Japanese described 
Korean punishments as barbaric in the Horitsu Shinbun in 1905 although Japan had 
practiced hangings for thirty years (Dudden 2005, 113). Koreans practiced flogging and 
from 1913 to 1920 about 600,000 people were flogged sometimes resulting in death 
(Dudden 1998). The Japanese used examples of Koreans using outdated and primitive 
customs to punish criminals when the Japanese used the same punishment tactics two 
decades earlier.  
 The changes that occurred in late 19th century Korea interested the Japanese, 
Chinese, Western nations such as the United States. The Japanese urged the Korean 
government to create a separate judicial branch for criminal proceedings.  Other legal 
modifications included granting foreigners the right to purchase land in Korea.  China’s 
final efforts to control Korea in the 1880s came with the usage of more international legal 
agreements.  The Chinese wanted Korea to sign treaties with Western nations such as the 
United States to curb Japan’s encroaching interests. The 1882 treaty between Korea and 
the United States encouraged the Koreans further to modify their criminal law codes.  
The resident-general wanted to assert that the treaty with the Americans further 
strengthened Japan’s stance to make Korea, “assimilate to us” (Ito in Dudden 1998, 244).  
Essentially, after China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese had to recognize 
Korea’s autonomy (zìzhǔ,自主) and independence (dúlì, 獨立) in the first article of the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895).  The grass roots uprising against the Japanese on March 1, 
1919 challenged the impression that the Japanese had presented to Western nations.  
Discussion - Aid from the West? 
 Western perception of the conflict in Asia was key for Korea’s efforts to regain 
sovereignty.  The geo-political context affected the struggle for independence in Korea.  
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Dissention from American missionaries such as Arthur Judson Brown reported to the 
West on the large number of arrests of Korean Christians in 1912 (Dudden 1998, 261).  
In 1920, Canadian journalist Frederick Mckenzie’s book, Korea’s Fight for Freedom, 
examined how the 1910 annexation may have brought material progress to Korea but the 
bureaucracy in Korea had failed as much as the Russians failed in Finland.  The poor 
administration in Korea was due to Japan’s insensitivity to Korea’s national ideals.  The 
Japanese resident-general Terauchi planned to remove extraterritoriality rights in Korea, 
which meant that Korean citizens were no longer able to protect their citizens in crimes 
involving foreigners. Squashing Korea’s the national language and sumptuary customs 
furthered public disapproval of the Japanese administration (Dudden 2005, 78).90   
 Many pro-Independence Koreans who wanted to end Japanese rule, did not return 
to indigenous traditions for inspiration as the Tonghak movement in the late 19th century 
had.  Instead, the activists of the 20th century moved towards the auspices of the Christian 
missionaries. The Japanese investigated key Korean political conspirators that were also 
Christians and often investigated churches (Kane and Park 2009). The Japanese grew 
suspicious of the Christian church and the churches’ efforts to convert Japanese citizens; 
the government stamped Christianity out of Japan centuries earlier (Fukase-Indergaard 
and Indergaard 2008).  The Korean government in the 19th century persecuted Korean 
Christians, but the tide turned in the early 20th century the Japanese persecuted the 
Koreans.  Also signing treaties with Western nations in the late 19th century allowed more 
missionaries to enter and interact with Koreans directly (Kane and Park 2009).  The 
ability to engage with members of different cultures in everyday life developed a new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 For Korean men, cutting off the top-knot was the ultimate insult.  The top-knot was fashioned when their 
long hair was tied up and pulled up to the top.  
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understanding of one another (Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003).  Western origins of 
Christianity gave the churches greater autonomy compared to other institutions in Korea.    
 Attempts to get help from America remained nonetheless.  In 1905, Yi Seung-
Man wrote a letter to President Theodore Roosevelt to depict the conditions in Korea.  Yi 
and other Korean men who were educated in the United States went to the League of 
Nations to plead the case for Korean independence.  The help of Western missionaries 
had limited reach.  The loss of Korean sovereignty came with the loss of Korean cultural 
identity. Schools in Korea instructed in Japanese.  American missionaries’ schools were 
initially exempt from instructing in Japanese. The missionaries also had to abide by the 
new standards.  By 1939, Koreans had to adopt Japanese names.  It was not until after 
Japan’s defeat in World War II that Korea regained its independence and overturned 
Japan’s status as a rising power.  
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Table 28.  Involvement in Korea  
 Korea China Japan United States 
1876   Treaty of 
Ganghwa 
 
1882 Imo Soldier’s 
Uprising 
Regulations for 
Maritime and 
Overland Trade 
between 
Chinese and 
Korean 
subjects 
Treaty of 
Chemulpo 
Treaty of 
Amity and 
Commerce 
1883  24 rules for the 
traffic on the 
Frontier 
between Liao-
tung and Korea 
Stipulations for 
the Treaty 
Limits in Korea 
 
 
1884 Kapshin 
“progressive” 
Coup 
 Agreement 
Respecting the 
Foreign 
Settlement at 
Chemulpo 
 
1894 Gabo social 
Reforms 
   
1897 Empire of 
Korea formed 
대한제국 
(大韓帝國) 
 
   
1899  Commercial 
Treaty  
  
1904   Taft-Katsura 
Agreement 
Taft-Katsura 
Agreement 
1905   Protectorate 
Treaty  
 
1909   Memo of justice 
and prisons in 
Korea; 
Bank of Korea; 
reconstruction of 
Antung-Mukden 
railway 
 
1910   Annexation 
Treaty 
 
When interpreting this table see that the treaties involved the top column country with Korea unless 
otherwise noted. The items under the Korean column were significant events, which happened in Korea 
domestically. 
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Conclusion 	   From Japan’s economic actions, the Koreans combated treaties that granted Japan 
access to labor and natural resources in Korea.  The strength of the Japanese military 
weakened Korea’s ties to China.  Korea’s colonial experience highlighted how legal 
measures affected regional politics.  Japan’s economic stronghold in Asia resulted from a 
series of treaties that granted them entry in China, Korea, and Taiwan. The Japanese used 
natural resources and labor power from these regions to develop industries in Japan.  As 
with the collapse of the Qing Empire in China, the Yi dynasty in Korea dissolved due to 
their inability to adapt to the economic goals of a modern nation-state.  Trade was 
paramount, as were the development of technology and the removal of superstitious past 
ways.  
 The treaties of the 19th century filled volumes. The lasting impact of the treaties 
included introducing Korea to Christian missionaries.  Though some missionaries such as 
Arthur Brown sided with Japanese colonialism and believed that the Japanese imperial 
plans would help Korea rid its pagan past, many Christian workers helped to protect 
Korean civilians (W. Kang 2005, 97).  The success of Christianity was linked to 
ordaining Korean priests and ministers that could proselytize in the native tongue. By 
building schools and developing curricula for doctors, missionaries indirectly supported 
domestic education in Korea.  Directly, religious leaders spoke out against Japanese 
colonialism and created save havens for political dissidents to meet.   
 The Korean independence movement in 1919 failed and independence was not 
granted until after Japan’s defeat in World War II.  Despite its relative brevity compared 
to other colonial regimes, Japanese colonialism in the early 20th century established post-
racial understanding of colonialism. Economic calculations furthered certain relationships 
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while abandoning others. By overlooking key socio-political customs of Asia, 
international law in the late 19th and early 20th centuries made strides to facilitate trade.  
The reproduction of the idea for trade reappeared without much variation in multiple 
treaties involving different signers in the 19th century.  
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CHAPTER 6 
BILATERAL TREATIES IN A CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 
 
 Throughout the dissertation, I assessed general trends and specific ramifications 
of how international treaties shaped domestic polities.  The project used treaties of the 
19th century because it is enriching to recall the effects of these partnerships and conflicts.  
I thread this work towards other ends such as immigration policies, regional economic 
organizations, and other international treaty plans such as human rights and 
environmental climate change protocols.  The five major conclusions of the thesis 
discusses how 1) regional differences among partners affected the outcome of the 
treaties, 2) by the end of the 19th century, the effect of regional differences lessened over 
time, 3) China’s poor experience with Western legal systems established a trajectory for 
the Chinese that led to nearly a century of domestic and civil disputes, 4) Japan used the 
Western style treaties to expand national prestige and establish imperial rule, and 5) like 
China, Korea initially floundered under the Western legal system.   
 First, I generally found that cultural differences affected the types of treaty 
exchanges during the 19th century.  The treaties were distributed widely among nation-
states of varied geographic regions. The geography is not the determinant of the 
differences.  However, geography becomes a useful category that aligns similarities in 
cultural and legal traditions. I noted that treaties between European and Asian countries 
were less reciprocal than treaties among European states along economic and diplomatic 
provisions.   The content of the treaties focused on economic goals.  Treaties among 
Asian states were not mutually beneficial in the 19th century.  The intra-Asian treaties that 
were written using the Western style deepened the crevices among Asian states that were 
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departing from one form of imperialism, the Chinese tributary state, to the Western 
imperial mode for economic extraction that Japan heralded.  
 Second, over time, the asymmetries in treaties dissipated.   The general pattern 
towards symmetry, Mahoney (2010) speculated, powerful actors manipulating other 
actors in large-scale institutions.  The struggle to accept the new legal system proved 
problematic in several ways.  First, the concept of exchange among equally ranked 
partners was a new challenge.  Second, the economic impetus of free trade opened Asian 
states to Western foreigners also caused alarm.  However, the expansive use of reciprocal 
language coincided with widespread circulation of similarly worded documents and 
treaties.  
 Third, China’s political orders in the 19th century changed as a reaction to 
international treaties.  In Provincializing Europe (2000), Chakrabarty warned scholars 
against using proscribed frames for comparison that saw Europeans as “advanced” while 
other regions were not.  The common historical narratives privileged Western economic 
and legal traditions.  Cultural gaps between Asian and Western policy makers in the 19th 
century informed in part challenges found today.  The dissertation’s findings are 
applicable to the culturally entangled legal climate of the 21st century.  Primarily, the 
research examines segues to global trading patterns.  Effective policy on trading 
initiatives should keep in mind the cultural sensitivities that challenged past interactions.  
 Fourth, Japan’s rise to prominence as an international power in the early 20th 
century is partially attributed to Japan’s maneuver of Western style treaties.  Japan’s 
successes were not based on Japan imitating the West.  The Japanese elites used the 
period of Western intrusion to revamp status hierarchies.  The efforts to favor wealthy 
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merchants coincided with expanded commerce with Western partners.  The Ansei treaties 
of 1858 allowed dissenters of the preexisting order to blame Western intrusions as a 
symptom for the shogun’s ineffective rule.  The turn towards “modernity” occurred not 
without internal resistance.  The opportunity to add Western social standards into the 
Charter Oath signaled a departure from past practices.  A variant of economic extraction 
and the expansion of national prestige also took place.   
 Fifth, Korea suffered during the 19th century.  Treaties alone may not explain the 
complexities of domestic turbulence in Korea, but Japan’s intrusion into Korea with the 
Ganghwa Treaty signaled a need to focus on foreign relations.  The policy of isolationism 
was ineffective for Asian states.  New international relations emphasized the importance 
of trade.  The reluctance to trade widely with Western and Asian partners threatened 
Korea’s ability to sustain self-governance.  Therefore, Japan’s extraction of Korean, 
Taiwanese, and Chinese labor and resources did not merit admonishments from the 
Western communities’ family of nations.  Instead, Japan’s impetus to further trade in the 
region received praise from Western commentators.   
 The treaties patterned a shift towards symmetries because the dominant structures 
pushed a mixture of neoliberal economics, realist power stages, and institutional ideology 
of appropriate legal actions to change global practices towards forms most recognizable 
to Western observers.  The language for trade and compliance grew towards standards 
that members of the international community recognized as valid.  Issues such of human 
rights, child labor laws, and minimum wages are appropriated norms that scholars and the 
public could agree upon.  Similar processes are in place to institutionalize convergences 
on these issues.    
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Bilateral treaties in the modern context 
 In this section, I will lay out the implications of regionalism in contemporary 
trade relations.  Regionalism is not connected to negative biases of imperialism.  Trade 
and bilateral agreements are prominent in the IR literature.  Pollins’s 1989 and Rose’s 
2007 studies on trade following the flag focused largely on modern nation-states and their 
emphasis on economic gains.  Pollins (1989, 747) discussed how distance affected 
bilateral trade agreements.  Proximity was an aid.  Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
diffused globally and the documents followed formulated scripts with similar wording 
and content (Neumayer and Plümper 2010).  In effect, exponential growth in the number 
of treaties signified increasing disparities between capital-importing countries that were 
more likely to sign BITs with capital-exporting countries if other capital-importing 
countries signed treaties with the exporting state (Neumayer and Plümper 2010).  As 
recognized polities had gained more treaty partners in the 19th century, contemporary 
treaties also contracted with recognized trading partners.  Specific trade initiatives 
diffused as a policy before their efficacy could be tested. 
 Global trading markets evaluated long-term and short-term growth.  Scholars 
(Clark and Beckfield 2009, Zhou and Park 2012) examined on global markets post-World 
War II in search of regional effects.  Beckfield (2008, 2010) focused on regionalism 
based on the formation of intergovernmental organizations.  Zhou and Park discussed 
theories on structural equivalence as salient ideal types applicable in current trade 
relations.  Network analysis captured the dynamism of legal institutional changes.   In 
addition to bilateral trade agreements, sociological studies on human rights treaties also 
examined the interplays of law, culture, and the nation-state.  
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 As a core sociological concept, homophily used in network analysis, related to 
global economic development as well.  As economic interest dictated treaties of Latin 
America, Africa, and Asia, trade encouraged the mediation of cultural differences.  
Homophily’s social networks origin was for interpersonal relations (McPherson et al. 
2001).  The extrapolation of the term in international relations examined countries as 
singular homogenous entities.  As complex entities such as nation-states are generalized 
for theoretical simplicity, the test for homophily yielded purposeful reductions of 
abstracted concepts such as culture.   
 In a novel study examining homophily in global trade, Min Zhou (2011) tested for 
homophilous patterns from 1950 to 2000.  He tested three hypotheses on geographic, 
political, and cultural homophily.  First, geographic homophily was defined by distances 
between countries being within 3000km from another country (Hummel et al. 2007).  
Second, political homophily aligned countries with similar political institutions as gauged 
with democratic versus autocratic spheres to facilitate trade.  He posited that similar 
political institutes would set fewer legal restrictions and allow trade to flourish.  Third, 
cultural homophily relied on common languages, colonial history, and civilizational 
categories as Huntington (1996) had described.  Zhou (2011) found statistical evidence to 
support all three forms of homophily aiding global trade.   
 Though Huntington theorized the civilization groups post-hoc after wars, imperial 
regimes, and economic agreements, the sentiment to proscribe a “beyond geography” 
causal analysis of economic success especially in Asia carried certain “national 
essences.”  In addition, Zhou’s fine grained examination of geographic and cultural 
homophilies for the intermediate input and final manufacture sectors in bilateral trade 
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demonstrated geographic propinquity and cultural homophily’s aid in intermediate input 
and final manufactures but not in the raw materials sectors. The intensification of geo-
cultural homophily contemporaneously brought past colonial histories in direct relation to 
modern economic trends.    
 Zhou and Park (2012), a companion study to Zhou (2011), examined structural 
equivalences and network structures in global trade.  Structural equivalence assessed a 
country’s similarities and differences based on its trading partners in relation to another 
country’s trading partners (Snyder and Kick 1979).  Three assumptions of structural 
equivalence included 1) bilateral trade imbued cultural meaning, 2) common business 
networks reduced transaction costs and facilitated direct bilateral trade, and 3) similar 
institutions reduced risk and allowed smoother cross-national transactions.  The cohesive 
mechanisms of structural equivalence paired in line as three factors of 1) common social 
values and tastes, 2) information flows, and 3) similar institutions which led to increased 
bilateral trade (Zhou and Park 2012, 507).  Zhou and Park (2012) found support for 
structurally equivalent countries having better trade relations that continued to grow over 
time.  
 Examining global economies in terms of homophily and structural equivalences 
harken back ideologies of similarities aiding development.  Assimilative theories for 
colonialism sanctioned dominant cultures overruling local practices.  Particularly in Asia, 
Japan’s assimilative imperial policies harbored an extreme type of homophily. 
Homophily resembled Japan’s aims towards Pan-Asianism in the early 20th century.  For 
a century or longer, colonial powers ruled African and Latin American states while 
shaping the linguistic and religious patterns in the region.  Despite the shorter durations 
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of colonialism, the structural equivalence score between Japan and Korea was .991 out of 
1 in 2000.  The industrial infrastructure that the Japanese left in Korea, Taiwan, and 
China affected economic development in East Asia (Shin and Robinson 2001).   
 After opening Asian ports to foreign nations, the laws on the books allowed 
certain changes to take place in Asia. The transmission of new skills and technology 
evolved throughout the 19th century.  Even though new curricula were in place, 
educational opportunities were most available to those that were elites in the old regime.   
Treaties promoted Western law.  Newly trained lawyers sustained these ideas for law.  
Euro-centric bases of the legal profession spread as a process of elite reproduction 
(Dezalay and Garth 2010, S. Liu 2013).  Asian scholars avoided the syncretism of values.  
In Asia, the introduction of a distinct legal practice accumulated into a logic for 
economic, social, and political organization.   
 With bilateral treaties, the evolvement from loosely constructed asymmetric 
agreements towards symmetric legal partnerships (at least in the language of the treaties) 
emerged over time.  As Mahoney had noted, the convergence towards stability arrived 
when the dominant party disproportionately distributed resources to already powerful 
actors (Mahoney 2010, 16).  Unbalanced accumulation of wealth and resources reified 
themselves in global governance, especially for trade.  With law as a constant force, 
embracing its informal registers also accounted for the amount of discrepancies that were 
written into the early treatises of international law (Gong 1984).  As a practice, law 
became difficult to enforce as interpretation and governance evolved based on internal 
and external pressures.   
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 The cohesion of regions, especially after the advent of the European Union (EU), 
beckons how despite reciprocal language, coalitions based on geography help to achieve 
balance of power in the international system.  The EU’s stance on immigration, 
citizenship, and national identity are integral to the economic debates.  Treaties created 
the EU.  Similarly, treaties expanded global partnerships in trade and assimilated beliefs 
based on accepted standards for concepts such as human rights agreements.  The 
convergences towards agreeable standards for human rights, justice, and environmental 
responsibilities may require multiple wide-reaching treaties, but the medium for 
discourse among nation-states became available through treaties.  
  
 	  
	   J.M.	  Park	  258	  
APPENDIX 
TREATY CODEBOOK 2013 	  
1) Country  
Code 
Country Name 
JPN   Japan Japan 
KOR Korea 
USA United States 
GBR Great Britain 
ARG Argentine Confederation 
AUH Austria-Hungary 
BOL Bolivia 
Bulgaria Bulgaria 
BRA Brazil 
CHN China 
CHL Chile 
COL Colombia 
COS Costa Rica 
CUB Cuba 
DMK Denmark 
ECU Ecuador 
ElSalvador El Salvador 
FRA France 
HES Hesse 
ITA Italy 
MEX Mexico 
MON Monaco 
NED Netherlands 
Nicaragua Nicaragua 
PER Peru 
PAN Panama 
PAR Paraguay 
POR Portugal 
Romania Romania 
RUS Russia 
Siam Siam (Thailand) 
SPA Spain 
SWE_NOR Sweden-Norway 
SWI Switzerland 
TRI Tripoli (Barbary States) 
URU Uruguay 
VIE Vietnam (Kingdom of Annam) 
 
VARIABLE Descriptive Label  
2) Name Treaty Name 
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3) Year Year of the Treaty 
4) CCODE1 Signer Country number 1 
5) CCODE2 Signer Country number 2 
 
VARIABLE Descriptive Label  
6) Region Name of regional pairing 
<1> GPAS Great Powers and Asian States 
<2> EUR Intra Great Powers including the United States 
<3> ASIA Intra Asian States 
<4> GPPC Great Powers and the Postcolonial Latin American States 
<5> LAT Intra Postcolonial Latin American States 
<6> PCA Postcolonial Latin American States and Asian States 
<7> OTH Other treaties of interest 
 
7) DipPriv Diplomatic Privileges, including for commercial agents 
<1> Diplomatic privileges are reciprocal, i.e. diplomatic agents of ccode1 in  
ccode2 are like the diplomats of ccode2 in ccode1 AND diplomatic  
privileges are extended to nations friendly to contracting parties  
<2> Diplomatic agents will have full jurisdiction over their country's vessels 
and offices in the other country’s property 
 
8) ConRep Establishing Consular Representation, including commercial agents 
<1> Country code 1 (ccode1) will have consul in Country code 2 (ccode2) 
<2> Ccode2 will have consul in ccode1 
<3> Countries from both ccode1 and ccode2 will have representatives in the 
other’s country 
<4> Both sides will appoint consul for a specific diplomatic duty 
 
9) Relief Disaster, distress relief, shipwreck, rescue and other emergencies 
<1> Ccode1 may access ports of ccode2 during emergencies 
<2> Ccode2 may access ports of ccode1 during emergencies 
<3> Both countries will help the other during emergencies 
 
10) Clandtra Clandestine Trade 
<1> One country will seize the goods of the other if the other is trading 
clandestinely 
<2> Both countries seize goods of the other if trade was unauthorized; also 
noted if it was an attempt to suppress trade of certain goods 
 
11) Protprop Protection of Physical and Material Properties  
<1> Local authorities of either country (but not both) will protect citizens from 
the other country residing in it from arson, mobs, attacks, etc: 
A) citizens of ccode1 residing in ccode2 will have the protection of 
ccode2 officials in case of attacks                     
      OR 
B) Citizens of ccode2 residing in ccode1 will have the protection of 
ccode1 officials in case of attacks 
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<2> Local authorities from both countries agree to protect the property of 
foreigners who entered their country 
 
12) ETJ Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
<1> In criminal or commercial disputes, when persons must be tried for criminal 
activities, the citizens of either country (but not both) residing in other’s 
country will be tried by consul according to the laws of the country where 
the crime was committed: 
A) citizens of ccode1 residing in ccode2 will be tried by consul of 
ccode1 for crimes against ccode2 
      OR 
B) citizens of ccode2 residing in ccode1 will be tried by consul of 
ccode2 for crimes against ccode1 
<2> Citizens of either country residing in the other’s domain will be tried 
according to the laws of the alleged persons’ citizenship 
<3> Both sides will renounce the costs incurred in the arrest and maintenance of 
the person to be surrendered 
 
13) Reside Foreign Residence 
<1> Citizens of either country (but not both) should be permitted to reside, rent, 
purchase land, and build warehouses in other country 
<2> Citizens of both countries should be permitted to reside, rent, purchase 
land, and build warehouses in the other country 
 
14) Locauth Local Authority  
<1> Citizens of either country (but not both) in other country will be under the 
local authority of foreign country for  
<2> Citizens of both residing in the other's country will be under the other's 
local authority; also citizens of ccode1 in ccode2 and citizens of ccode2 in 
ccode1 will address grievances with local authorities 
<3> Local authorities will assist extradition proceedings and the return of 
deserters 
 
15) Opium Restrictions on the Opium trade 
<1> Neither country will sell opium to the other 
<2> Both parties agree to not sell opium to a third party 
<3> Ccode1 may sell opium to ccode2 after paying a tariff 
 
16) Terminate Right to Terminate the current treaty 
<1> Yes, either party can terminate the treaty 
<2> No, neither party may terminate the treaty 
 
17) Nextmeet Arranging a next meeting for the two parties 
<60> The terms of the treaty are good for 5 years 
<120>  The terms of the treaty are good for 10 years 
 
18) MFN Most-favored Nation Status 
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<1> One of the countries is granted MFN status 
<2> Both countries are granted MFN status 
 
19) Relig Religious freedoms, namely Christianity mentioned in the treaties 
<1> A) Treaty mentions both parties adherence to Christianity  
OR  
B) both parties allow for freedom religion to the citizens of the other 
where religions are not solely Christianity 
<2> Citizens of either (but not both) countries are allowed to practice their 
religion in the other’s country 
 
20) Studyabr Promote intellectual exchanges especially in learning languages 
<1> Citizens of either (but not both) countries are allowed to travel abroad to 
study the other’s language, culture, and technologies 
<2> Citizens of both are allowed to study in the other's country 
<3> Treaty mentions the use of translators, interpreters, or teachers but not 
training people abroad 
 
21) Lang The official languages used in the treaty 
<1> English in combination with Chinese 
<2> English in combination with Spanish 
<3> English in combination with Other language 
<4> Languages, including combinations, not including English or French 
<5> French 
 
22) sovergn The recognition of sovereignty 
<1> One country (but not both) recognize the sovereignty of the other 
<2> Both countries recognize the sovereignty of the other 
<3> One country (but not both) promise to relinquish rule over a third location 
or another location 
 
23) Port Establish treaty ports. The treaty specifies whether one or both 
countries would open up the ports 
<1> Specific treaty ports were named and were not reciprocal 
<2> Both countries would open up their respective ports for trading purposes 
<3> Less than 16 ports were open and may include ports of a third location 
 
24) Portname Names of the Ports open to the Other country 
 The name of the treaty port is typed in 
 
25) Fugitive Harboring fugitives 
<1> Citizens of one country (but not both) agree to relinquish known fugitives 
wanted by the other in violation with local laws  
<2> Both countries agree to send back fugitives to their native countries if found 
 
26) Armsale Sale of firearms or weapons  
<1> Both countries agree to prohibit the trade of goods deemed “contraband of 
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war”  
<2> A) Written permission of the importing country is needed for sale of 
arms 
            OR 
B) Written permission from the exporting country is needed for trade 
 
27) Article The number of articles in the treaty total 
 Raw number of treaties including supplements or rules attached to the 
article unless the supplement is signed at a different sitting 
 
28) Type The type of treaty 
<1> Peace including armistice treaties 
<2> Commerce and navigation 
<3> Friendship including Commerce and Amity, Friendship and General 
Intercourse 
<4> Extradition 
<5> Arbitrage 
<6> Delimitation, protectorate, annexation, and order treaties specific to 
territory gain or loss 
<7> Other treaties including Consular conventions, arbitration, diplomatic 
representations, public health, pilotage 
 
29) Histleg Historical legacy 
<1> The two countries mentioned attempt to correct past disagreements 
<2> The two countries reminded each other of longstanding history (neutral, 
positive or negative) with one another 
 
30) prevcon Previous legal arrangements prior to the treaty on hand 
<1> Laws from prior treaties are still valid 
<2> Laws from previous contracts are being updated or amended 
 
31) secure Securing commerce is a goal in the treaty 
<1> Both countries wish to secure commerce with one another 
<2> Both countries wish to secure commerce at a third location 
 
32) ratif Ratification time for the treaty in months 
<0.1> if it is to be done as soon as possible without any time specification 
<6> 6 months  
<12> 12 months 
 Any other duration are coded by months 
 
33) decade Binned decades of when the treaty was signed 
<1> 1783-1800 
<2> 1801-1820 
<3> 1821-1840 
<4> 1841-1860 
<5> 1861-1880 
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<6> 1881-1900 
<7> 1901-1912 
 
34) post-1885 Era when the treaty was signed, whether it was before or after 1885 
<1> 1783-1884 
<2> 1885-1912 
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